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Drawing on research and theory (discussed in Chapter 1) emphasising cognitive-
ecological interaction and sampling processes in judgment (e.g., Fiedler, 2000), the 
present research investigated the role of social sampling (Galesic, Olsson & Reiskamp, 
2012) in preferences for wealth redistribution. Two studies (Ch. 2) provide evidence 
that social sampling leads wealthier people to oppose redistributive policies. Wealthier 
participants reported higher levels of wealth in their social circles (Studies 1a and 1b) 
and, in turn, estimated wealthier population distributions, perceived the distribution as 
fairer and were more opposed to redistribution. Study 2 (Ch. 2), drawing data from a 
nationally representative survey, revealed that neighbourhood-level deprivation ± an 
objective index of social circle wealth ± mediated the relation between income and 
satisfaction with the economic status quo.  In Studies 3a and 3b (Ch. 3), participants 
experimentally presented with a low (high) wealth income sample subsequently 
estimated poorer (wealthier) population distributions, demonstrating reliance upon the 
novel samples. The effect of the manipulation on redistributive preferences was 
sequentially mediated via estimated population distributions and fairness, such that 
participants shown a high wealth sample estimated less unequal (3a) or wealthier (3b) 
distributions, perceived the distribution as fairer and were more opposed to 
redistribution. Studies 4a and 4b (Ch. 4) tested whether warning against social 
sampling, providing an alternative sample or both interventions together might serve to 
reduce social sampling. Whereas providing an alternative sample alone was sufficient to 
eliminate social sampling (4a and 4b), providing a warning had no effect (4a), and 
providing both an alternative sample and a warning lead to an increase in social 
sampling (4a and 4b). Taken together, the findings suggest that a) social sampling 
SURGXFHVV\VWHPDWLFGLIIHUHQFHVLQZHDOWKLHUDQGSRRUHUSHRSOHV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKH
income distribution, b) social sampling contributes to divergence in the economic 
2 
 
preferences of wealthy and poor and c) social sampling is likely immune to deliberate 























Economic inequality ± disparity in levels of wealth, income and consumption ± has 
increased markedly across developed nations over the past few decades, and presently 
stands at its highest level for the past half a century (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2011). A growing body of literature documents negative 
social, political and economic consequences of high levels of inequality. For example, 
in comparisons between developed nations, and between US states, Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2010) found that income inequality is strongly associated with reduced life 
expectancy, and greater prevalence of mental illness, infant mortality, homicides and 
imprisonment rates. In the economic domain, analyses conducted by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF; 2011) found that lesser inequality is associated with more stable 
and enduring economic growth, and explains more variance in the longevity of growth 
spells than freedom of trade, government corruption, or levels of foreign investment and 
debt. In the political domain, inequality is associated with greater polarisation amongst 
both political elites and electorates (Garand, 2010; McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, 2003, 
2006). Furthermore, theorists have argued that economic inequality translates into 
political inequality, serving to distort the democratic process (Dahl, 2006; Gilens, 
2005). Political gridlock, rent seeking amongst wealthy individuals and business, and 
reduced electoral turnout amongst poorer sections of society partly explain why 
majoritarian electoral systems have apparently done little to limit rising inequality 
(Bonica, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, 2012). Research also suggests that, in parallel 
with rising inequality, tax policies in developed nations have tended to become 
increasingly less progressive since the 1960s, potentially both a cause and consequence 
of inequality (Piketty & Saez, 2006).     
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 Correspondingly, various organisations, political actors and theorists have 
stressed the importance of enacting policy measures, such as redistribution via 
progressive tax and transfer mechanisms, to reduce historically high levels of inequality 
(e.g., IMF, 2011; OECD, 2011; Piketty, 2014). President Obama, for example, recently 
stressed the importance of building bipartisan consensus on tackling income inequality 
in the 2015 State of The Union Address (Reuters, 2015). Research and theory, however, 
suggests that building consensus around reducing inequality, and around the means 
employed to reduce it, is likely to be a difficult and complex task. Notably, attitudes 
toward inequality diverge strongly as result of ideological preferences, as well as due to 
the differing material interests of poorer and wealthier individuals (Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Sears & 
Funk, 1991).    
Although people often view equality as an important justice principle in the 
abstract (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Rawls, 1971), research demonstrates important individual 
and situational differences in attitudes toward inequality. Theoretical perspectives in 
political psychology place a strong emphasis upon the role played by motivational 
processes and individual differences in ideologies, in determining such attitudes. For 
example, attitudes toward inequality differ between politically right and left-leaning 
individuals, and relative opposition to equality appears to be a core feature of 
conservative ideology (Giddens, 1998; Jost et al., 2003). A further defining feature of 
conservatism is resistance to change and a desire to preserve the prevailing social order 
(Connover & Feldman, 1981; Jost et al., 2003). As such, conservatives are inclined to 
maintain social arrangements, structures and authorities that maintain and perpetuate 
inequality (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009; Jost et al., 2003).  
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Much theorising in political psychology emphasises the role of motivated social 
cognition, suggesting that people adopt conservative, anti-egalitarian political 
ideologies as a means of satisfying certain epistemic and existential needs related to the 
management of uncertainty and fear (Jost, et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Napier, 
Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai & Ostafin, 2007; Kruglanski, 1996). This reasoning is 
supported by research demonstrating associations between conservatism and intolerance 
of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1954), and higher needs for order, closure and 
structure (Altemeyer, 1998; Jost et al., 2007; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Conservatives, compared to liberals, also perceive that the world is more threatening 
and dangerous (Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2007). Conservative ideology also serves an 
apparent a palliative function by providing a buffer against the negative hedonistic 
consequences of economic inequality, partly explaining greater happiness and 
subjective wellbeing amongst conservatives compared to liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008).   
Relatedly, system justification theory also stresses the motivational basis of anti-
egalitarian political attitudes, suggesting that people are generally motivated to justify 
prevailing social systems and arrangements that serve to perpetuate inequality (Jost, 
1995; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Kay & Zanna, 2009). Drawing on cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and just-world theory (Lerner, 1980), system 
justification theory suggests that people are motivated to rationalise the social 
arrangements to which they are unavoidably subjected as fair, just and legitimate, and 
further, that it is psychologically adaptive to do so (Jost & Hunyady, 2003). System 
justification can explain why people often hold beliefs that are seemingly at odds with 
their interests, such as anti-egalitarian political beliefs or outgroup-favouring 
VWHUHRW\SHVHJRIWKH³GHVHUYLQJULFK´DQG³XQGHVHUYLQJSRRU´DPRQJVWORZ-income 
individuals (Jost, 2001; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003).   
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Other theories in political psychology, such as social dominance theory, have 
emphasised the role that socio-political processes play in giving rise to belief systems 
that serve to  maintain inequality (Pratto, 1999, Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1993). Social dominance theory suggests that societies strive to maintain order and 
reduce intergroup conflict by developing ideologies that legitimise hierarchies of power, 
status and wealth (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This involves the propagation of 
³OHJLWLPLVLQJP\WKV´which are shared cultural beliefs that justify the hegemony of 
some groups over others, via claims to paternalistic duty, mutual benefit or divine right 
(Sidanius, 1993). Social dominance orientation, GHILQHGDVLQGLYLGXDOV¶ preference for 
group-based inequality, is associated with endorsement of beliefs and attitudes which 
underpin support for economic inequality, such as belief in meritocracy and economic 
conservatism (Pratto et al., 1994). 
Current theory in political psychology tends to emphasise the intra-psychic, 
motivational XQGHUSLQQLQJVRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGLQHTXDOLW\6XFKDFFRXQWV
suggest that political beliefs generally are a reflection of opaque existential, epistemic 
and group-based motivations, and are adopted and maintained in the service of 
satisfying these needs and motives. Broadly, this motivated social-cognitive perspective 
implies that motives influence beliefs and attitudes by imposing selectivity upon 
information search, attention, processing and recall (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Frey, 1986; 
Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1987). This renders political cognition a constructive process, 
allowing the same social and political reality to be construed differently across people 
and situations, in accordance with extant goals and motives. Anti-egalitarian political 
attitudes are assumed to reflect motivated attempts to fend off uncertainty or fear in the 
face of threat (Jost et al., 2003), rationalise inescapable social arrangements that are 




Crucially, the locus of these tendencies lies inside the mind ± political attitudes are 
assumed to reflect the top-down, goal directed operation of psychological processes.  
In a departure from theories emphasising the top-down, intra-psychic 
determinants of political attitudes, the present research proposes a novel approach which 
highlights the importance of bottom-up (i.e., stimulus driven), ecological processes, in 
addition to psychological processes, in determining attitudes toward inequality. The 
present work draws upon theorising in the domain of judgment and decision making 
which highlights processes of cognitive-ecological interaction (e.g., Fiedler, 2000; 
Fiedler & Wänke, 2009). Echoing theorists such as Brunswik (1955), Lewin (1951) and 
Simon (1982), this perspective emphasises the importance of understanding the 
ecological input that impinges upon the mind, in pursuing understanding of the mind 
itself. It assumes that human judgment is relatively sensitive to the statistical properties 
of environments (e.g., event frequency). Further, it assumes that input from the 
environment is often selective and systematic, irrespective of motivational influences or 
cognitive shortcomings (Fiedler, 2000; Simon, 1982). Hence the organisation of 
information in the external environment, in tandem with the sampling processes by 
which information is acquired from it, serve to shape knowledge of the external world 
in a systematic and often biased manner. The present research proposes to investigate, 
specifically, the role that such sampling processes play in shaping perceptions of the 
wealth distribution, and the consequences that this may entail for attitudes toward this 
distribution. 
1.1.2. Organisation of the Chapter 
The following section discusses the evolution of probability theory during the 
Enlightenment, which provides the historical and philosophical context for 
contemporary theorising on the nature of knowledge acquisition and belief, and debates 
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regarding human rationality. The subsequent section introduces the notion of frequency 
learning, and competing theories of estimation which describe how humans make 
quantitative judgments about the external world. Whereas some perspectives 
optimistically suggest that human belief and judgment reflects the laws of probability 
and statistics (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Peterson & Beach, 1967), other perspectives 
instead emphasise the constructive, irrational and bias-prone nature of cognitive 
processes (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). The following section discusses 
these divergent perspectives in the context of debates regarding human rationality. It 
also addresses theorising in contemporary social psychology in relation to rationality, 
highlighting particularly how the notion of bias within social psychology is construed 
primarily in terms of intrapsychic processes. The next section introduces the cognitive-
ecological approach, which serves as a counterpoint to theories implying that human 
MXGJHPHQWLVHLWKHU³XQERXQGHGO\´UDWLRQDORUKRSHOHVVO\LUUDWLRQDODQGHUURUSURQH
This approach, emphasising the role of sampling processes, demonstrates how biased 
judgment need not stem from biased cognitive processes, and is often parsimoniously 
explained in terms of biased environmental input. The penultimate section discusses 
how a cognitive-ecological approach might apply to social and political-psychological 
phenomena and outlines in brief how such processes may serve to influence attitudes 
toward inequality. The final section summarises the present chapter, and briefly 
describes the research reported in the subsequent chapters. 
1.2. The Twilight of Probability: The Emergence of Probability Theory and 
Enlightenment Notions of Human Rationality 
The notion that the human mind is attuned to natural frequencies has a long and 
nuanced history dating back to the Enlightenment, and is grounded in the interplay 
between the theories of mind proposed by scholars such as David Hume (1738) and 
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Richard Hartley (1749) on the one side, and classical probability theory emerging 
originally from the correspondence between Pierre de Fermat and Blaise Pascal in 1654, 
on the other. Historical treatments have argued that the classical interpretation of 
probability that emerged during the 17th and 18th century was of a contradictory or 
³-DQXVIDFHG´FKDUDFWHU (Gigerenzer, 1994; Hacking, 1975). One face was materialist, 
concerned with objective, observable frequencies, such as co-occurrence between 
comets and the death of kings, or between the presence of fever and disease. The other 
was epistemic, concerned with subjective probabilities and degrees of, or the 
³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV´RIEHOLHI.  In contemporary interpretations of probability, objective 
probability is that associated with random physical systems, such as roulette wheels or 
coin tosses, which yield stable outcomes at a persistent rate over long-run series of 
observations. Subjective probability, on the other hand, can be assigned to any 
statement to represent the extent to which a proposition is supported by available 
evidence, and is formally represented DVWKHSRVWHULRUSUREDELOLW\DVVLJQHGYLD%D\HV¶
theorem. Whereas objective probability is concerned with the true, physical tendency of 
a given event to occur, subjective probability refers instead to strength of belief as 
warranted by prior experience.    
Although the dichotomy between subjective and objective probability is familiar 
to, and well established in, present-day interpretations (e.g., in the distinction between 
subjectivist Bayesian inference vs. the frequentist Neyman-Pearson approach to 
hypothesis testing), this was not the state of affairs during the early evolution of 
probability theory in the 17th and early 18th century. As Gigerenzer (1994) notes, a 
puzzle exists insofar as the Enlightenment probabilists showed little acknowledgement 
of the dichotomy between subjective and objective interpretations of probability, 
vacillating unperturbed between these different meanings.  
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According to Daston (1988), the explanation for this inconsistency can be found 
in the close relationship between probability theory and the associationist psychology of 
the era. Daston argues that the classical probabilists were able to reconcile the 
inconsistencies between the subjective and objective faces of probability by recourse to 
the theories of mind proposed by Locke, Hartley and Hume. Both Locke and Hume 
believed that the mind is highly attuned to frequencies of events, unconsciously and 
automatically tallying frequencies and apportioning degrees of belief accordingly. In 
+XPH¶VYLHZSUREDELOLVWLFWKLQNLng is synonymous with rationality, or 
³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV´LQWKHparlance of the time. David Hartley (1749) went a step further, 
FRPELQLQJ/RFNH¶VLGHDVZLWK1HZWRQ¶VSK\VLRORJLFDOWKHRU\RQWKHYLEUDWRU\EDVLVRI
sensations, explicitly linking the laws of the mind with the laws of mathematical 
SUREDELOLW\,Q+DUWOH\¶VYLHZUHSHDWHGDVVRFLDWLRQVSURGXFHFHUHEUDOYLEUDWLRQVZKLFK
with repetition, imprint grooves of mental habit onto the surface of the brain. According 
to Hartley, this physical mapping of frequency information onto the brain allows human 
judgment to imitate the law of large numbers; given a sufficient number of 
observations, belief will approximate the true likelihood of a given event.  
In the early nineteenth century, then, probability and human reasoning were 
understood as two sides of the same coin; the laws of classical probability were 
grounded in Enlightenment theories of human reasoning, and the psychological theories 
of Hume and others invoked probability theory to describe the mechanics of reasoning. 
Associationist psychology enabled the classical probabilists to blend subjective degrees 
of belief and objective, observed frequencies, and probability theory provided 
associationist psychology a normative standard by which to describe and evaluate 
reasoning. A strict distinction between beliefs and frequencies was not required by the 
Enlightenment thinkers because probabilities were understood to be inherently 
subjective in nature, an emergent feature of human experience with the world as 
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opposed to a property of the physical world itself. Given the assumption, widely held by 
the Empiricists, that the world is deterministic, an omniscient, all-knowing being such 
DV*RGRU/DSODFH¶VVHFXODULVHGGHPRQFRXOGGLVSHQVHZLWKSUREDELOLW\DOWRJHWKHU, as it 
could directly know the laws of nature. Human beings, on the other hand, are bounded 
in their knowledge by the constraints of time, space and cognitive capacity and, as 
argued by Locke (1689), are thus condemned to live in the twilight of probability, 
drawing inferences on the basis of limited experience.  
In the view of the Empiricists, then, reasoning by probabilities was to be 
considered rational insofar as probabilities are built upon, and reflective of, objective, 
real-world frequencies. Given human beings arbitrarily limited knowledge of the world, 
probability represented the best option available to mere mortal beings, and thus the 
Empiricists considered reasoning according to the laws of probability as the de-facto 
standard of rationality. Insofar as the biasing effects of passion and interest could be 
controlled, human judgement could conceivably approximate that of a Laplacean demon 
by applying the laws probability and statistics. 
But such an optimistic view of human reasoning was not set to endure. 
Historical accounts (e.g., Daston, 1988) suggest that the French revolution and its 
aftermath undermined the confidence of the 18th century intellectual and political elites 
in the notion of a shared standard of reasonableness. Psychological theories 
guaranteeing the apportioning of frequencies to degrees of reasonable belief soon gave 
way to theories emphasising, instead, the illusory nature of human belief. Etienne de 
Condillac (1754) expressed doubt concerning the link between frequency and belief 
postulated by Hume and others, pointing to the disruptive influence of needs, wants and 
temperament on human judgement. Such pathologies were argued to influence how the 
mind distributes attention, and as a consequence, the organisation of experience 
12 
 
(Daston, 1988). The notion of correspondence between objective frequency and 
subjective belief fell from favour, and in 1837, the mathematician Siméon-Denis 
Poisson became the first to explicitly distinguish in print between the subjective and 
objective meanings of probability.          
1.3. Theories of Frequency Learning and Estimation 
Darwin (1872/1965) noted that people use facial cues, such as wavering eyes or low-
hanging lids, to make an inference as to another person¶s guilt. Male cane toads use the 
pitch of a rival¶s croak to infer its likely size and decide whether to fight or flee (Krebs 
& Davies, 1987). Indeed, the capacity to make inductive inferences about unknown 
aspects of the external world has been demonstrated in various species, from insects to 
birds to mammals (for a review, see Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005).  This capacity is 
assumed in models employing Bayes¶ theorem to describe hunting and foraging 
behaviour in nonhuman animals (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). These models describe how 
animals make use of the statistical properties of the environment in maximizing the 
efficiency of hunting and gathering behaviour, and consequently, their survival.  
(FRORJLFDODQDO\VHVRI³RSWLPDOIRUDJLQJ´provide a rational analysis of animal 
behaviour grounded in the evolutionary assumption that an organism should strive to 
maximize its rate of energy intake rather than simply consuming all the available food 
in a particular area, and should target sources of food that provide the greatest returns 
(for reviews see Pyke, 1984; Pyke, Pulliam & Charnov, 1977). According to optimal 
foraging theory, an organism will only attempt to acquire a food item if the calorific 
return per unit time is greater than the return obtainable by continuing to search for 
another item. In order for prey or foraging locations to be ranked and prioritised 
according to net return, they must first be classified according to their statistically 
distinct return-rates (time spent in pursuit and processing) and encounter rates (per-unit 
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search time). Optimal foraging thus functionally relates food choice and search 
strategies WRRUJDQLVPV¶ILWQHVVYLDWKHDELOLW\ to suitably adapt behaviour to the 
statistical properties of the environment, in such a way that maximizes energy 
consumption and minimizes energy expenditure.  
Optimal foraging theory has been primarily applied to the analysis of animal 
behaviour, for example in identifying when, rationally, a bird should stop feeding in one 
tree and move to another, or why a bear may favour hunting salmon over other prey. 
Some research does indeed suggest that human behaviour may follow similar patterns 
(e.g., Hutchinson, Wilke & Todd, 2008; Pirolli, 2007). For example, the anthropologist 
Alden-Smith (1991; cited in Hertwig, Hoffrage & Martignon, 1999) argues that a 
³FRQWLQJHQF\SUH\´PRGHOEHVW explains why Inajjuamiut eskimos in Canada undertake 
dangerous and time-consuming Beluga whale hunts rather than pursuing easier prey 
such as ducks or seals. Cane, Clark and Mitroff (2012) extended the logic of optimal 
foraging theory to the domain of visual search. In line with the predictions of the theory, 
participants adjusted search times to account for expectations regarding target 
prevalence and adjusted expectations on-line to account for the higher order, inter-trial 
target distributions. In short, participants spent relatively more or less time searching for 
a target, depending on the frequency at which it occurred across previous trials.   
 Whether applied to humans or the most rudimentary of animals, it is a 
prerequisite of optimal foraging models that organisms possess a cognitive mechanism 
for monitoring and learning environmental frequencies and are able to effectively adapt 
behaviour to best exploit this statistical structure. These models imply that both humans 
and animals behave like ³intuitive statisticians´%UXQVZLN55; Peterson & Beach, 
1967), learning and updating probabilities on the basis of frequency information 
sampled from the environment and adjusting behaviour accordingly. Theoretical 
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assumptions aside, what is the evidence that humans, specifically, do indeed possess 
such a capacity for learning frequencies and if so, how might it operate? The following 
sections review prior research on quantitative estimation, focusing on how people make 
frequency estimates of events such as objects, people or episodes. Following the 
taxonomy employed by Hertwig, Hoffrage, and Martignon (1999), a distinction is 
employed between two broad classes of estimation mechanisms, specifically, estimation 
by direct retrieval versus estimation by inference. 
1.3.2. Estimation by Direct Retrieval 
Enlightenment theories of mind assumed that human beings possess a mechanism for 
frequency learning, automatically and unconsciously tallying frequencies of events and 
deriving degrees of belief accordingly,Q+XPH¶s (1738, p. 141YLHZ³:KHQWKH
chances or experiments on one side amount to ten thousand, and on the other to ten 
thousand and one, the judgement gives preference to the latter, upon account of that 
VXSHULRULW\´. Indeed, a body of evidence is supportive of the notion that humans are 
attuned to frequency information, although in light of contemporary evidence, +XPH¶V
position appears slightly over-optimistic concerning the sensitivity of this mechanism. 
Nevertheless, numerous studies report that humans can learn and estimate frequencies 
with reasonable accuracy (e.g., Barsalou & Ross, 1986; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 
Hintzmann & Block, 1972; Jonides & Jones, 1992). Shedler, Jonides and Manis (1985), 
for example, asked participants to estimate the number of restaurants in various fast 
food chains and found that these estimates were closely related to the actual number of 
extant outlets. Participants have also been shown to make fairly accurate judgements of 
the frequency of experimentally presented stimuli (e.g., Hintzmann, 1969), and 
judgements of the frequency of real-world events such as single words (Shapiro, 1969), 
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single letters (Attneave, 1953) and pairs of letters (Underwood, 1971) that correlate with 
their objective relative frequency of occurrence.  
Like Hume (1739), Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984) assume that individuals store 
a fine-grained count of frequency information and directly access this count from 
memory when required to make a quantitative estimate of a given property. In their 
view, people¶VDELOLW\ to make reasonably accurate frequency judgements about events 
as mundane and meaningless as bigrams (letter pairs) suggests that frequency learning 
is likely an automatic process and hence requires little or no attentional capacity. 
Frequency learning also bears several other hallmarks of automaticity. For example, 
sensitivity to frequency does not improve with either task practice or explicit feedback 
on the accuracy of judgements, and develops at an early age showing no subsequent 
improvement in later life (Hasher & Chromiak, 1977). From this perspective, frequency 
is one of the few attributes of stimuli that is encoded automatically (others include 
spatial location, temporal information and word meaning), although the notion of 
automaticity in frequency learning is not uncontroversial (see Barsalou, 1992). 
Nevertheless, there appears to be broad agreement with the general conclusion that 
people possess some capacity to learn domain-specific frequency information and can 
generate reasonably accurate estimates from this information when required (Hertwig, 
Hoffrage & Martignon, 1999).  
1.3.3. Estimation by Inference       
In contrast to the notion that people can directly access a more-or-less accurate count of 
actual events in a class, an opposing group of theories suggest that it is not the actual 
events themselves that are retrieved from memory during estimation (Brunswik, 1952, 
1955; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Rather, these approaches contend that 
frequencies are inferred from the value of cues that are related to the to-be-estimated 
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event. For example, an inference about the relative population size of different cities 
could be made by reference to the sense of familiarity elicited by the names of those 
cities, following the logic that cities with which one is familiar (vs. unfamiliar) are 
likely larger and more populous (Hertwig, Hoffrage & Martignon, 1999). Similarly, one 
could make an inference about SHRSOH¶VUHODWLYH income ranking by considering the 
clothes they wear, the cars they drive or the neighbourhood in which they live. Note that 
these two examples are not equivalent. Estimation in the first example relies upon a 
subjective cue (familiarity), whereas the latter relies on an ecological (environmental) 
cue or cues. This distinction divides estimation by inference theories into two classes, 
one specifically emphasising the role of heuristics, and the other ecological cues, in 
quantitative estimation.  
Heuristics 
Research within the heuristics and biases framework initiated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973, 1974) suggests that people use a set of general purpose heuristics 
such as availability, representativeness and anchoring in estimating quantitative 
properties. In a now classic study, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked participants to 
judge whether each of five consonants appears more frequently in either the first or third 
position of words in the English language. Although all letters presented are more 
common in the third position, two-thirds of participants judged the first position to be 
more likely for the majority of presented letters.  
 According to Tversky and Kahneman, biases of this kind in quantitative 
estimates can be accounted for by the availability heuristic. According to availability, 
estimates of frequency reflect the number of instances that can be readily brought to 
mind)RUH[DPSOHLQMXGJLQJZKHWKHUWKHOHWWHU³5´LVPRUHFRPPRQLQWKHILUVWRU
third letter position, a person can draw samples RIZRUGVWKDWKDYH³5´LQWKHILUVWDQG
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third position from memory, or assess the ease with which such a sample could be 
drawn, and make an estimate based on the sample statistics or perceived ease of 
sampling. Samples, however, may not be representative of a population, for example if 
it is easier to recall words with a specific letter in the first rather than third position, thus 
leading to systematic biases in people¶s estimates. The availability cue is subjective 
rather than ecological because the relationship between the sample and the criterion can 
only be evaluated with respect to the sample drawn by any one particular individual.  
 In support of this perspective, a large body of research shows that real-world 
quantitative estimates are often biased in the direction predicted by availability and 
other heuristics. For example, people estimate that better publicised causes of death, 
such as accidents, are more probable than less publicised but more frequent causes, such 
as strokes (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman & Coombs, 1978; Slovic, Fischoff & 
Lichtenstein, 1982), and that self-rated knowledge of countries is strongly correlated 
with estimates of population size (Brown & Siegler, 1992). 
Ecological cues 
Brunswik (1952, 1955) observed that environmental objects or events are often not in 
immediate contact with the subject, and hence these distal properties must be inferred 
on the basis of available proximal cues. For example, object size (in the absence of a 
tape measure), must be inferred from proximal cues indicating distance, and projected 
video size on the retina. According to Brunswik, WKHHQYLURQPHQWUHSUHVHQWVD³FDXsal 
WH[WXUH´LQZKLFKSUR[LPDOFXHVDQGGLVWDOHYHQWVare regularly, but not invariably, 
linked together. Because these causal linkages are not absolutely invariant, they entail 
some degree of uncertainty as to their correspondence. Thus the relationship between 
proximal cues and distal events is necessarily probabilistic. As such, not all cues are 
created equal; different cues vary in the extent to which they facilitate successful 
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estimationRU³DFKLHYHPHQW´ of a given distal property, and intercorrelation leads to 
redundancy between overlapping cues. ,Q%UXQVZLN¶VWHUPLQRORJ\FXHVYDU\LQWHUPV
RIWKHLU³HFRORJLFDOYDOLGLW\´WKDWLVin their degree of correlation with a distal variable 
to which they relate. In estimating a given real-world quantity, the task of the organism 
is to make an inference based on the cue or cues that have the strongest relationship 
with the estimated event, the most ecologically valid cues.  
In this view, then, event frequencies themselves are not stored and directly 
accessed during estimation. Rather, a set of related proximal cues and information as to 
their corresponding cue validities are stored in and retrieved from memory. This is 
arguably a less cognitively demanding process, in that it requires the storage and 
retrieval of only the discrete correlations between proximal cues and distal events, as 
opposed to the storage and retrieval of a complete tally of discrete events themselves. 
This reduces the need to store vast amounts of frequency information in memory, and 
consequently, for extensive memory search during estimation. Theories of inference via 
ecological cues, and via direct retrieval, however, share an important similarity: both 
processes require that people accurately perceive event frequencies and their co-
occurrences to enable either later retrieval from memory, or so that cue validities may 
be learned and updated.  
1.3.4. Heuristics versus Frequencies 
The preceding discussion highlights a clear contradiction in the research findings and 
theoretical assumptions derived from direct theories of quantitative estimation versus 
heuristics. On the one hand, Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984) and others argue, and 
provide evidence to show, that people store a frequency count of experienced events and 
access this count when estimation is required. Jonides and Jones (1992, p368) 
summarised these findings as follows: ³$VNDERXWWKHUHODWLYHQXPEHUVRIPDQ\NLQGV
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of events, and you are likely to get answers that reflect the actual relative frequencies of 
the events with great fidelity´. On the other hand, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) do not 
assume that people store a count of frequencies, but rather construct a sample of an 
event ad-hoc and infer frequencies from the sense of ease with which the sample could 
be constructed. Contrary to the advocates of direct retrieval, they interpret their findings 
to be indicative of systematic biases in human judgement. Brown and Siegler (1993, p. 
511) draw attention to this paradox, noting that:  
³>«@research has not culminated in any theory of estimation, not even in a 
coherent framework for thinking about the process. This gap is reflected in 
the strangely bifurcated nature of the research in the area. Research on 
heuristics does not indicate when, if ever, estimation is also influenced by 
domain-specific knowledge; research on domain specific knowledge does 
not indicate when, if ever, estimation is also influenced by heuristics´  
 The tension between these two perspectives ±frequency learning versus 
inference by heuristics ± cannot be easily resolved by assuming that they apply under 
different circumstances. Conceivably, quantitative estimates may rely upon stored 
frequencies when the relevant events have been experienced and stored in memory, and 
rely on inference from subjective cues when relevant domain-specific knowledge is 
unavailable. Tversky and Kahneman (1973), however, also report experiments in which 
participants sequentially experienced series of events. For example, in one study 
participants were serially presented with a list of names, including those of well-known 
celebrities of either gender, and were required to judge whether the list included more 
men or women. Participants erroneously judged the class (men/women) containing the 
higher proportion of famous names to be more frequent. In a further study, participants 
were serially presented with word pairs that were either highly (phonetically or 
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semantically) related, or unrelated. Although related and unrelated word pairs were 
presented with the same frequency, participants judged related pairs to have appeared 
more frequently during presentation than unrelated pairs. Both studies imply that 
availability applies to directly experienced events as well as events that have not been 
directly experienced and must necessarily be inferred from available cues.           
1.4. Competing Visions of Rationality? 
The theories of Hume and his 20th century intellectual descendants appear to paint a 
very different picture of human reasoning capacities than that arising from the heuristics 
and biases literature. For the Empiricists and, to a lesser degree, the advocates of direct 
retrieval mechanisms such as Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1984), the laws of human 
inference are assumed to reflect the laws of probability and statistics. Much 
contemporary research in psychology, economics and behavioural ecology has been 
grounded in the assumption that statistical tools provide both a normative benchmark 
and a descriptive model of human (and animal) inference. In the 1960s, early research in 
WKHGRPDLQRIMXGJPHQWDQGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJXVLQJ³ERRNEDJV´DQG³SRNHUFKLSV´LH
bags with varying proportions of different coloured chips from which participants drew 
samples) compared participaQWV¶UHYLVLRQRIEHOLHIVLQUHVSRQVHWRUHSHDWHGVDPSOLQJ
DJDLQVWWKHQRUPDWLYHSUHVFULSWLRQVVSHFLILHGE\%D\HV¶UXOH (Peterson & Beach, 1967; 
Peterson & Miller, 1964; Ulehla, 1966). Despite some systematic deviations from 
normative prescriptions (e.g., conservatism in the updating of beliefs), this research 
broadly suggested that people respond in qualitatively appropriate ways to new 
evidence (Hahn & Harris, 2014). 'UDZLQJRQ%UXQVZLN¶V55) metaphor, researchers 
likened human reasoning capacities to those of an intuitive statistician; the laws of 
probability and statistics were concluded to provide a good approximation of inference 
processes in humans (e.g., Peterson & Beach, 1967). Elsewhere, %D\HV¶WKHRUHPhas 
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been employed to model the hunting and foraging behaviour of animals (Stephens & 
Krebs, 1986), human memory processes (Anderson, 1990) and economic behaviour 
(Harsanyi, 1967). Such theories characterised by the notion of the intuitive statistician 
embody a highly optimistic view in which judgement is considered to be unboundedly 
rational (see Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), that is, constrained only by limitations on 
information available in the context of judgement.  
Research in the heuristics and biases tradition, on the other hand, points to a 
very different and considerably less optimistic conclusion: that human inference is 
systematically biased and error proneDQGIXQFWLRQVWKURXJKWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI³TXLFN
DQGGLUW\´KHXULVWLFVrather than the laws of probability (Kahneman, Tversky & Slovic, 
1982). On first glance, this perspective is diametrically opposed to accounts 
emphasising the probabilistic and statistical nature of human judgment, highlighting 
instead an inherent irrationality. This appearance is, however, misleading since both 
perspectives employ the same normative standard, stemming from the classical view 
held by Locke, Hume and others, which equates rationality with the laws of probability 
and statistics. In both traditions, error is defined as a departure in reasoning from the 
dictates of classical rationality, as epitomised by phenomena such as availability 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), base-rate neglect (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Tversky & 
Khaneman, 1981) or the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), within 
heuristics and biases research. In short, both views accept the laws of probability and 
statistics as an appropriate normative benchmark for rational inference although they 
disagree as to whether humans can live up to this standard (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). 
Much research has been conducted to examine the validity of these two 
perspectives, identifying conditions under which reasoning either adheres to, or departs 
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from, this standard. But how realistic is such a benchmark?  And what does this 
research tell us about human judgment as it occurs in complex, ill-defined, real-world 
environments, as opposed to the well-defined and highly controlled laboratory setting? 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996, p. 2) argue that the prospects do not look promising 
from either perspective:  
³,IRQHZRXOGDSSO\WKHFODVVLFDOYLHZWRVXFKFRPSOH[UHDO-world 
environments, this would suggest that the mind is a supercalculator like a 
Laplacean Demon (Wimsatt, 1976) ± carrying around the collected works of 
Kolmogoroff, Fisher or Neyman [...] On the other hand, the heuristics and 
biases view of human irrationality would lead us to believe that humans are 
hopelessly lost in the face of real-ZRUOGFRPSOH[LW\´   
The implication is that neither view provides a fair, ecologically valid representation of 
human reasoning capacities. Whereas the classical view holds seemingly unrealistic 
expectations about the computational capacities of the human mind, heuristics and 
biases research equates deviations from this very same unrealistic standard with poor 
judgement in the real-world. 
)XQGHUKLJKOLJKWVDQLPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHQRWLRQRI³HUURU´
DQGWKHQRWLRQRID³PLVWDNH´,QSV\FKRORJ\WKHWHUPHUURULVXVHGLQDWHFKQLFDOUDWKHU
than an evaluative sense, denoting the deviation of a response from an objectively 
defined standard, such as a population or sample mean, a predictive model or Bayesian 
rules of inference. Errors reflect misjudgements of well-defined artificial stimuli which 
depart from a given normative model (e.g., Bayes theorem). Theories of direct retrieval, 
and the heuristics and biases perspective, are both grounded firmly in the study of error 
as defined in this way. Phenomena such as conservatism or base-rate neglect, for 
example, are defined completely by departures in judgment from the normative 
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prescriptions of classical rationality ± the laws of probability and statistics ± which 
provides unambiguously ³true´ answers to the kind of judgment problems frequently 
studied in the laboratory.  
A mistake, on the other hand, can be defined as a misjudgement of a poorly 
defined, real-world stimulus that may entail tangible consequences for the organism, 
and, ³$OWKRXJKLWLVUHODWLYHO\HDV\WRGHWHFWDQHUURUEHFDXVHWKHQDWXUHRIWKHVWLPXOXV
is known and the normative judgement of it can be modelled with some certainty, it is 
much more difficult to determine that a judgement, perhaps even the same judgement, is 
DOVRDPLVWDNHEHFDXVHWKHFULWHULDPXVWEHEURDGHUDQGORFDWHGLQWKHUHDOZRUOG´
(Funder, 1987, p. 78). Although errors may reveal important information about the 
processes by which judgments are made, such as whether these processes cohere to the 
classical model of rationality, they do not necessarily tell us about the accuracy or utility 
of judgment as it occurs in the real-world (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995; Funder, 1987).  
Funder (1987) provides an example from the domain of perceptual constancy 
that serves to illuminate this point. Consider the Ponzo illusion (Figure 1.1); the lower 
horizontal line appears, incorrectly, to be longer than the upper line. Outside the 
laboratory, however, perception would almost always be correct; objects near the 
horizon that produce an equivalent retinal image to nearer objects are genuinely larger. 
If the criterion for accuracy in the Ponzo illusion is taken to be the literal length of the 
two dimensional lines as printed on the page, then judging the lines to be non-equivalent 
is an error. If, however, the figure is considered a representation of three dimensional 
space, then the two lines could indeed be non-equivalent. Furthermore, if the image 
were substituted for a photograph shot along a railroad track, then the two objects (if not 




Figure 1.1  
 
An example of the Ponzo illusion, first demonstrated by Mario Ponzo in 1911. 
 
Such illusions may be useful insofar as they tell us something about how 
different cues are used in maintaining perceptual constancy, but perceptual errors in the 
context of visual illusions do not imply perceptual mistakes in the real world. In order to 
make informed statements about the accuracy of visual perception, it must be evaluated 
with respect to the real world contexts and stimuli upon which it is adapted to function, 
rather than the engaging but zero-stakes realm of visual illusion paradigms.  
A similar argument has been made in regards to the study of human judgment by 
Savage (1954), who GUDZVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³VPDOOZRUOGV´ (e.g., monetary 
gambles, the ultimatum game, neoclassical economic models) in which all relevant 
DOWHUQDWLYHVFRQVHTXHQFHVDQGWKHLUSUREDELOLWLHVDUHNQRZQDQG³ODUJHZRUOGV´LQ
which some of the relevant information is missing or must be estimated from samples. 
Small worlds are certain and, like visual illusions, contain all the necessary information 
to determine an optimal, rational solution to a given problem. These conditions, 
however, rarely hold in the large, uncertain, complex world in which people live their 
day-to-day lives and, consequently, nor do the requirements (e.g., complete and 
unbiased information) of classical rationality.  
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Cognitive limitations aside, this observation calls into question the assumption 
that everyday human reasoning can ever live up to the dictates of classical rationality, 
either descriptively or normatively, since the input to cognitive processes is constrained 
and shaped by the environment. If classical rationality represents an ideal that will 
generally be unobtainable in practice, then asking whether and to what extent judgment 
coheres to such a standard is perhaps not the most informative question to ask if the 
goal is to understand how, and how well, reasoning functions in the real world. In this 
vein, Simon (1989, p. 377) poses a rather different question, namely ³+RZGRKXPDQ
beings reason when the conditions for rationality postulated by the model of 
neoclassical economics are not met?´ 
1.4.1. Ecological Rationality 
Whereas classical rationality is concerned with the construction of objectively accurate 
and general representations of the world, the kind of everyday, practical reasoning in 
which human beings most frequently engage is first and foremost concerned with 
making quick and effective judgments to solve problems that confront the organism 
(Todd, Fiddick & Krauss, 2000). As argued previously, the requirements of classical 
rationality rarely hold in the real world and such a view seemingly involves unrealistic 
assumptions about the cognitive capacities of the human mind. Correspondingly, an 
alternative perspective emphasising both the psychological and ecological, questions 
whether classical rationality provides an appropriate norm for evaluating judgment. 
Simon (1956, 1982) observed that reasoning mechanisms must operate effectively 
within the kind of real-world constraints that decision makers face and argued for the 
replacement of classical models of rationality with a concept of bounded rationality.  
This perspective takes the functional view that judgment processes should be 
evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in solving real-world problems, irrespective of 
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whether they produce accurate representations of the world. According to Simon (1990, 
p.7), ³+XPDQUDWLRQDOEHKDYLRXULVVKDSHGE\DVFLVVRUVZKRVHWZREODGHVDUHWKH
structure of task environments and the computational caSDFLWLHVRIWKHDFWRU´6LPRQ¶V 
dictum captures the notion that human reasoning necessarily involves an interaction 
between both internal cognitive processes, and present and past external ecological 
conditions, and as such cannot be adequately understood when either dimension is 
neglected. Furthermore, the notion of bounded rationality emphasises that the structure 
of information in the environment can serve to either constrain or facilitate the operation 
of reasoning mechanisms. The relative accuracy of judgement is thus to be understood 
as a function of the fit between cognitive processes and the nature of the information 
that is fed in from the environment.  
6LPRQV¶GLFWXPhence entails that rationality is bounded not only by 
internal cognitive constraints, as exemplified by heuristics and biases research, but also 
by the environment or task structure in which judgments are made. The environment 
may impact upon judgment via the adjustment of individuals to the structure of local 
environments or tasks, as well as via the adaptation of reasoning mechanisms 
throughout our evolutionary history (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996).  
1.4.2. Bias and Rationality in Contemporary Social Psychology 
:KHUHDV6LPRQ¶Vnotion of bounded rationality emphasises the interplay between both 
the mind and environment in understanding judgement (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009; Todd 
& Gigerenzer, 2007), theorising in social and cognitive psychology has largely focused 
upon how limitations of the human mind serve to bias judgement in various ways 
(Fiedler & Wänke, 2009; Kreuger & Funder, 2004). TKH³PLVHUOLQHVV´RIKXPDQ
cognition is argued to force reliance on heuristics which lead to rationally sub-par 
judgement strategies and outcomes. For example, availability suggests that frequency 
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estimates reflect the ease with which available information is retrieved from memory 
rather than actually experienced frequencies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Representativeness suggests that people judge the probability that an uncertain event 
belongs to a given category by the extent to which it is subjectively experienced as 
typical of that category, at the expense of neglecting base-rates and sample size 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). As discussed previously, these models imply that the 
mind employs subjective, internal cues (e.g., ease or fluency of recall, perceived 
typicality) in arriving at a judgement, and hence fails to represent frequencies, 
probabilities and contingencies as they exist in the external world.  
In addition to cognitive shortcomings, much contemporary research in social 
psychology emphasises how processes of motivated social cognition serve to bias 
judgment in various ways (e.g., Kruglanski, 1996). Motivational biases ostensibly lead 
people to engage in varieties RI³ZLVKIXOWKLQNLQJ´in service of maintaining desired 
views of the self and others. For example, individuals engage in self-serving 
attributions, attributing success to internal dispositions and failure to external 
constraints (Fiske & Taylor, 2008), and distort or selectively recruit self-referent 
information in order to enhance or maintain positive self-esteem (Green, Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008; Sedikides, Green & Pinter, 2004). Similarly, people are said to engage in 
motivated search or processing of information in service of reaching a desired 
conclusion (De Dreu, Nijstad & Knippenberg, 2008; Kunda, 1990). Further, people 
display an apparent preference for information that is consistent with prior beliefs 
(Baron, 1995), for example, selectively processing information that is congruent with 
stereotype-based expectancies (Bodenhausen, 1989; Hamilton & Sherman, 1990).  
In the context of social judgement, such biases are rarely judged explicitly 
against normative standards of rationality, given that ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVD³WUXH´RU
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³FRUUHFW´MXGJHPHQWFDQQRWHDVLO\EHGHILQHG (Hahn & Harris, 2014; Kruglanski & 
Ajzen, 1983). Unlike judgements of probability or frequency, there is rarely a clear, 
objective criterion for determining the absolute correctness RILQGLYLGXDOV¶beliefs about 
another person or group, their attitudes toward a given political issue or the veracity of 
positive self-views. However, this research entails that the top-down operation of 
motives or expectancies introduce a lack of impartiality into the acquisition and use of 
information in judgement (see Hahn & Harris, 2014), for example via the selective 
recruitment of evidence consistent with preferences or beliefs. Hence a violation of 
rationality in principle is heavily implied, insofar as rational judgment requires 
impartiality and independence from emotions, instincts, desires and preconceptions. 
Further, akin to heuristics, it is typically assumed that such motivational or expectancy-
driven biases exert negative, systematic HIIHFWVRQWKHDFFXUDF\RISHRSOHV¶EHOLHIV
(Baron, 2008), although questions of accuracy are often not addressed directly in such 
research (Hahn & Harris, 2014; Funder, 1987).   
1.5. The Cognitive-Ecological Approach 
The varied conceptions of bias discussed above, whether stemming from cognitive 
shortcomings or motivations and expectancies, all involve a conception of bounded 
rationality that is grounded exclusively in the mind. Bias is internally attributed to either 
cognitive shortcomings or the top-down operation of motives and expectancies. Further, 
these perspectives emphasise that it is the inherently constructive nature of cognition 
that gives rise to biased judgement. Heuristics, motives and expectancies serve to render 
information selectively accessible by determining the course of information search, and 
also how such selectively accessed information is subsequently utilised in judgement. 
These models tacitly assume that the input upon which judgment is based is in itself 
unbiased, and that any apparent bias in output can be accounted for by biasing processes 
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operating exclusively within the mind (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009). The potential role 
played by the information input itself in the generation of judgement biases is, however, 
rarely considered in such models.  
An alternative approach is to turn this assumption upside down, placing the 
explanatory burden at the opposite end of the scale ± the information samples upon 
which judgements are based (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 
2006; Fiedler & Wänke, 2009). 7KLV³sampling approach´EHJLQVZLWKWKHZRUNLQJ
assumption that cognitive processes are generally consistent with normative principles, 
and biases in judgement are instead said to arise from pre-existing biases in information 
samples drawn from the environment, even when the sampling process itself is 
unbiased. This view is supported by research demonstrating that people can provide 
high-fidelity descriptions of samples (Fielder, 2000; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Zacks 
& Hasher, 2002), but that pre-existing biases in (accurately judged) samples carry over 
into judgements of populations (Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch & Wilde, 2000; Juslin, 
Winman & Hanson, 2007). Whereas the cognitive and social psychological models of 
bias discussed earlier emphasise cognitive processes, the sampling approach emphasises 
the role of informational input upon which cognitive representations are formed 
(Fiedler & Juslin, 2006). Biases in judgement can emerge despite, and perhaps because 
of, the normative accuracy of cognitive processes. Pre-existing biases in samples will 
inevitably carry over into judgments of populations where (biased) samples are judged 
accurately.   
It is important to note that this approach does not attribute biased judgment 
exclusively to environmental constraints. Rather, consistent ZLWK6LPRQ¶s notion of 
ERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\DVVKDSHGE\WKH³scissor EODGHV´RIERWKPLQGDQGHQYLURQPHQW 
this approach emphasises a dynamic interaction between cognition and environmental 
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information. Information samples are constrained by the distribution of stimuli in a 
given individual¶s environmentDQGFRQYHUVHO\LQGLYLGXDOV¶DWWHQWLRQFRJQLWLYH
capacity and processing goals can serve to influence the inclusion of stimuli in samples, 
which act as the interface between mind and environment (Fiedler, 2000). Similarly, 
external information LVSDUWO\DIXQFWLRQRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGHFLVLRQVDFWLYLWLHVDQG
search strategies in the external environment, and internal mental states depend on 
environmental input through communication, social interaction and culture (Fiedler & 
Wänke, 2009). For example, different environments (e.g., urban vs. rural) differ in the 
extent to which they afford opportunities for contact with outgroups, and peopleV¶
intergroup attitudes also determine their inclination toward interacting with members of 
outgroups when given the opportunity to do so. Contact shapes intergroup attitudes, 
which in turn influences both the quantity and quality of subsequent contact, and feeds 
back in to attitudes.      
1.5.1. Biases in Samples 
As noted previously, much psychological theory assumes that information is selectively 
accessible, and variations in judgement or behaviour are assumed to reflect a subset of 
all knowledge that is potentially available in memory. Concepts such as priming, 
selective retrieval, domain specificity, schematic knowledge and resource limitation 
impose constraints on what is accessible under a given set of circumstances, and 
consequently, how incoming information from the environment will be treated by the 
mind.  
A similar selectivity also applies to information as originally encountered in the 
external world ± spatial and temporal constraints, density of information, social 
distance, and cultural and economic restrictions all impose boundaries upon what 
information a person can potentially acquire from the social and physical world. For 
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example, people have greater access to information about themselves than they do of 
other people. On a broader social level, they also have more knowledge of their own 
culture and in-groups, than out-groups and socially or spatially distant cultures. In an 
analogous fashion, social and conversational norms place limits on what can be 
communicated between people, commercial imperatives determine what consumers 
may learn about different goods and services, and media policies shape what 
information is made available to the public about policy and politicians.  
These examples demonstrate how information is often rendered selectively 
accessible by the environment alone. In many circumstances, environmental constraints 
are sufficient to render information selectively accessible, irrespective of cognitive 
shortcomings or motivated processing (Fiedler & Juslin, 2006). Availability biases, for 
example, might reflect accurate, veridical probability judgements of information 
encountered, but where environmental samples are biased, for example due to external 
media coverage, biases will inevitably manifest in judgment (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). 
In addition, irrespective of the influence of cognitive or motivational biases, a 
SHUVRQ¶V sampling strategies vis-à-vis the environment can serve to shape the 
information it affords in various ways. Different internet search engines, for example, 
prioritise results in differing order, and events receive varying degrees of coverage 
across varied media outlets. The impression of a person solicited from an interview will 
vary depending on whether an interviewer asks questions focusing on introvert or 
extrovert behaviour (Snyder, 1984). Small, relative to large samples, are prone to 
underrepresent rare events (Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004) and are more prone 
to regression than larger samples. As such, features of sampling strategies including the 
source, extent and direction of sampling will influence the constitution of samples in 
various ways, and consequently, judgments that are based upon these samples.  
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It has been demonstrated that in hypothesis testing, for example, people tend to 
examine cases that are expected or known to possess a focal property more often than 
cases known or expected to lack the property, a tendency known as the positive-test 
strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987). Although such a strategy runs counter to the logic of 
falsification (e.g., Popper, 1959), it is arguably rational when considered in light of 
inductive, probabilistic (versus deductive, logic-based) models of inference, and 
possesses functional value in uncertain, real-world contexts, for example when the costs 
of a Type II error (i.e., a false-negative) are high (Chater & Oaksford, 1994; Oaksford & 
Chater, 2003). Oaksford and Chater (2003) cite the example of a person testing the 
hypothesis that drinking from a particular well causes illness. This person may place 
greater value on evidence of illness after drinking from the well than upon absence of 
illness. In such a situation, positive-testing is clearly adaptive due to the high risk 
associated with erroneously rejecting the hypothesis that the well is contaminated - 
many people would become ill.  
Positive testing potentially provides a sampling-based explanation of 
phenomena often attributed to confirmation bias, a tendency to seek or give preference 
to evidence that supports pre-existing beliefs, expectations or hypotheses (for a review, 
see Nickerson, 1998). Fiedler, Walther, Freytag and Plessner (2002) conducted a 
simulated classroom study in which teachers were instructed to test the stereotype-
consistent hypothesis that boys perform better in science whereas girls perform better in 
languages. Consistent with positive testing, teachers tended to focus on questioning 
boys in science more so than girls, and girls more so in language than boys (the rate of 
correct answers was held equal across gender and subject). The resulting unequal 
sample sizes of correct responses led to biased, stereotype-consistent impressions; smart 
boys were judged to be better than smart girls in science, and vice-versa in language. 
When asked to test the opposing hypothesis, however (i.e., boys are better in languages 
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and girls are better in science), the opposite positive test strategy yielded larger samples, 
and more favourable evaluations, for girls in science and for boys in language. In sum, 
sample size, an ecological feature determined by the sampling strategy, overrode any 
internal influence of gender-stereotypical expectancies.  
In some judgement contexts, the structure of information in the environment can 
serve to prompt, or will necessitate, sampling strategies that produce biased samples. 
Consider the bias toward confirmatory results in publication practices. Because null 
findings are rarely published, irrespective of cognitive or motivational biases on the part 
of individual researchers, samples of research on a given phenomenon will inevitably be 
skewed toward supportive findings. Similarly, therapists and clinical psychologists are 
only exposed to patients they treat, such that the spontaneous recovery of untreated 
individuals is unobserved (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009). The true base-rate of recovery is 
hence unknown to these practitioners. This is of course unavoidable, given that non-
patients suffering from a given condition are by definition absent from patient records, 
and ethical concerns may preclude the use of non-intervention controls in clinical 
validation studies.  
Even where complete information on base rates is available, the organisation of 
information in the environment may elicit sampling strategies that serve to distort base 
rates represented in samples, for example in the domain of medical diagnosis. Judging 
the likelihood that a patient has breast cancer or AIDS given a positive test is a task of 
conditional inference, the normative solution of which requires the calculation of a 
posterior probability according to %D\HV¶theorem1.1. The likelihood of a positive 
mammogram given breast cancer (i.e., the hit rate) is approximately 80%; however the 
reverse probability, the rate of breast cancer given a positive mammogram (i.e., the 
posterior probability equating to diagnosticity of the test) is below 10%. This is because 
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the base rate of breast cancer, at around 1%, is roughly 8 times lower than the likelihood 
of a positive test (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). An analogous situation occurs in the 
case of HIV.  
Research examining problems of this form has consistently demonstrated a 
tendency of judges to substantially overestimate posterior probabilities. This 
phenomenon has been attributed to a tendency of judges to neglect base rate 
information1.1 (Bar-Hillel, 1980, Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). However, research 
conducted by Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch and Wilde (2000) points to a rather different 
conclusion. Participants were asked to estimate the posterior probability of breast cancer 
given a positive mammogram on the basis of information freely sampled from a 
population of index cards organised by either the criterion (i.e., cancer vs. no cancer) or 
predictor category (i.e., positive vs. negative mammogram), which preserved the 
aforementioned probabilities. Under the former circumstances, participants sampled 
approximately equal numbers of cases with and without breast cancer, hence drastically 
inflating the rate of breast cancer in the sample, and in turn gave typically inflated 
                                                          
Footnote 1.1  
%D\HV¶WKHRUHPHVWLPDWHVWKHSRVWHULRUSUREDELOLW\RIDQHYHQWHJEUHDVWFDQFHUEDVHGXSRQREVHUYHG
conditions (e.g., a positive mammogram) that are associated with the event. Where A and B are events, 
the posterior probability is given by; 
 
where P(A) and P(B) are the independent probabilities of events A and B (e.g., the population base rate of 
breast cancer and the probability of a positive mammogram, respectively), P(A|B) is the conditional 
probability of A where B is true (e.g., the probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram) and 
P(B|A) is the probability of B given that A is true (i.e., the probability of a positive mammogram given 
breast cancer; the hit rate for the test). 
35 
 
estimates of diagnosticity. Under the latter conditions, however, participants were able 
to identify that only a small proportion of positive mammograms were associated with 
breast cancer, and provided relatively accurate estimates of diagnosticity.  
Far from suggesting base rate neglect, this finding implies that relative 
sensitivity to base rates is sufficient to produce bias in conditional probability 
judgements due to sampling processes. Sampling conditionalised on a criterion (e.g., 
breast cancer vs no breast cancer) can produce base rate inflation in samples, and hence 
an accurate assessment of sampled information will carry over into biased judgement. 
When sampling is appropriately conditionalised on a predictor category, however, 
population base rates are preserved relatively intact in samples, leading to relatively 
accurate judgement of posterior probabilities relative to the population.  
This is of clear practical importance given how information is often organised in 
the real world. For example, medical statistics are organised according to diseases rather 
than by positive versus negative test results. Relatedly, media framings and narratives 
often focus disproportionately upon socially undesirable behaviour, such as alcoholism, 
drug use and welfare dependency, amongst specific social groups such as the poor or 
ethnic minorities (Bullock, Wyche & Williams, 2001; Clawson & Trice, 2000; Gilens, 
1999, 1996). Such a tendency presumably inhibits unbiased assessment of the relative 
prevalence of differing (positive and negatively valenced) behaviours and attributes 
within and across different social groups. A disproportionate media or political focus on 
the undesirable behaviour of specific social groups (e.g., the poor), or otherwise higher 
exposure to members of certain groups due to their greater density in the population, 
can presumably serve to distort base rates. In turn, this may lead to overestimation of 
certain attributes or behaviours given membership in a certain social category  (e.g., 
drug or alcohol abuse given low socioeconomic status). Unrepresentative media 
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portrayals may hence lead to illusory correlations (e.g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) 
between specific groups and certain negative behaviours or attributes.  
1.5.2. 7KH³1DwYH´,QWXLWLYH6tatistician 
The re-examination of prominent judgement biases in light of environmental sampling 
processes suggests that, on the one hand, internally attributing biased judgement to 
cognitive shortcomings seemingly paints an unfairly pessimistic picture of human 
rationality. Such a dim view is also difficult to reconcile with those findings 
demonstrating impressive performance in certain judgement tasks such as frequency 
estimation, optimistically OLNHQLQJWKHPLQGWRDQ³LQWXLWLYHVWDWLVWLFLDQ´HJ Zacks & 
Hasher, 2002; Peterson & Beach, 1967), or demonstrating the functional, ecological 
rationality of judgement in real-world contexts (e.g., Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). On the 
other hand, it is also clear that cognitive processes cannot be completely exonerated. 
Irrespective of biases inherent in the environment, biases can manifest in judgement due 
to the sampling schemes employed by the individual as in the case of positive testing, a 
strategy that under some circumstances might indeed stem from goals or expectancies 
(e.g., Sanitioso, Kunda & Fong, 1990). To fully localise the source of judgement bias in 
either the mind or environment is hence misleading. Density effects resulting from 
unequal samples exemplify this point (Fiedler et al., 2002). Judges may be privy to 
unequal observations as a result of selectivity imposed by either the external 
environment (e.g., differing motivation or attendance of equally able students; greater 
exposure to the behaviour of majority vs. minority social groups), due to the search 
strategies relied on by the individual (e.g., positive testing), or decisions which serve to 
shape feedback from the environment (e.g., avoidance of contact with outgroups). 
 In attempting to integrate these contradictory perspectives and research findings, 
researchers have employed a further metaphor: the naive intuitive statistician (Fiedler & 
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Juslin, 2006; Juslin, Winman & Hansson, 2007). In agreement with research 
demonstrating relative accuracy in frequency and probability judgement (Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979; Peterson & Beach, 1967; Zacks & Hasher, 2002), and internally consistent 
judgements of samples themselves (Fiedler et al., 2000; Freytag & Fiedler, 2006), it is 
assumed under this framework that cognitive processes operating on incoming 
information are generally unbiased and provide normatively accurate descriptions of 
samples. It is further assumed, however, that people are naïve or ³myopic´ in respect to 
the external constraints imposed on samples by the environment, and also in respect to 
the more sophisticated properties of samples and sampling processes (Fiedler, 2012; 
Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; Juslin, Winman & Hansson, 2007). For example, people tend to 
assume that the samples they encounter are representative of relevant populations, 
failing to account for selectivity imposed by either the environment itself or by the 
sampling processes employed to extract information from it. Research further indicates 
that people are naïve in regards to constraints imposed by statistical properties such as 
sample size (Kareev, Lieberman & Lev, 1997), skewness (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004), and 
the negative relation between sample size and variance (Kareev, Arnon & Horwitz-
Zeliger, 2002).  
As opposed to emphasising biased processing in the mind, then, this perspective 
re-construes biased judgement as a result of meta-cognitive myopia (MM; Fiedler, 
2012). This term refers to accurate, unbiased judgement of information samples in the 
absence of any critical reflection on their origin or statistical properties, or appropriate 
top-down correction for biases in samples related to these factors. Biases in judgments 
of conditional probability, for example, appear to result not from base-rate neglect 
(samples are judged with relative accuracy), but from ignorance of systematic biases 
introduced by the sampling strategy itself (i.e., criterion sampling).  
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Similarly, the finding that positive testing of expectancy-congruent and 
expectancy-incongruent hypotheses leads to opposing biases implies naivety in regards 
to the effect of sampling strategy on the density of observations  (e.g., correct and 
incorrect answers) across combinations of variable levels (e.g., girls/boys in 
languages/science; Fiedler et al., 2002). Positive testing need not reflect a motivated or 
expectancy driven bias toward seeking confirmatory information, but simply an 
innocent tendency to sample evidence in line with a focal hypothesis.  
A further example of MM comes from research demonstrating that people are 
unable to ignore repeated (and hence redundant) information, even when it is clearly 
understood that repeated observations are irrelevant and misleading (Unkelbach, Fiedler 
& Freytag, 2007). Unkelbach et al., (2007) showed SDUWLFLSDQW¶VQHZVUHSRUWVRIVKDUH
pricings sequentially over 16 days, with information on some winning shares selectively 
repeated across different news shows. Although estimates of daily winning rates were 
relatively accurate, evaluations and purchasing intentions were higher for shares whose 
winning was repeated, even when those shares in fact performed worse than other, 
lesser-repeated shares. This bias toward often repeated shares persisted even when 
participants were forewarned of the distorting effect of repetition and explicitly 
instructed to ignore redundant information.       
1.6. Consequences of Sampling Processes for Social and Political Attitudes 
The preceding discussion suggests various ways in which sampling processes might 
serve to influence perceptions of people, groups, events and other features of the social 
world. As mentioned, spatial and temporal constraints, density of information, social 
distance, and cultural and economic restrictions serve to shape and constrain the 
information samples to which people are exposed. Such selective exposure due to the 
informationaOVWUXFWXUHRISHRSOHV¶GD\-to-day environment, or the sampling processes 
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used to extract information from it, presumably lead to divergent social perceptions 
across different people and groups. Research on sampling processes shows that, in 
many circumstances, no cognitive or motivational bias need be present in order for 
biased perceptions to emerge (Fiedler, 2000). For example, irrespective of their attitudes 
or prejudices, people are exposed to more information about majority rather than 
minority groups, and those groups which are spatially and temporally more proximal. In 
other circumstances, sampling processes might interact with cognitive or motivational 
factors to bias perceptions. Political ideology, for example, inclines people toward 
sources of information that align with their political beliefs (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009), 
and prejudice can discourage interaction with members of outgroups (Plant & Devine, 
2003).  
The relationship between these internal and external sources of bias can be 
conceived of as bidirectional and self-reinforcing1.2.2Biased environments can serve to 
elicit biased perceptions, motivating information search strategies or behaviours that 
further distort feedback from the environment. Such processes of cognitive-ecological 
interaction presumably play an important role in shaping knowledge of the social and 
political world, and consequently in determining important social and political attitudes.  
                                                          
Footnote 1.2 
 
Note that the studies reported in forthcoming chapters do not examine effects of person-environment 
interaction on judgment from a bidirectional perspective.  Rather, the present studies focus predominantly 
upon the role of information samples (e.g., of others incomes) in systematically determining judgements 
of the wider environment (e.g., the population income distribution), and in turn, political attitudes (e.g., 
support for redistribution), in a unidirectional sequence. The present research does not directly examine 
whether judgments or attitudes reciprocally influence sampling strategies (e.g., positive testing; Iyengar & 
+DKQRURWKHUZLVHDIIHFWEHKDYLRXULQDPDQQHUWKDWFDXVHVFKDQJHVLQDSHUVRQ¶VHQYLURQPHQW
(and consequently in the constitution of available samples). 
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 The domain of intergroup attitudes provides a neat illustration of this point ± 
research suggests that differences in sample size can account for certain in-group 
serving biases (Kunda, 1990). For two groups with the same rate of positive behaviour, 
the group for which a higher number of observations are available will be judged more 
positively (Sanbonmatsu, Shavitt & Gibson, 1994). Where the base-rate of positive 
behaviours is high, evaluations of the in-group will more accurately reflect the high rate 
of positive behaviour insofar as observations of the behaviour of in-group members are 
denser, and hence judgements are less regressive, relative to judgements of outgroup 
members (Fiedler & Wänke, 2009; Meiser & Hewstone, 2001, 2004). Irrespective of 
any motivational bias in intergroup comparison, then, evaluations of in-group members 
may be conferred a positivity advantage over evaluations of outgroups, due to the 
regressive nature of judgements based on small samples. Similar logic can be applied to 
outgroup homogeneity; the tendency to provide simplistic and homogeneous judgments 
of outgroups. Where in-groups and outgroups share the same variety of attributes, 
relative underexposure can render fewer attributes recognisable amongst outgroups 
relative to in-groups (Fiedler, Kemmelmeir & Freytag, 1999; Linville, Fischer & 
Salovey, 1989).  
Sampling-based accounts complement research demonstrating complex and 
sometimes contradictory relationships between out-group prejudice and the density of 
minorities (e.g., Pettigrew, Wagner & Christ, 2010). Intergroup contact serves to reduce 
prejudice and should be more likely to occur in places where minorities are greater in 
number, but opposing relationships are often observed (higher or lower prejudice in the 
presence of either greater or fewer minorities). These inconsistencies can be accounted 
for by factors that moderate the extent of contact between majority and minority group 
members, such as the level of segregation between groups (e.g., Pettigrew et al., 2010; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Contact might serve to reduce prejudice via the 
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aforementioned sampling mechanisms, although the extent of contact may in turn be a 
function of ecological variables (e.g., physical segregation in urban, educational and 
work environments) rather than the actual density of minorities per se. This is not to 
dismiss the role of social-psychological factors (e.g., threat), and of course, prejudice 
itself begets segregation. Rather, it highlights the kind of interdependence and 
interaction between ecological and psychological processes suggested previously. 
Threat, for example, is determined partly by the perceived availability of resources such 
as jobs, housing and healthcare, and such perceptions are subject in turn to the sampling 
processes and constraints described earlier.  
As discussed at the outset of the chapter, research in political psychology 
emphasises WKHLGHRORJLFDODQGPRWLYDWLRQDOXQGHUSLQQLQJVRISHRSOHV¶DWWLWXGHV
towards important social and political issues such as inequality, immigration, foreign 
policy and domestic security (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jost, 
Ledgerwood & Hardin, 2008; Pratto, Liu, Levin, Sidanius, Shih, Bachrach & Hegarty, 
2000; Pratto, Stallworth & Conway-Lanz, 1998). Undoubtedly, ideology plays a 
powerful role in determining these attitudes, but beliefs regarding relevant facts and 
figures ± factual political knowledge - also exert a strong influence on political attitudes 
and responses to policy (Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). 
Whether people correctly estimate that 5% of people in the UK are Muslims, or 
incorrectly estimate the proportion at 21% (Ipsos Mori, 2014), is likely not a trivial 
factor in determining public attitudes toward immigration or issues of domestic security. 
Similarly, whether people correctly estimate that less than 1% of UK welfare spending 
is lost to fraud annually, versus 27% (You Gov, 2013), presumably exerts a strong 




Accordingly, research shows that judgements regarding important social 
statistics and political facts of this kind are often wildly inaccurate, and further, that 
such misinformed judgements are indeed related to attitudes and policy preferences 
(Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000). A sampling approach, emphasising 
the interactivity of cognitive and ecological processes, can contribute to explaining the 
emergence and persistence of such widespread distortions in political knowledge, in 
more and less obvious ways.  
Selectivity in media coverage, for example, plays a relatively obvious role in the 
genesis of misperceptions. A large part of people¶s political knowledge is accrued 
vicariously via the media, which serves to select and filter information for public 
consumption (Barabas & Jeritt, 2009; Graber, 2002, 2004). Such filtering is not 
completely unbiased. The content of news media is determined by editorial priorities, 
such as the perceived appeal of a given story to a target audience. It is also influenced 
by political and commercial priorities, such as the partisan alignment of editorial 
departments or media financiers, and the business concerns of advertisers (e.g., 
Hermann & Chomsky, 1988). More fundamentally, limitations upon resources, such as 
time, column inches and access to sources, constrain reporting to a subset of all 
potential news stories, and editorial and commercial priorities in turn determine which 
stories are selected for reporting. As such, news media provides non-random, 
unrepresentative information samples, and renders information about politically relevant 
events and circumstances selectively accessible to the public.  
Sampling models discussed earlier imply that biases in information samples will 
inevitably become manifest in judgement, for example in the form of structural (i.e., 
environmental) availability biases (Dawes, 2006; Lichtenstein et al., 1978). Over-
reporting of objectively rare events in the media, for example benefit fraud or 
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unemployment, can render such events subjectively more frequent than they are in 
reality, and vice-versa for relatively common events (e.g., in-work poverty). Selection 
biases in news media might also carry over to related judgements in which unknown, 
distal features of the social and political world, such as the division of government 
spending or the proportion of immigrants from a given ethnic group, are inferred via 
frequency of exposure. Respondents to a poll about the division of UK welfare 
spending, for example, estimated on average that 41% of the entire UK welfare budget 
is spent on unemployment benefits, whereas the actual figure for the year reported was 
in fact 3% (You Gov, 2013). Speculatively considered, this severe level of distortion in 
public perception perhaps reflects the relative preoccupation of politicians and the 
media with spending on the unemployed relative to other categories of welfare 
spending, such as pensions. In a similar vein, a disproportionate focus on particular 
social groups in news media (e.g., benefit claimants, Muslims) can foster illusory 
correlations such that the likelihood of negative behaviour given membership in a 
particular social category is prone to overestimation (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976).  
All the aforementioned examples imply that bias resides in available information 
(i.e., news reporting) prior to sampling, and as such, no cognitive or motivational bias is 
necessary for biased judgement to emerge. Sampling processes employed by individuals 
themselves, such as positive testing (e.g., sampling evidence of Muslims committing 
terrorist acts) or criterion sampling (e.g., sampling reported instances of terrorism), 
further serve to introduce or exacerbate potential biases in information acquired via the 
media. A person testing the hypothesis that benefit fraud is more common than tax 
evasion will presumably sample relatively more stories concerning benefit fraud, 
irrespective of any underlying (environmental) bias in reporting, and even in the 
absence of any motivation to confirm this hypothesis (Klayman & Ha, 1987). Although 
motivational processes might not always be necessary to explain biased political 
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judgments of the kind discussed, however, such processes certainly play an important 
and obvious role - the sources from which people sample, the hypotheses they entertain 
and the search strategies they employ will, of course, often be related to goals, 
expectations, attitudes and ideologies.  
Research and theorising in the domain of socioecological psychology  serves to 
further underscore the importance of social and physical environments in shaping 
political attitudes (e.g., Oishi & Graham, 2010; Oishi, 2014). Although this perspective 
does not emphasise sampling processes, it is grounded in a similar, objectivist 
epistemology to the sampling approach, examining how objective features of the 
environment, and not only subjective construal of environments, affect cognition, 
emotion and behaviour, and vice-versa. Research in this vein examines both how 
individuals adapt to distal, macro-environmental properties (e.g., climate and 
geography, demography, economies, institutions), and conversely, how individuals give 
ULVHWRDQGPDLQWDLQVSHFLILFHQYLURQPHQWVYLDSURFHVVHVRI³QLFKHFRQVWUXFWLRQ´2LVKL
2014; Yamagishi, 2011). Correspondingly, much research supports the notion that 
political attitudes are influenced by macro-level properties of the social and political 
environment. For example, cross-national variations in attitudes toward the welfare state 
are systematically related to country-level differences in the structure of welfare 
regimes (Larsen, 2008), levels of unemployment (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003) and 
levels of immigration (Eger, 2008). Findings of this kind broadly support the notion that 
political attitudes are adapted to the particular social and political environments in 
which people reside. Via an opposite, and perhaps more familiar process, individual 
attitudes lead to changes in macro-level political environments, via both more and less 
subtle mechanisms. An unambiguous example is the effect of political attitudes upon 
voting tendencies, which in turn determine the character of government and policies 
enacted. People also shape the political context to which they are exposed in a more 
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direct manner, and on an individual level. For example, individuals choose to live in 
communities in which their political ideology is widely shared, and members of 
political minorities in a given community show an increased desire to migrate compared 
to members of political majorities (Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter & Nosek, 2014). This 
highlights how individuals own attitudes and behaviour serve to shape the ideological 
environment in which they exist, in a manner that potentially leads to relative 
overexposure to political attitudes similar to ones own.      
1.6.1. Homophily, Social Sampling and Attitudes Toward Inequality 
The sampling approach also implies that people¶s own social and psychological 
attributes serve to shape the social environment around them, and consequently, the 
information samples to which they are exposed (Galesic, Olson & Rieskamp, 2012). A 
large body of research indicates that a basic organising principle of social networks is a 
tendency toward homophily ± the principle that contact between similar people occurs 
more frequently than contact between dissimilar people (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; 
Marsden, 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001; Reagans, 2011). Social 
environments are spatially and demographically clustered such that people tend to 
associate with others who share similar sociodemographic attributes (e.g., ethnicity, age, 
education and socioeconomic status) to themselves, and are geographically proximal. 
Furthermore, homophily extends to psychological attributes, such as beliefs, attitudes 
and preferences (Huston & Levinger, 1978). Like-minded individuals may selectively 
associate with each other (Festinger, 1957) or conformity may be bred via processes of 
social influence (Cialdini & Goldstiein, 2004; Asch, 1954). Correspondingly, research 
in political science highlights the influence that social networks exert on political 
attitudes and behaviour (Newman, 2013; Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg, 2013; Mutz, 
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2002), demonstrating for example that people who interact frequently share similar 
voting preferences (Pattie & Johnston, 2000). 
Galesic et al. (2012) investigated how homophily, in tandem with sampling 
processes, influences judgments of population-level social distributions. Specifically, 
the authors propose that, in estimating unknown properties of their social environments, 
people draw on samples of people they know and regularly encounter, such as their 
family, friends, colleagues and acquaintances ± their social circles. Due to homophily, 
these social samples DUHQRWUDQGRPEXWDUHFRQGLWLRQHGXSRQSHRSOHV¶RZQ attributes, 
and hence are not representative of the wider population. Correspondingly, the authors 
found that social sampling produces systematic deviation in estimates of population-
level distributionsLQOLQHZLWKSHRSOHV¶RZQVWDQGLQJRQWKHDWWULEXWHXQGHUHVWLPDWLRQ. 
For example, wealthier, relative to poorer participants, reported moving in wealthier 
social circles, and consequently estimated wealthier population-level wealth 
distributions. Comparable results were obtained for various other attributes including 
incidence of work stress, education, health problems and number of friends. The authors 
show how this interaction between sampling processes and the informational structure 
of social environments can parsimoniously account for both self-enhancement and self-
depreciation effects. Alternatively, explanations involving motivational influences such 
as self-esteem, or cognitive shortcomings, struggle to account for these seemingly 
contradictory biases in a unitary model (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbacher Yurak & 
Vredenburg, 1995; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
Social sampling processes might also be expected to play a role in determining 
political and economic attitudes. Sampling processes V\VWHPDWLFDOO\PRXOGSHRSOHV¶ 
perceptions of how incomes and wealth are distributed across society. Wealth is 
considered an important determinant of economic attitudes, for example in classical 
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economics, due to the differing material interests of wealthier and poorer individuals 
(Alesina & Guiliano, 2011; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Sears & Funk, 1991). Poorer 
people are expected to oppose inequality and favour redistribution to a greater extent 
than the wealthy insofar as it is in their material self-interest to do so. Social sampling 
suggests an additional, less obvious avenue by which wealth can create divergence in 
economic attitudes ± sampling from homophilous social circles presumably leads 
wealthier and poorer individuals to hold differing perceptions of the wealth distribution. 
Because they are disproportionately exposed, via their social contacts, to other similarly 
wealthy individuals, it follows that wealthier, relative to poorer people, are prone to 
overestimate levels of affluence across wider society. Although important ideological 
differences exist in political and economic preferences, conservatives and liberals alike 
are sensitive to distributive outcomes, and employ knowledge of those outcomes in 
judging the fairness of social arrangements (Deutsch, 1975; Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers 
& Ordonez, 1993; Rawls, 1971). This is the theoretical rationale underpinning the 
present research, which will investigate the role played by social sampling processes in 
determining perceptions of the income distribution, and whether sampling processes can 
consequently help to explain divergence in economic attitudes.          
1.7. Chapter Summary 
The importance of reducing historically high levels of economic inequality has been 
increasingly stressed from various quarters, due to its deleterious social, economic, 
political and psychological consequences (IMF, 2011; OECD, 2011; Picketty, 2014; 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Research and theory in political psychology suggests that 
ideological and motivational forces present a barrier to such efforts by creating wide 
divergence in attitudes toward inequality (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). Whereas theory in 
political psychology has generally stressed the intrapsychic bases of political attitudes, 
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certain lines of research in the domain of judgment and decision making imply that 
ecological processes might also play an important role. Even where beliefs and 
judgments are unbiased by cognitive shortcomings or motivational factors, systematic 
biases in information due to environmental structure can lead to biased perception and 
judgment (Fiedler, 2000).  
 Enlightenment philosophy equated human belief with the laws of probability 
and statistics, suggesting that human beings possess an inherent capacity for 
³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV´+DUWOH\ 1749; Hume, 1739). This view later fell from favour in light 
of evidence that belief and judgment are easily swayed by passions and interests, 
FDVWLQJGRXEWXSRQKXPDQV¶ capacity for rational thought and behaviour. Developments 
in psychology in the 20th century paralleled these circumstances. Whereas some lines of 
research suggested that humans are well attuned to the statistical properties of their 
HQYLURQPHQWVDQGUHDVRQDNLQWR³LQWXLWLYHVWDWLVWLFLDQV´HJ%UXQVZLN+DVKHU
& Zacks, 1979; Peterson & Beach, 1967), subsequent research suggested that belief and 
judgment is inherently constructive in nature (e.g., Kruglanski, 1996; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973, 1974). This latter epistemological perspective entails that 
motivational influences or cognitive shortcomings impose selectivity upon information 
search, attention, processing and recall (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Frey, 1986; Kruglanski, 
1996; Kunda, 1987). Consequently, theories of this kind cast serious doubt on the 
capacity of human beings to live up to the normative dictates of classical rationality. 
 Theories emphasising the interactive nature of both cognitive and ecological 
processes pose a counterpoint to perspectives that construe human belief and judgment 
as either unboundedly rational, or hopelessly distorted, biased and error-prone. This line 
of reasoning also offers a potential means of unifying contradictory findings and images 
of human rationality. Cognitive-ecological perspectives demonstrate how selectivity in 
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information can arise from the environment as well as the mind (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler 
& Wänke, 2009; Simon, 1982. Hence environmental structures, and the sampling 
processes by which information is acquired, need also be considered in explaining 
biases in belief and judgment. This requires a recasting of rationality in light of the 
HFRORJLFDOFRQVWUDLQWVLQZKLFKKXPDQVRSHUDWHHSLWRPLVHGE\6LPRQ¶VDQDORJ\
of rational behaviour as shaped by the twin scissor blades of mind and environment. 
Such processes of cognitive-ecological interaction have clear implications for 
political cognition, and consequently, they may also play a role in determining political 
attitudes, including attitudes toward inequality. One avenue by which this might occur 
is via processes of social sampling (Galesic et al., 2012). 3HRSOH¶VRZQZHDOWK
systematically determines the wealth of others they are exposed to in their day-to-day 
lives, such that wealthy people are exposed to relatively more wealthy others, and vice 
versa. As such, wealthier and poorer people may have different perceptions of how 
wealthy their society is. Because people are sensitive to distributive outcomes, such 
divergence in perceptions of the distribution may in turn influence attitudes toward it 
(Deutsch, 1975; Mitchell et al., 1993; Rawls, 1971).   
1.8. Outline of Following Chapters 
Chapter 2 addresses, in more specific detail, how social sampling processes might serve 
to influence attitudes toward inequality, and reports three studies to support this basic 
proposal. Using a correlational design, Studies 1a and 1b show how household income 
indirectly influences attitudes toward redistribution of wealth via social sampling, 
SDUWLDOO\H[SODLQLQJZHDOWKLHUSHRSOH¶VJUHDWHURSSRVLWLRQWRZDUGUHGLVWULEXWLYHHIIRUWV
Study 2 presents a conceptual replication of these findings drawing data from a large-
scale, nationally representative survey conducted in New Zealand, the New Zealand 
Attitudes and Values Survey (NZAVS). Unlike Studies 1a and 1b which relied upon 
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SDUWLFLSDQWV¶VXEMHFWive estimates, Study 2 uses an objective proxy for social circle 
wealth (levels of deprivation in participants¶ neighbourhood).  
 Chapter 3 examines whether providing novel, alternative and ostensibly real 
information about the distribution of incomes can influence perceived fairness of the 
distribution and support for redistributive measures. Both Studies 3a and 3b attempted 
to manipulate perceptions of the population-level income distribution by presenting 
PRUHYHUVXVOHVV³HIILFLHQW´LHKLJKYVlow mean) samples of income. These attempts 
were met with mixed success. In both studies, participants estimated relatively more or 
less wealthy population distributions in line with the samples presented, demonstrating 
that they relied upon the novel samples in inferring population distributions. The 
efficiency manipulation, however, did not translate into between-group differences in 
economic attitudes as predicted. However, in line with the findings described in Chapter 
2, the manipulation did indirectly affect preferences for redistribution sequentially via 
inequality (Study 3a) or efficiency (Study 3b) of population estimates, and fairness, 
such that wealthier samples reduced support for redistribution.  
 Chapter 4 seeks to address whether the tendency to estimate population-level 
income distributions via social sampling can be prevented or attenuated either by 
introducing awareness of the unrepresentative nature of social circles and warning 
against social sampling, providing an alternative sample, or both interventions in 
combination. In both Studies 4a and 4b, providing an alternative sample alone was 
sufficient to prevent social sampling, although warning against social sampling was not. 
Providing both an alternative sample and introducing awareness of social sampling 
biases ironically backfired, producing stronger social sampling effects. In line with prior 
research and theory, the findings suggest that social sampling is difficult to prevent, and 
deliberate attempts at exerting metacognitive control over sampling are likely to fail. 
51 
 
 Chapter 5 summarises the findings of Studies 1a ± 4b, and discusses the present 
findings in the broader context of related research and theory on normative justice 
judgements, political attitudes and political economy. Alternative avenues by which 
social sampling processes might influence political beliefs and attitudes are explored, as 
well as the implications of social sampling for democratic process and public policy. 
Some speculation upon the nature of social samples, and why and how they might 
influence for economic attitudes, is provided. The present findings are also discussed in 


















Recent decades have witnessed marked increases in economic inequality across 
developed nations (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011).  
Although people generally view equality as an important justice principle in the abstract 
(e.g., Deutsch, 1975), there is weaker consensus about adopting policies to reduce 
inequality (e.g., Hochschild, 1986). One source of dissensus is wealth itself: wealthier 
(vs. poorer) people tend to be more opposed to redistribution (Alesina & Guiliano, 
2011). This is no surprise from a classical economic standpoint, since the material 
burden of redistributive policies falls on wealthier people (Meltzer & Richard, 1981), 
whereas redistribution is aligned with the self-interest of poorer people (Bartels, 2005; 
Sears & Funk, 1991; Feldman, 1982). Further, wealthier people are more likely to adopt 
ideological positions that militate against redistribution (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & 
Malle, 1994).  The present chapter proposes and tests a complementary psychological 
mechanism that leads wealthier people to be less supportive of redistribution than 
poorer people, independent of biases stemming from self-interest and ideology3.1. 
Social Sampling: Extrapolating from Social Circles to the Population  
Inferences about inequality, poverty and affluence in society are constrained, like all 
social judgments, by the cues the environment affords (e.g., Fiedler, 2000; Gibson, 
                                                          
Footnote 2.1  
Chapter 2 appears as a published article in Psychological Science: 
Dawtry, R. J., Sutton, R. M., & Sibley, C. G. (2015). Why Wealthier People Think People Are Wealthier, 





1960). Lacking ready knowledge of how various (social and non-social) attributes are 
distributed, individuals draw on samples of the people they know, including family, 
friends, and colleagues (Galesic, Olsson & Rieskamp, 2012; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985).  
Crucially, these social circles are not representative of the overall population, since 
social environments are spatially clustered. That is, individuals with similar incomes 
generally live close together and move in similar social circles (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin & Cook, 2001). Hence the social circles of wealthier (vs. poorer) individuals 
include relatively fewer low earners and relatively more high earners (see Figs. 1a and 
2a).   
Sampling from such unrepresentative sub-populations can lead to systematic 
differences in perceived population distributions.  Relative to poorer people, wealthier 
individuals tend to estimate that higher incomes are more common and lower incomes 
less common in the wider population.  As a result, people tend to perceive higher mean 
levels of wealth in society as their own wealth increases. Crucially, this social sampling 
process does not stem from a political or self-serving motivation, but reflects the 
RSHUDWLRQVRI³DQXQELDVHGPLQGDFWLQJLQDSDUWLFXODUVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH´*DOHVLFHWDO
2012, p. 7).  
Political-Psychological Sequelae of Social Sampling 
Rich and poor people alike judge wealth levels in society against normative criteria, 
including efficiency and equality (Deutsch, 1975; Rawls, 1971).  Contemporary theories 
of distributive justice construe equality as a state in which people have approximately 
the same level of wealth, irrespective of privilege, effort, or merit. Efficiency refers to 
the extent to which inputs such as labor and economic resources produce a greater 
overall level of wealth.  Increments in efficiency imply an increase in income for at least 
one person at no penalty to another (i.e., Pareto optimality: see Arrow & Debreu, 1954; 
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Okun, 1975). Thus, efficiency is reflected in a higher mean level of wealth for a given 
society, and is often operationalized in this way (e.g., Mitchell et al., 1993). 
All else being equal, people prefer these efficient distributions, in which the 
mean wealth in society is higher.  Similarly, all else being equal, people prefer 
egalitarian distributions to those that are highly unequal.  In other words, people prefer 
their economic pies both big (efficient), and cut into similarly sized slices (equal).  
These criteria are also applied interactively; people become less concerned with 
inequality as efficiency increases. These preferences are revealed by increased 
satisfaction and ratings of fairness (Scott, Matland, Michelbach & Bornstein, 2001; 
Mitchell et al., 1993). It follows, to the extent that social sampling leads wealthier (vs. 
poorer) people to conclude that society is wealthier, they will be more satisfied with the 
status quo and perceive it as fairer.  In turn, this can be expected to affect redistributive 
attitudes, since perceptions of fairness are an important proximal motivator of support 
for redistribution (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Fong, 2001; Smith & Tyler, 1996).   
The Present Research 
The present research investigates how social sampling, in tandem with normative justice 
judgments, informs SHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRWKHUHGLVWULEXWLRQLQGHSHQGHQWO\RISROLWLFDO
orientation and perceptions of self-interest.  Normative principles of justice, such as 
equality and efficiency, condition how people respond to information concerning the 
distribution of wealth across society.  The information people receive about distributive 
outcomes is, however, constrained by the structure of the social environment in which 
they are embedded.  Consequently, richer and poorer citizens may differ on their 
attitudes to redistribution in part because they have a different experience of how rich 
their country is.  
55 
 
In Studies 1a and 1b, American participants indicated their own household 
income, and estimated how incomes are distributed across both their immediate social 
circles and the wider population. Participants then indicated how fair and satisfactory 
they perceived society to be, and whether they supported redistributive efforts.  We 
hypothesised that, controlling for political orientation (Studies 1a and 1b) and perceived 
self-interest (Study 1b), wealthier (vs. poorer) participants would, via a sequential 
indirect path of mediation, report a higher level of mean wealth in their social circles, 
estimate a higher level of mean wealth in the USA, perceive the distribution of wealth 
in USA as fairer, and tend to oppose redistributive policies. 
Study 2 examined data from a nationally representative survey in New Zealand.  
It utilized census measures of neighborhood-level economic deprivation to derive an 
REMHFWLYHLQGH[RIZHDOWKOHYHOVLQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOFLUFOHV6LQFHUHVLGHQWVRIPRUH
affluent (less deprived) areas are exposed to wealthier social samples, we predicted that 
WKH\ZRXOGVKRZPRUHVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK1HZ=HDODQG¶VHFRQRPLFVWDWXVTXR
independent of political attitudes and control factors. Analogous to Studies 1a and 1b, 
this entails that the relationship between household income and satisfaction is mediated 




US participants were recruited online (N = 305, 51.5% male; Mage = 37.40 years; SDage 
= 12.04) via $PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUN%XKUmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 
2011).  Given our focus on the role of household income, it was desirable to minimise 
the number of individuals who are dependent on parental income. Hence we requested 
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that only individuals of 25 years or older complete the survey.  Fifteen participants 
reported their age to be below 25.  All analyses were conducted both with and without 
these participants¶GDWD and no substantive differences emerged, so reported analyses 
include all participants.  In keeping with previous investigations of the 
representativeness of Mturk samples (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010), the 
incomes of the present sample were somewhat lower than, but similarly distributed to, 
the US population (based on the US Census Bureau, 2013).  Thus, 10.27% of the 
sample reported household incomes placing them in the wealthiest 20% of the US 
population, and 20%, 26.89%, 21.64% and 20.32 % reported household incomes in the 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th wealthiest quintiles respectively.  Sample size was determined a 
priori based on budgetary considerations. Data collection proceeded until the 
predetermined sample size was reached. Although 300 participants were requested, an 
additional 5 did not complete the entire survey and provided only partial data. For all 
studies reported herein, ethical approval was obtained from the institutional Ethics 
Committee, and the research was conducted in full accordance with the World Medical 
Association Declaration of Helsinki. 
Materials and Procedure
 
In accordance with the method used by Galesic et al. (2012), participants estimated 
complete income distributions as opposed to summary indicators such as the mean. This 
indirect method allowed for estimation of both within-participant Gini indices and mean 
incomes for reported social circle and population distributions. It was also expected to 
minimise any potential biases (e.g., from ideology or self-enhancement motives) 
introduced by explicitly asking participants about inequality and average incomes. 
Participants first estimated the distribution of annual household income across 
their social contacts by indicating the percentage of contacts earning incomes within 
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each of eleven $15,000 intervals ($0 ± $15,000; $15,000 - « The 
final interval was open-ended (all incomes of $150,000 upward). Household income 
was defined as ³«WKHcombined annual earnings of all household members from all 
sources, including wages, commissions, bonuses, Social Security and other retirement 
benefits, XQHPSOR\PHQWFRPSHQVDWLRQGLVDELOLW\LQWHUHVWDQGGLYLGHQGV´  Social 
FRQWDFWVZHUHGHILQHGDV³«adults you have been in personal, face-to-face contact with 
DWOHDVWWZLFHWKLV\HDUIRUH[DPSOHIULHQGVIDPLO\FROOHDJXHVDQGRWKHUDFTXDLQWDQFHV´ 
(Galesic et al., 2012). Using an identical procedure, participants then estimated the 
distribution of annual household income acURVVWKH³HQWLUH86SRSXODWLRQ´The order of 
the distribution estimation tasks was not counterbalanced2.2.4   
Two questions assessing perceived fairness of and satisfaction with the US 
LQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQIROORZHGHJ³7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXIHHOWKDWKRXVHKROGLQFRPHV
are fairly-XQIDLUO\GLVWULEXWHGDFURVVWKH86SRSXODWLRQ´ Extremely Fair; 9 = 
Extremely Unfair, reverse-coded prior to analysis).  These items were highly correlated 
(r =.88) and their mean formed a composite measure of perceived fairness.  
  Redistributive attitudes were assessed using four items Į  adapted from 
the Gallup Poll Social Audit Survey (HJ³7KHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWH
                                                          
Footnote 2.2 
To examine order effects, a further study was conducted in which a sample of US MTurkers (N = 306) 
estimated social circle and population distributions in counterbalanced order with a 2 minute filler task. In 
a moderated mediation analysis (PROCESS model 14, 10,000 resamples), presentation order did not 
moderate the indirect effect of own income on population mean income via social circles, b = - .09, SE = 
.11, p =.38. The indirect relationship between own income and population mean income was the same 





ZHDOWKWKURXJKKHDY\WD[HVRQWKHULFK´1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree).  In 
a final section, participants provided demographic information, including annual 
household income, and rated their political orientations (1 = Extremely Liberal; 9 = 
Extremely Conservative). Examples of the Study 1a estimation tasks and a complete list 
of questionnaire items appear in Appendix I. 
Study 1b 
Participants  
US participants were recruited online (N = 321, 48.4% male; Mage = 35.06 years; SDage 
= 10.92) via $PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN0turk; Buhrmester et al., 2011). As in Study 
1a, only individuals of 25 years or over were requested to complete the survey, but 24 
participants reported being younger than this.  Reported analyses include these 
participants; excluding them did not affect results.  In Study 1b, 8.9% of the sample 
reported household incomes placing them in the wealthiest 20% of the US population, 
and 20.5%, 27.5%, 21.5%, and 20.9% reported household incomes in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
and 5th wealthiest quintiles respectively.  Sample size was determined a priori based on 
budgetary considerations. Data collection proceeded until the predetermined sample size 
was reached. Although 300 participants were requested, an additional 21 did not 
complete the entire survey and provided only partial data. 
Materials and Procedure 
  
Study 1b utilised a novel response method in which participants were asked to estimate 
mean incomes across quintiles (i.e., each 20%) of their social circles and the US 
population.  Compared to the method used in Study 1a, participants are required to 
PDNHXVHRIWKHVDPH³UDZ´ data (available knowledge of incomes), and are equally 
subject to the environmental constraints proposed in the social sampling model.  The 
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method here is more time-efficient, and the use of different response formats in the two 
studies builds confidence in the robustness of the findings.  Participants also provided 
explicit estimates of social circle and population mean incomes and rated levels of 
inequality. 
Participants first estimated the mean annual household income within each 
income quintile (i.e., lowest to highest earning 20%) of their social contacts, and then 
within each quintile of the US population as a whole, on sliding scales (ranging from 
$1000 - $250,000 in $100 units).  Social contacts and household income were defined 
as per Study 1a.  In addition, participants provided an explicit estimate of the mean 
income across their social circles, and another for the entire US population, on a sliding 
scale (ranging from $1000 - $100,000 in $100 units).  Participants provided ratings of 
inequality across both their social circles and the US population (2 items for each, e.g., 
³7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHKRXVHKROGLQFRPHVHTXDOO\± unequally distributed across your 
social contacts (the population of the United States)´ =  Very Equally; 6 = Very 
Unequally; r = .48 and r = .62 respectively.  Participants then responded to the same 
fairness and satisfaction items used in Study 1a (r = .81; 1 = Extremely Fair/Satisfied; 6 
= Extremely Unfair/Dissatisfied, reverse-coded prior to analysis).  Redistributive 
attitudes were assessed with the four-item scale used in SWXG\DĮ  Strongly 
Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree). Three items (Į  assessed perceived self-interest in 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQHJ³To what extent do you feel that redistribution of wealth through tax 
DQGZHOIDUHLVLQDJUHHPHQWZLWK\RXURZQILQDQFLDOLQWHUHVWV´1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 
= Strongly Agree).  A further three items (Į  assessed political orientation ³+RZ
ZRXOG\RXGHVFULEH\RXUSROLWLFDODWWLWXGHV´ Very Liberal/Very Left-Wing/Strong 
Democrat; 7 = Very Conservative/Very Right-Wing/Strong Republican).  In a final 
section, participants provided demographic information including annual household 
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income. Examples of the Study 1b estimation tasks and additional questionnaire items 
(those not included in Study 1a) appear in Appendix II. 
2.3. Results 
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b display estimated population and social circle distributions of 
household income, respectively, for high and low-income participants (the highest and 
lowest earning third of the sample) in Study 1a. Figures 2.2a and 2.2b display estimated 
population and social circle distributions of household income, respectively, for high 
and low-income participants (the highest and lowest earning third of the sample) in 
Study 1b.  Correlations, means and standard deviations for the Study 1a and Study 1b 
variables are presented in Table 2.1.  Due to the scaling of the measures, all analyses 
across both studies were conducted on standardized data. 
In Study 1a, within-participant (social circle and population) mean incomes and 
Gini indices were estimated on the assumption of complete homogeneity of incomes 
within each income interval. Following the advice of Ravallion (1992), incomes in the 
lowest interval were set at 80% of the upper bound of the interval ($12,000) and 
incomes in the highest interval were set at 30% above the lower bound ($195,000). 
Incomes within all intervening intervals were assumed to be equivalent to the interval 
midpoint (e.g., all incomes in $15,000 ± $30,000 were set at $22,500). Weighted mean 
incomes were derived by calculating the total income at each interval, summing these 
totals, and dividing across the population (i.e., by N = 100). Cumulative proportions of 
total income at each X % of the population were derived following the same 
assumptions, allowing for approximation of the Gini index with trapezoids. Where Xk is 
the cumulative proportion of the population and Yk is the cumulative proportion of 
income indexed in non-decreasing order, the resulting approximation for the Gini index 








Study 1a average estimated social circle (Fig. 2.1a) and population (Fig. 2.1b) income 
distributions (estimated percent across income intervals) as a function of participant income. 
Poorer and wealthier participants are the bottom and top third, respectively, ranked by household 




            Figure 2.2a 
 
                           Figure 2.2b 
 
 
Study 1b average estimated social circle (Fig. 2.2a) and population (Fig. 2.2b) income 
distribution (estimated mean incomes across quintiles) as a function of participant income. 
Poorer and wealthier participants are the bottom and top third, respectively, ranked by 
household income (data for the middle income third is not displayed for clarity). 
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Table 2.1. Means and intercorrelations of Study 1a and Study 1b variables (continued overleaf) 
 
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Study 1a                   
1. Household Income $54,732 ($47,238) -               
2. Social circle mean  
  income $54,294 ($25,295) .48*** -             
3. Population mean  
     income $58,604 ($17,230) .19*** .34*** -           
4. Social circle inequality 
(Gini Index) 26.35 (9.97) -.12* -.11 -.09 -         
5. Population inequality 
     (Gini Index) 35.51 (7.48) -.07 -.15* -.05 .21*** -       
6. Fairness/Satisfaction 3.54 (2.02) .18** .24*** .17** -.08 -.16** -     
7. Support for 
redistribution  3.91 (1.15) -.21*** -.25*** -.18** .06 .15** -.70*** -   
8. Political Preferences 4.47 (2.23) .15** .15* -.01 -0.05 -.14* .42*** -.57*** - 
Study 1b (derived mean income/inequality indices)                 
1. Household Income $55,500 ($55,999) -               
2. Derived social circle 
mean income $65,980 ($36,419) .42*** -             
3. Derived population 
mean income $83,992 ($28,214) .11 .51*** -           
4. Derived social circle 
inequality (Gini Index) 30.31 (11.87) -.06 .01 -.07 -         
5. Derived population 
inequality (Gini Index) 41.64 (11.09) -.02 -.19*** -.14** .34*** -       
6. Fairness/Satisfaction 2.28 (1.31) .14* .14* .16** -.22*** -.22*** -     
7. Support for 
redistribution  4.09 (1.23) -.21*** -.21*** -.09 .14* .18** -.71*** -   
8. Political Preferences 3.53 (1.49) .13* .12* .07 -.06 -.14* .49*** -.61*** - 
9. Self-interest in 















         
Table 2.1 (continued). 
 
         
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Study 1b (direct mean income/inequality ratings) 
1. Household Income $55,500 ($55,999) -               
2. Estimated social circle 
mean income $48,184 ($22,829) .60*** -             
3. Estimated population 
mean income $44,054 ($13,142) .18** .32*** -           
4. Estimated social circle 
inequality 4.06 (1.15) -.01 -.05 .09 -         
5. Estimated population 
inequality  5.34 (.91) .15* .06 -.05 .20*** -       
6. Fairness/Satisfaction 2.28 (1.31) - .18** .11 -.19** -.41*** -     
7. Support for 
redistribution  4.09 (1.23) - -.19** -.03 .09 .28*** - -   
8. Political Preferences 3.53 (1.49) - .05 .03 -.08 -.18** - - - 
9. Self-interest in 
redistribution 3.53 (1.19) - -.23*** -.02 .06 .18** - - - 
 
Note.  Higher values indicate more of each construct. Higher values for the political preferences measure indicate greater Conservatism, 
and higher values for evaluations indicate more favorable evaluations. Redundant coefficients have been deleted from the lower 
panel.  
 






In Study 1b, (social circle and population) mean incomes and Gini indices were 
calculated directly on estimated quintile mean incomes (i.e., the mean of estimated 
quintile mean incomes). These Gini indices capture the inequality between the mean 
incomes of the poorest through wealthiest quintiles (as opposed to inequality 
approximated continuously across each X percent of the population). These methods 
were chosen for computational simplicity, and enabled simultaneous computation of 
mean incomes and Gini¶s across all participants using a bespoke spreadsheet. 
From Social Sampling Effects to Policy Preferences 
:HILUVWH[DPLQHGZKHWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQFRPHwas indirectly related to redistributive 
preferences sequentially via social circle mean income, population mean income and 
fairness/satisfaction. Bootstrapped mediation analyses (10,000 resamples) examined the 
indirect relationship of income to redistributive preferences via these mediators using 
the PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 6; see Hayes, 2012), separately for Study 1a and 
1b participants.  Designed to specifically test hypotheses of serial mediation in which 
the sequence of mediators represents an assumed causal chain, this procedure estimates 
path coefficients and 95% bias-FRUUHFWHGDFFHOHUDWHGFRQILGHQFHLQWHUYDOV%&D&,¶V
for the total and all possible specific indirect effects of X on Y.  Political orientation was 
included as a covariate in analyses for both Study 1a and 1b data.  Perceived self-
interest in redistribution was an additional covariate in Study 1b.  In both studies, we 
also controlled for population Gini since this was negatively related to estimated mean 
incomes.  We repeated the analyses without the covariates included and obtained similar 
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results. Eight participants in Study 1a, and 26 in Study 1b, were excluded from these 
analyses due to missing data (principally, household income)2.3.5  
As expected, in Study 1a the relationship between participant income and 
redistributive preferences was sequentially mediated through social circle mean income, 
population mean income, and then fairness/satisfaction, controlling for political 
RULHQWDWLRQDQGSRSXODWLRQ*LQL%&D&,¶VRI-.02 and -.003, indirect effect = -.01).  No 
other indirect effects attained significance.  The direct effect of household income was 
not significant after accounting for the proposed mediators and covariateV%&D&,¶VRI
-.12 and -.05, direct effect = -.03). 
In Study 1b, separate mediation analyses were conducted for mean incomes and 
LQHTXDOLW\LQGLFHVGHULYHGIURPHVWLPDWHGGLVWULEXWLRQVDQGWKHQIURPSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
direct estimates.  As predicted, for derived mean incomes, the relationship between  
participant income and redistributive preferences was sequentially mediated through 
social circle mean income, population mean income, and fairness/satisfaction, 
controlling for political orientation, population Gini and perceived self-interest in 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQ%&D&,¶VRI-.03 and -.01, indirect effect = -.02).  An indirect path from 
household income to redistributive preferences via mean social circle income was also 
                                                          
Footnote 2.3 
Two participants were additionally excluded from Study 1b analyses due to outlying income scores 
(+4.72 and +10.62 SD). The indirect effect of income on redistribution via directly estimated mean 
incomes is not significant when these participants are included. In Study 1a, two participants also reported 
household incomes above +4 SD (+4.66 and +6.25), however, excluding these participants did not affect 
the results and hence their GDWDZDVUHWDLQHGLQWKHUHSRUWHGDQDO\VHVZKHQH[FOXGHG%&D&,¶VRI-.02 
and -.002, indirect effect = -.-.0 for the sequential mediation of income on redistributive preferences 




VLJQLILFDQW%&D&,¶VRI-.08 and -.002, indirect effect = -.04).  The direct effect of 
household income was not significant after accounting for the proposed mediators and 
FRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.05 and .12, direct effect = .04).   
Repeating this analysis on the Study 1b direct estimates of mean social circle and 
population incomes produced similar results; the relationship between participant 
income and redistributive preferences was sequentially mediated through social circle 
mean income, through population mean income, through evaluations, controlling for 
political orientation and perceived self-LQWHUHVWLQUHGLVWULEXWLRQ%&D&,¶VRI-.02 and -
.001, indirect effect = -.01).  The direct effect of household income was not significant 
after accounting for the proposed mediators and covariates (BCD&,¶VRI-.07 and .11, 
direct effect = .02). 
As shown in Figures 2.3a (Study 1a), 2.3b (Study 1b derived measures) and 2.3c 
(Study 1b direct estimates), higher (vs. lower) income participants estimated more 
efficient social circle distributions, and consequently, more efficient population 
distributions. In turn, increased efficiency was related to more fairness and lower 
support for redistribution.  
In Study 1b, we also sought to examine the accuracy of both poorer (lowest 
income third of sample) and ZHDOWKLHUKLJKHVWLQFRPHWKLUGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶HVWLPDWHVE\
comparing them with external data. The derived mean incomes of both poorer (M = 
$81,215, SD = $31,228) and wealthier (M = $86,249, SD = $23,635) participants were 
significantly above the mean US household income of $71,274 (obtained from US 
Census Bureau data for 2012), t (102) = 3.23, p = .002 and t (104) = 6.49, p < .001 for 
poorer and wealthier participants, respectively. Derived estimates did not differ between 
poorer and wealthier participants, t (206) = 1.31, p = .19. In contrast, directly estimated 




Figure 2.3a.  
6WXG\DLQGLUHFWSDWKYLDGHULYHGPHDQLQFRPHLQGLFHVSROLWLFDOLGHRORJ\DQGGHULYHGSRSXODWLRQ*LQL¶V
were included as covariates). The total effect is given is given in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 2.3b.  
Study 1b indirect path via derived mean income indices (political ideology, perceived self-interest in 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQDQGGHULYHGSRSXODWLRQ*LQL¶VZHUHLQFOXGHGDVFRYDULDWHV The total effect is given is 
given in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 2.3c.  
Study 1b indirect path via direct mean income ratings (political ideology and perceived self-interest in 
redistribution were included as covariates). The total effect is given is given in parentheses. 
 

 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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$47,643, SD = $11,536) participants were significantly below the mean US household 
income of $71,274, t (100) = 21.44, p < .001 and t (102) = 20.79, p < .001 for poorer 
DQGZHDOWKLHUSDUWLFLSDQWVUHVSHFWLYHO\3RRUHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLUHFWHVWLPDWHVZHUHKHQFH
less acFXUDWHLQVRIDUDVWKH\ZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\ORZHUWKDQZHDOWKLHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶t 
(202) = 4.21, p <.001.  
Testing Alternative Mechanisms 
We next sought to examine the potential mediating role of ideological variables in the 
relation between household income and redistributive preferences, and to compare the 
relative size of indirect relations via ideological and ecological pathways.  Parallel 
mediation analyses 352&(66PRGHOUHVDPSOH¶VZHUHconducted testing the 
relation of income to redistribution via social circle mean incomes and ideological 
variables (political ideology and self-interest) simultaneously, for both Studies 1a and 
1b. In Study 1a, a contrast of the indirect relation of income to attitudes to redistribution 
via social circles (%&D&,¶s of -.15 and -.01, indirect effect = -.07) and political 
ideology (%&D&,¶s of -.19 and -.04, indirect effect = -.11) revealed no difference in the 
size of the indirect effect via these parallel pathways (%&D&,¶s of -.11 and .06, effect = 
.04). In Study 1b, contrasts of the indirect relation of income to attitudes to 
redistribution via derived social circle means (%&D&,¶s of -.07 and .0001, indirect 
effect = -.03), political ideology (%&D&,¶s of -.12 and -.003, indirect effect = -.06) and 
self-interest (%&D&,¶s of -.21 and -.09, indirect effect = -.16) revealed no difference in 
the size of the (non-significant) indirect path via social circles compared to that via 
political ideology (%&D&,¶s of -.04 and .09, effect = .03). The indirect path via self-
interest, however, was significantly greater than the indirect path via both social circles 
(%&D&,¶s of .05 and .19, effect = .11) and political ideology (%&D&,¶s of .01 and .16, 
effect = .09). Repeating this analysis for the Study 1b directly estimated social circle 
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means produced the same pattern of results (effect via social circles = effect via political 
ideology; effect via self-interest > effect via political ideology and effect via social 
circles), with the exception that the indirect path via social circles attained significance 
(%&D&,¶s of -.12 and -.01, effect = -.06).  
To summarise, these models show that, in Study 1a, income was negatively, 
indirectly related to support for redistribution to the same extent via both ideological 
and ecological pathways. Contrastingly, for Study 1b, derived social circle mean 
income was negatively, indirectly related to support for redistribution via ideological 
variables (political ideology and self-interest) only, and to a greater extent via self-
interest specifically. Similarly, for Study 1b directly estimated social circle mean 
income, although both the ideological and ecological variables accounted for the 
negative relation between income and support for redistribution, the path via self-
interest specifically was most influential.   
Study 2 
,Q6WXGLHVDDQGESDUWLFLSDQWV¶VXEMHFWLYHHVWLPDWHVRIWKHLQFRPHGLVWUibution across 
their social contacts were assumed to reflect the natural sample of incomes to which 
they are exposed in their day-to-day lives. This assumption is shared by other studies of 
social sampling effects, which have also relied on subjective estimates (e.g., Galesic et 
al., 2011).  However, variance in these subjective estimates may be attributable to 
psychological factors as well as objective differences in social circles. For example, 
participants may anchor upon their own income to estimate social circle incomes 
(Krüger, 1999).  
The present study examines whether the previous findings could be conceptually 
replicated using an objective indicator of social circle incomes. Specifically, using data 
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from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Survey (NZAVS; 2009), we examined 
whether household income is indirectly related to perceived economic/social fairness 
via neighbourhood-level economic deprivation, independent of political ideology and 
other control variables.  
2.4. Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 4634 registered voters in New Zealand, for whom complete data for 
the measures analyzed here were available (2681 women, 1953 men). Participants, of 
whom 79.2% were born in New Zealand and 79.2% were employed, had a mean age of 
47.25 (SD = 14.66).  Mean household income was $85,552 (SD = $71,154).  The 
majority of missing data were due to non-reported household income.  
Sampling Procedure  
The full Time 1 (2009) NZAVS contained responses from 6518 participants sampled 
from the 2009 New Zealand electoral roll. The electoral roll is publicly available for 
scientific research and in 2009 contained 2,986,546 registered voters. This represented 
all citizens over 18 years of age who were eligible to vote regardless of whether they 
chose to vote, barring people who had their contact details removed due to specific 
case-by-case concerns about privacy. The sample frame was split into three parts. 
Sample Frame 1 constituted a random sample of 25,000 people from the electoral roll 
(4,060 respondents). Sample Frame 2 constituted a second random sample of a further 
10,000 people from the electoral roll (1,609 respondents).  
Sample Frame 3 constituted a booster sample of 5,500 people randomly selected 
from meshblock area units of the country with a high proportioQRI0ƗRUL3DFLILF
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Nations and Asian peoples (671 respondents). Statistics New Zealand (2014) define a 
meshblock as:  
³«Whe smallest geographic unit for which statistical data is collected and 
processed by Statistics New Zealand. A meshblock is a defined 
geographic area, varying in size from part of a city block to large areas of 
rural land. Each meshblock abuts against another to form a network 
covering all of New Zealand including coasts and inlets, and extending 
out to the two hundred mile economic zone. Meshblocks are added 
WRJHWKHUWRµEXLOGXS¶ODUJHUJHRJUDSKLFDUHDVVXFKDVDUHDXQLWVDQGXUEDQ
areas. They are also the principal unit used to draw-up and define 
electoral district and local authority boundaries´  
Meshblocks were selected using ethnic group proportions based on 2006 
national census data. A further 178 people responded but did not provide contact details 
and so could not be matched to a sample frame.  
In sum, postal questionnaires were sent to 40,500 registered voters or roughly 
1.36% of all registered voters in New Zealand. The overall response rate (adjusting for 




The individual-level fairness measure was composed from four items Į DYDLODEOH
in the NZAVS that were most conceptually similar to the fairness/satisfaction items 




RSHUDWHVDVLWVKRXOG´DQG³,QJHQHUDO,ILQG1HZ=HDODQGVRFLHW\WREHIDLU´ (1 = 
Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree). Two further items were included from the 
National Wellbeing Index (Tilioune, Cummins & Davern, 2006). Respondents rated 
WKHLUVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK³7KHHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQLQ1HZ=HDODQG´DQG³7KHVRFLDO
FRQGLWLRQVLQ1HZ=HDODQG´ (1 = Completely Dissatisfied; 10 = Completely Satisfied). 
Items were standardised prior to averaging to account for differences in scaling. 
Meshblock Deprivation 
The NZDep2006 Scale of Deprivation (Salmond, Crampton & Atkinson, 2007) is a 
neighbourhood-level measure of relative socioeconomic deprivation based on national 
census data, combining weighted information on the proportion of people in a given 
meshblock (geographical unit) experiencing various dimensions of deprivation (e.g., the 
proportion of people in receipt of a means-tested benefit, not living in their own home, 
aged 16-24 and unemployed, with no access to a car; the proportion of equivalized 
households with income below an income threshold). The scale ranges from 1-10, 
dividing New Zealand into deciles according to the distribution of the principal 
component scores derived from these dimensions, with a score of 10 (1) indicating that 
a given area is in the most (least) deprived 10% of areas in New Zealand according to 
the NZDep2006 scores. The NZDep2006 scale was used in the present analysis as an 
REMHFWLYHSUR[\IRUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOFLUFOHHVWLPDWHVRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW
individuals living in more/less deprived areas will tend to have relatively 
poorer/wealthier social contacts. Insofar as geographic mobility and communication 
technologies allow for social ties with people from other regions, it should be 
acknowledged that the NZdep2006 may underestimate the variance in income levels to 
which people are exposed via their social contacts, and is hence by no means a perfect 
alternative to estimated social circle distributions. All else being equal, this may result 
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in underestimation of social sampling effects. Nevertheless, prior research and theory 
emphasises spatial proximity as a key defining feature of social networks (Reagans, 
2011; McPherson et al., 2001; Wellman, 1996). Our sample contained 4226 unique 
meshblock area units, with 1.09 participants per unit (SD = .33, range 1-5). The 
geographic size of these meshblock units differs depending on population density, but 
each unit tends to cover a region containing a median of roughly 90 residents (M = 103, 
SD = 72, range = 3-1,431). In 2013, at the time of the latest census, there were a total of 
46,637 meshblocks.  Mean area-unit deprivation across meshblock units included in the 
sample was 4.91 (SD = 2.82).   
Covariates  
Political orientation was measured in the NZAVS on a 7-point scale (1 = Extremely 
Conservative; 7 = Extremely Liberal) and was included in the model. Other control 
variables were age, gender (0 = Male; 1 = Female), whether the respondent was born in 
New Zealand (0 = No; 1 = Yes) and whether the respondent was in paid employment (0 
= No; 1 = Yes). 
2.5. Results 
As anticipated, the relationship between household income and fairness was mediated 
via meshblock deprivation score, after accounting for the aforementioned control 
YDULDEOHV%&D&,¶VRIDQGLQGLUHFWHIIHFW ); wealthier respondents 
lived in less deprived neighbourhoods and consequently perceived New Zealand to be a 
more fair society. The direct effect of household income on fairness remained 
VLJQLILFDQW%&D&,¶VRIDQGdirect effect = .065). The outcome of the model 
was the same whether we took the two General System Justification items only, the two 
National Wellbeing Index items only, or all four items as the criterion variable.     
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To ensure that these results did not depend on a particular operationalization of 
neighborhood wealth or economic attitudes, we tested a number of conceptually similar 
models, substituting different measures of each construct.  For example, we found that 
significant indirect paths ran from household income through neighborhood median 
income, the proportion of poor relative to wealthy residents and the proportion of 
residents in receipt of state benefits.  These indirect paths were significant whether we 
took fairness, General System Justification, National Wellbeing Index, or voting for the 
National party (the incumbent, economically conservative party) as outcome measures 
(these analyses appear in Table S1, Appendix III). 
Similarly to Studies 1a and 1b, a parallel mediation model (PROCESS model 4, 
10,000 resamples) was tested to compare the relative contribution of income to fairness 
via ecological (neighbourhood deprivation) and ideological (political ideology) 
pathways (age, gender, employment status and whether participants were born in New 
Zealand were included as controls). A contrast of the indirect relation of income to 
fairness via neighbourhood deprivation (%&D&,¶s of .008 and .019, indirect effect = -
.013) and political ideology (%&D&,¶s of -.0001 and .002, indirect effect = .001) 
revealed that the indirect effect was only significant via neighbourhood deprivation, and 
that this relationship was significantly greater than the (non-significant) pathway via 
political ideology (%&D&,¶s of .007 and .019, effect = .013). In sum, this model 
suggests that the ecological variable alone, neighbourhood-level deprivation, accounts 
for the positive relation between income and fairness.   
2.6. General Discussion 
The present findings confirm that self-interest (Study 1b) and ideological motivations 
(Studies 1a and 1b) are important contributors to the differing economic attitudes of 
wealthier and poorer people (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Meltzer & Richard, 1981).  
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The present findings also uncover another mechanism.  Consistent with theory and 
research on social sampling effects, wealthier (relative to poorer) Americans reported 
moving in wealthier social circles, and extrapolated from them when estimating wealth 
levels across America as a whole (Studies 1a, 1b).  In turn, consistent with theory on 
normative justice judgments, these estimates were associated with the perceived fairness 
of wealth distribution in America, and opposition to redistribution.    
These results suggest that the rich and poor do not simply have different views 
about how wealth should be distributed across society.  Rather, they subjectively 
experience living in subtly ± but importantly ± different societies.  Thus, in the 
relatively affluent America inhabited by wealthier Americans, there is less need to 
distribute wealth more equally (Mitchell et al., 1993; Scott et al., 2001).  Study 2, using 
data from New Zealand, shows that this is not unique to the USA.  It also demonstrates 
that the relaWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSHRSOH¶VRZQLQFRPHDQGWKHLUDWWLWXGHVWRZDUG
redistribution is mediated by objective metrics of wealth levels in their social circles. 
This provides new validation of the social sampling perspective, which assumes that 
cognition is determined by objective ecological conditions, but has been tested using 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶VXEMHFWLYHSHUFHSWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQREMHFWLYHPHDVXUHVRIWKRVHFRQGLWLRQV
(Galesic et al., 2012).    
On balance, the present data seem to suggest that sampling processes and 
ideology are perhaps equally important in explaining the negative relation between 
income and economic attitudes. Recall that both ideology and social samples mediated 
the relation between income and support for redistribution to a similar extent in Study 
1a, and neighbourhood deprivation (but not political attitudes) mediated the relation 
between income and fairness in Study 2. The present findings, however, cannot be 
interpreted as suggesting that social sampling processes play a relatively more important 
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role in determining economic attitudes generally than either self-interest or ideology. As 
is underscored by the Study 1a and 1b zero-order correlations (see Table 1) between 
political attitudes/social circles on the one side, and support for redistribution/fairness 
on the other, political attitudes seemingly bear a stronger direct relationship to economic 
attitudes than do social samples. Furthermore, in Study 1b, self-interest emerged as the 
only significant mediator of the relation between income and support for redistribution. 
Hence, although social sampling processes help explain (i.e., mediate) the differing 
economic attitudes of wealthier and poorer individuals, self-interest perhaps plays a 
more powerful role in this regard, and both political attitudes and self-interest are more 
powerful direct determinants of economic attitudes than social sampling. It should, 
however, be appreciated that, insofar as attitudes to inequality and redistribution are in 
and of themselves components of political ideology, (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), strong 
relationships between political ideology and support for redistribution likely reflect 
some degree of redundancy between these variables (and similarly so for self-interest in, 
and support for, redistribution).  
We suggest that the processes observed here are antagonistic to political efforts 
to reduce inequality.  As inequality grows, wealth is becoming more spatially 
concentrated (Massey & Fischer, 2003).  This may lead to increasingly dissociated 
enclaves of political perception and preference.  Further, the disproportionate political 
power heOGE\ZHDOWKLHUFLWL]HQ¶VPHDQVWKDWWKHLUUHODWLYHO\OHVVHJDOLWDULDQHFRQRPLF
preferences will tend to hold sway (Bonica, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, 2013).  
Social sampling may also be antagonistic to rational political thought.  It 
DVVXPHVRQH¶VVRFLal circles are representative of wider society, and so can be seen as a 




hierarchy and their position within it.  This ability is prerequisite for rational decision 
making in models of political economy (Cruces, Perez Truglia & Tetaz, 2011; Meltzer 
and Richard, 1981).   
In contrast, the present results do not support strong claims about the accuracy 
of economic perceptions by specific groups in society.  Poorer (vs. richer) participants¶ 
explicit estimates were less accurate, underestimating mean US incomes to a greater 
extent (Study 1b).  However, these explicit estimates diverged widely from derived 
estimates of mean incomes which were significantly above objective levels, and 
similarly so, for both poorer and richer participants.  This method variance demands 
reticence in judging the overall accuracy of perceptions of economic efficiency.  The 
same appears to be true of perceived economic inequality (Chambers, Swan & 
Heesacker, 2014; Norton & Ariely, 2011), although the present studies do not speak 
GLUHFWO\WRWKDWOLWHUDWXUH$VSHRSOH¶VRZQZHDOWKLQFUHDVHVWKHLUVRFLDOFLUFOHVbecome 
wealthier, but not necessarily more unequal.  For this reason, we did not expect, nor 
REVHUYHLQGLUHFWSDWKVIURPSDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQZHDOWKYLDVRFLDOFLUFOHLQHTXDOLW\WR
national inequality.    
6RFLDOVDPSOLQJH[HPSOLILHVKRZ³FRJQLWLRQLVVLWXDWHd ± not isolated in inner 
representations and processes but causally interdependent with the current physical and 
VRFLDOHQYLURQPHQW´6PLWK	6HPLQS7KHSUHVHQWUHVXOWVKLJKOLJKWWKH
importance of ecological processes for understanding political behaviour, in addition to 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶LGHRORJLHVRUSHUFHLYHGVHOI-interest.  Attitudes to redistribution and the 
economic status quo appear to be subject to (informational) biases in the environment as 







Chapter 2 examined how the distribXWLRQRILQFRPHVLQLQGLYLGXDO¶V immediate social 
environment are systematically related to perceptions of the income distribution across 
wider society via social sampling processes (Galesic et al., 2012). Sampling processes 
apparently lead wealthier people to perceive greater levels of aggregate wealth across 
society, in turn leading them to be relatively more opposed to redistribution than poorer 
people. These findings suggest that divergence in the economic preferences of wealthier 
and poorer individuals cannot be explained entirely by differences in political attitudes 
and material interests. Rather, it is also important to consider how the informational 
VWUXFWXUHRISHRSOHV¶LPPHGLDWHVRFLDOHQYLURQPHQWV\stematically moulds perceptions 
of the income distribution (e.g., Cruces et al., 2013). 
 The present chapter seeks experimental corroboration for the findings described 
in Chapter 2, and for the contention that sampling processes play a causal role in 
determining important economic attitudes. In Studies 3a and 3b, Mechanical Turk 
participants were serially presented with values that comprised either a low or high 
mean (i.e., low vs. high efficiency) sample of incomes, which were ostensibly 
representative of the true UK (Study 3a) or US (Study 3b) household income 
distribution. These studies sought to ascertain whether manipulating perceptions of the 
income distribution in this manner would impact upon perceptions of fairness and 
support for redistributive measures.  
Given the correlational nature of Studies 1a through 2, it is not certain whether 




distortion via selective attention, processing or recall of information in the service of 
reaching a desired conclusion (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski, 1996). The Study 2 
findings do not lend themselves to this interpretation given that the analyses employed 
an objective proxy for social circles (i.e., neighbourhood deprivation) as opposed to 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶estimates. The correlational nature of Study 2 nevertheless leaves room for 
alternative explanations. For example, it is possible (if seemingly unlikely) that the true 
causal path from fairness to income via neighbourhood deprivation is reversed relative 
to the proposed model - people whom perceive New Zealand society as less fair may 
choose to live in poorer neighbourhoods, which renders them prone to poverty.          
As discussed in Chapter 1, prior research and theorising emphasising processes 
of motivated social cognition highlights the tendency for people to distort information 
such that it aligns with prior political beliefs, attitudes, and epistemic and existential 
needs (for a review, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003). For example, 
wealthier people may be prone to strategically estimate more efficient social circle and 
population income distributions as means of justifying their relative economic 
advantage and legitimising opposition to redistributive efforts. Conversely, poorer 
people may estimate less efficient distributions to make their own position appear 
relatively more favourable and maintain positive self-esteem, consistent with a common 
interpretation of the better-than-average effect (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak & 
Vredenburg, 1995). Indeed, research and theory in political psychology suggests that 
members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups alike engage in motivated distortion 
of social and political information in order to preserve the perceived legitimacy of the 
status quo, and their position within it (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Relatedly, prior research 
demonstrates that individuals can strategically misremember information in order to 




A non-motivated alternative to the sampling account may reside in the self-
anchoring phenomenon (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) or, relatedly, egocentric bias 
(e.g., Ross & Sicoly, 1979); people may employ knowledge of their own income in 
estimating the wider distribution, leading to relative overestimation of incomes similar 
to their own. Whether stemming from motivation or erroneous judgment processes, top-
down biases of this kind can account for relationships between income, estimated social 
circle distributions, and estimated population distributions, and predict results similar to 
those obtained in Studies 1a and 1b. 
These alternatives to the social sampling account all imply that systematic 
distortions in the subjective income distributions of wealthier and poorer individuals 
described in Chapter 2 result from subjective, top-down biases in the mind. In such 
accounts, cognitive or motivational biases exist in the mind prior to sampling, and serve 
to determine what information is sampled either internally (i.e., from memory) or 
externally (i.e., from the environment). For example, as implied by one common 
interpretation of confirmation bias (e.g., Jones & Sugden, 2001; Snyder & Swann, 
LQGLYLGXDOVWKDWHQWHUWDLQDJLYHQK\SRWKHVLVHJ³PDQ\$PHULFDQVDUH
ZHDOWK\´PD\EHELDVHGWRZDUGVDPSOLQJFRQILUPDWRU\LQIRUPDWLRQHJZHDOWK\
Americans) from memory or environment. The sampling account, on the other hand, 
suggests that distortion results from interaction between informational biases already 
apparent in the environment itself and the sampling processes that people employ; 
biases often reside in samples prior to any distortion occurring in the mind. Hence the 
sampling account entails that biases in judgement result not from sub-optimally rational 
processes (e.g., heuristics, motivational influences), but from biased samples that 
provide sub-optimal representational input for generally rational cognitive processes. 
Although the resulting outcome, that is, biased or inaccurate judgement, is the same 
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irrespective of whether biasing processes or biased samples are diagnosed as the cause, 
the distinction is not trivial because either would require a different treatment.   
The findings reported in Chapter 2 imply that, as a result of sampling processes, 
living standards across society as a whole appear more favourable from the perspective 
of increasingly wealthy individuals. Prior research and theory suggests that such 
increased perceptions of efficiency will reduce support for efforts aimed at reducing 
inequality - people become less concerned with inequality as efficiency increases, a 
phenomenon termed the equality-efficiency trade-off (Mitchell et al., 1993; Okun, 1975; 
Rawls, 1971; Scott et al., 2001). Presumably, sampling processes promote anti-
egalitarian political attitudes amongst the wealthy in part because higher (perceived) 
efficiency entails aggregate material benefits for society as a whole, as eschewed for 
H[DPSOHLQWKHGRFWULQHRI³WULFNOHGRZQ´HFRQRPLFV,QWKLVPDQQHUVRFLDOVDPSOLQJ
may lead wealthier people to perceive that the economic organisation of society is 
relatively fairer than would be the case given accurate perception, which in turn serves 
to justify anti-egalitarian political attitudes. Correspondingly, interventions that seek to 
increase support for redistributive efforts, for example by increasing empathy for the 
poor or changing political attitudes, may meet with limited success since chronic and 
pervasive sampling processes militate against such efforts via distorted perceptions.  
 In considering the role of sampling processes in judgement biases, some 
UHVHDUFKHUVKDYHHPSOR\HGDPHWDSKRURIKXPDQVDV³QDwYH´LQWXLWLYHVWDWLVWLFLDQV
(Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; Juslin, Winman & Hanson, 2007). To quote Fiedler and Juslin 
(2006), this metaphor captures the notion that: 
³[...] the processes operating on the given input information in general 
provide accurate descriptions of the samples and, as such, are not 
violating normative principles of logic and reasoning. Erroneous 
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judgements rather arise from the naiveté with which the mind takes the 
information input for granted, failing to correct for selectivity and 
constraints imposed on input, reflecting both environmental structures 
aQGVWUDWHJLHVRIVDPSOLQJ´ [p. 4]     
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is an extensive body of evidence to suggest that people 
possess an ability to automatically monitor and store natural frequencies and provide 
reasonably accurate frequency judgements when required to do so (Gigerenzer & 
Murray, 1989; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Lindskog, Winman & Juslin, 2013; Zacks & 
Hasher, 2002;). Hence, it seems a reasonable assumption that individuals are able to 
encode and reproduce, with some degree of accuracy, information concerning the 
distribution of incomes or other indicators of social status that are encountered in their 
day-to-day lives.  
The notion of the intuitive statistician implies that, by and large, social sampling 
processes are rational, obey normative principles of reasoning and produce accurate 
descriptions of the samples encountered. Even if social samples of incomes are drawn 
from the environment in a relatively unbiased fashion (i.e., sampling processes are 
unbiased), individuals are arguably naive to the environmental constraints imposed on 
samples themselves (Fiedler, 2000; Juslin, Winman & Hanson, 2007). As discussed in 
the prior chapters, social environments are structured such that similar individuals (e.g. 
relatively poor or wealthy individuals) tend to live close together and move in similar 
social circles; that is, social networks have a tendency toward homophily (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). Social samples of incomes are thus non-random, varying 
systematically as a function of a persoQ¶VRZQSRVLWLRQLQWKHLQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQ
(Cruces et al., 2013; Galesic et al., 2012).  
83 
 
Further, as noted by Juslin et al. (2007), people are naive to the properties of 
sample statistics and tend to assume that the properties of samples accurately describe 
properties of populations ± WKH\HYLGHQFHDEHOLHILQD³ODZRIVPDOOQXPEHUV´7YHUVN\
& Kahneman, 1971). For example, individuals appear to accurately judge sample 
variance but fail to correct for sample size in generalising to populations, producing 
relative underestimation of population variance (Kareev, Arnon & Horwitz-Zeliger, 
2002). Similarly, individuals may underestimate the probability of rare events in the 
population (e.g., very wealthy individuals) because they do not appreciate that small 
samples are relatively less likely to include them (Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 
2004). The systematic biases in population-level estimates observed in Studies 1a and 
1b, then, potentially reflect a failure to correct (or a relative under-correction) for 
external biases in samples, in combination with naive assumptions about the statistical 
properties of samples in generalizing to populations.  
The present chapter reports two further studies which seek to obtain 
experimental evidence for the notion that differences in available income samples 
impact upon fairness judgements and redistributive preferences independently of 
ideological or other top-down influences. Specifically, in Study 3a, US MTurk 
participants were presented with a series of incomes, ostensibly sampled 
representatively from the distribution of household incomes in the United Kingdom. 
Participants received either a low or high mean (i.e., low vs. high efficiency) 
distribution (inequality, i.e., the Gini index, was held constant). Similarly to Studies 1a 
and 1b, participants were then asked to estimate the population-level income 
distribution, judge the fairness of the distribution, and also the extent to which incomes 
should be redistributed. Study 3b was a direct replication of Study 3a, with the 
exception that participants were informed that incomes were sampled from the United 
States¶ income distribution. In both Studies 3a and 3b, it was predicted that participants 
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would base subsequent population estimates upon the sample presented during the 
study. Hence participants exposed to a high (vs. low) mean sample were expected to 
estimate more efficient (i.e., higher mean) population income distributions. This, in 
turn, was expected to influence redistributive preferences and fairness judgements, such 
that participants exposed to a high mean sample would perceive the distribution to be 
relatively fairer, and would be less inclined to redistribute income. 
3.2. Study 3a Method 
Participants 
US participants were recruited online (N = 203, 50% male; Mage = 35.12 years; 
SDage = 12.04) via $PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUN%XKUmester, Kwang, & 
*RVOLQJIRUDVXUYH\HQWLWOHG³(VWLPDWLQJ6RFLDO'LVWULEXWLRQV´ In keeping with 
previous investigations of the representativeness of MTurk samples (Paolacci, Chandler 
& Ipeirotis, 2010), the incomes of the present sample tended to be somewhat lower, but 
similarly distributed, to the US population as a whole (based on estimates from the US 
Census Bureau, 2013).  Thus, 8.12% of the sample reported household incomes placing 
them in the wealthiest 20% of the US population, and 15.08%, 25.1%, 27.6% and 
24.1% reported household incomes in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th wealthiest quintiles, 
respectively. Sample size was determined a priori based on budgetary considerations. 
For both studies reported herein, ethical approval was obtained from the institutional 
Ethics Committee, and the research was conducted in full accordance with British 





Two income samples were created, a low-wealth sample with a mean income of 
£41,000, and a high-wealth sample with a mean income of £72,000. These mean income 
values were selected to be approximately one standard deviation below/above the mean 
of the Study 1a (within SS) derived mean incomes calFXODWHGIURPSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
estimated population-level income distributions (M = $58,605; SD = $17,231)3.1.6 
Firstly, the low-mean sample was created by using a random number generator to 
produce a normal distribution of 100 values between 5000 and 200,000 with a mean of 
41,000. A linear combination of weights (summing to zero) was then added to the 
distribution to produce positive skew (as is characteristic of income distributions) whilst 
holding the mean of the distribution at 41,000. An iterative process was used to solve 
for a further series of weights to further transform the low-wealth sample, creating a 
new distribution with a mean of 72,000, thus forming the high-wealth sample. Values 
were weighted such that both the range (5,824 ± 182,041) and Gini index (Gini = 35) 
was the same for both low and high wealth samples.  
Measures    
Similarly to Study 1a, participants estimated the complete distribution of annual 
household income across the entire UK population by indicating the percentage earning 
incomes within each of eight £20,000 intervals (£0 ± £20,000; £20,000 - «
£140,000+), using a click-bar histogram.  The final interval was open-ended (all 
incomes of $£140,000 upward). Participants were also asked to directly estimate the 
mean UK household income (using single a click-bar ranging from £100 - £100,000). 
                                                          
Footnote 3.1 
Due to an error in creating the distributions, the mean of the HMD is somewhat lower than +1SD from the 





are household incomes equally ± XQHTXDOO\GLVWULEXWHGDFURVVWKHSRSXODWLRQRIWKH8.´
(1 = Very Equally; 6 = Very UnequallyDQG³7RZKDWH[WHQWLVWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQLQFRPH
between the poorest and wealthiest households in the UK small ± ODUJH´ Very 
Small; 6 = Very Large). The correlation between these two items (r = .33) was too low 
to warrant combining them into a single measure and hence these items were examined 
separately in reported analyses. Perceived fairness of the UK household income 
distribution was assessed using the same two fairness/satisfaction items (r = .79) used 
in Studies 1a and 1b (e.J³7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXIHHOWKDWKRXVHKROGLQFRPHVDUH
fairly-XQIDLUO\GLVWULEXWHGDFURVVWKH8.SRSXODWLRQ´ Extremely Fair; 6 = Extremely 
Unfair). Attitudes toward redistribution were assessed using the same 4-item Gallup 
3ROOVFDOHĮ XVHd in SWXGLHVDDQGEHJ³7KH8.JRYHUQPHQWVKRXOG
UHGLVWULEXWHZHDOWKWKURXJKWD[HVRQWKHULFK´ Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly 
Agree). Perceived self-interest in redistribution was measured using the same three-item 
VFDOHĮ XVHGLQ6tudy 1b HJ³To what extent do you feel that redistribution of 
ZHDOWKWKURXJKWD[DQGZHOIDUHLVLQDJUHHPHQWZLWK\RXURZQILQDQFLDOLQWHUHVWV´1 = 
Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree). Political attitudes were assessed with the same 
three-item scale (Į XVHGLQ6tudy 1b ³+RZZRXOG\RXGHVFULEH\RXUSROLWLFDO
DWWLWXGHV´ Very Liberal/Very Left-Wing/Strong Democrat; 7 = Very 
Conservative/Very Right-Wing/Strong Republican).  In a final section, participants 
provided basic demographic information (gender, age, education, household income), 
indicated whether or not they were born in the US, and if not, how long they had been 




At the very beginning of the survey, which was presented via Qualtrics survey software, 
participants were instructed that ³[«@we are interested in peoples' accuracy in 
estimating how various attributes are distributed across a wider population on the basis 
of a representative subsample of the distribution. You will be shown a series of either 
IQ scores, reaction times or household incomes that are representative of the underlying 
population distribution from which they were drawn. You will then be asked to estimate 
what proportion of people fall in each of several consecutive intervals´ This instruction 
served to facilitate the cover story that the study was concerned with estimating 
distributions in general and not specifically income distributions (all participants saw an 
income distribution only). The purpose of this cover story was to reduce any suspicion 
that the study was interested in political attitudes and their relationship to perceived 
income distributions. On the following screen, participants were given a definition of 
household income (as per Studies 1a and 1b) and were informed that they would view a 
series of household incomes that were probabilistically sampled (a simple definition 
was provided) from UK census data, and were hence representative of the true UK 




income per page. Each income appeared on the screen for 2 seconds before the page 
automatically advanced. Both high and low wealth series were presented in a fixed-
random order, such that incomes within each consecutive quartile (i.e., each consecutive 
25 incomes) were fully-randomised across participants, but all participants viewed 
quartiles in increasing order (i.e., lowest through highest income quartile). Participants 
then completed the dependent measures in the order they are described above and were 
fully debriefed as to the true aims of the study.    
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3.3. Study 3a Results 
Weighted-mean incomes and Gini indices of estimated income distributions were 
calculated using the same procedure used in Study 1a. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations appear in the upper panel of Table 3.1, and Figure 3.1 graphs mean 
estimated distributions for both the low and high sample wealth conditions against the 
values actually presented in either condition.  
Firstly, independent t-tests were conducted to examine the effect of sample 
wealth level on the key dependent measures. As can be seen in the upper panel of Table 
3.1, the sample wealth manipulation H[HUWHGDFOHDULPSDFWXSRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
population estimates; both derived and directly estimated means were significantly 
higher in the high versus low mean sample condition. Unexpectedly, Gini indices were 
also found to differ between sample wealth conditions; participants in the high sample 
wealth condition estimated less unequal distributions. Overtly measured perceptions of 
inequality did not differ between the low and high sample wealth conditions. Contrary 
to expectations, perceived fairness and support for redistribution did not differ 
significantly between the high and low sample wealth conditions. 
Subsequent analyses sought to examine whether sample wealth level exerted any 
indirect effect on redistributive preferences sequentially via derived/estimated 
SRSXODWLRQPHDQLQFRPHV*LQL¶VHVWLPDWHGLQHTXDOLW\DQGVXEVHTXHQWO\IDLUQHVV
Similarly to Studies 1a and 1b, bootstrapped mediation analyses (10,000 resamples) 
examined the indirect effect of sample wealth level on redistributive preferences via the 
proposed mediators using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 6; see Hayes, 2012, 
2013). Political preference and perceived self-interest in redistribution were included as 
covariates in all models. Due to the scaling of the incomes measures, all analyses were 
conducted on standardised data. 
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Figure 3.1. Study 3a mean estimated population-level distributions in the low (left) and high (right) mean 
conditions against low and high mean distributions actually presented.  
 
 
Study 3a Mediation Analyses 
Contrary to expectations, sample wealth level was not found to exert any indirect effect 
on redistributive preferences via derived mean income and fairness, either with the 
UHOHYDQWFRYDULDWHVLQFOXGHG%&D&,¶VRI-.12 and .04, indirect effect = -.03), or without 
FRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.17 and .04, indirect effect = -.05). No other indirect effects 
attained significance. Sample wealth level, however, was found to exert an indirect 
effect on redistributive preferences sequentially via Gini indices and fairness, both with 
WKHUHOHYDQWFRYDULDWHVLQFOXGHGLQWKHPRGHO%&D&,¶VRI-.07 and -.003, indirect effect 
= -DQGZLWKRXWFRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.09 and -.004, indirect effect = -.03). No 
other indirect effects attained significance. As shown in Figure 3.2 participants in the 
high sample wealth condition estimated less unequal population income distributions, 
perceived the distribution to be fairer, and were consequently less supportive of 
redistributive efforts.  
The above analyses were repeated for direct mean income and inequality 
estimates. Sample wealth level was not found to exert any indirect effect on  
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Figure 3.2. Study 3a indirect effect of distribution manipulation on support for redistribution via 
population Gini index and fairness. The total effect is given in parentheses. 
 
 
redistributive preferences via directly estimated mean income and fairness, either with 
WKHUHOHYDQWFRYDULDWHVLQFOXGHG%&D&,¶VRI-.14 and .002, indirect effect = -.06), or 
ZLWKRXWFRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.18 and .004, indirect effect = -.07). No other indirect 
effects attained significance. Furthermore, sample wealth level was not found to exert 
any indirect effect on redistributive preferences sequentially via directly estimated 
inequality and fairness, both with the relevant covariates (i.e., political attitudes and 
self-LQWHUHVWLQUHGLVWULEXWLRQLQFOXGHGLQWKHPRGHO%&D&,¶VRI-.06 and .04, indirect 
effect = -RUZLWKRXWFRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.07 and .06, indirect effect = -.01). No 
other indirect effects attained significance.  
3.4. Study 3a Discussion 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, mean estimated income distributions reasonably 
approximate the underlying shape of the low or high wealth samples that were presented 
in the learning task. Although participants in the high sample wealth condition 
estimated significantly less unequal distributions (recall that range and Gini were in fact 
held constant), overtly measured perceptions of inequality did not differ between 
conditions; participants in the high sample wealth condition estimated, but did not 
apparently perceive (quite correctly), lesser inequality. The sample wealth manipulation 
was, however, clearly successful; participants in the high sample wealth condition both 
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estimated significantly more efficient distributions and provided higher point-estimates 
of mean income, although, contrary to expectations, the manipulation did not translate 
into between-condition differences in either fairness or support for redistribution. 
Further, no indirect effect of the sample wealth manipulation on these attitudinal 
measures was observed via either derived or directly estimated mean incomes. Although 
the manipulation did not impact upon the attitudinal measures, either directly or 
indirectly, via levels of efficiency, the mediation analyses suggest that it did so 
indirectly via Gini indices; participants in the high sample wealth condition estimated 
(but did not overtly perceive) less unequal distributions, in turn leading to greater 
perceptions of fairness and, consequently, reduced support for redistribution. In contrast 
to the Study 1a and 1b findings, then, the redistributive concerns of participants in the 
present study were not sensitive to the efficiency of the income distribution, but were 
sensitive to inequality.  
In hindsight, it seems possible that the sample wealth manipulation failed to 
directly impact upon fairness and redistributive concerns because US participants were 
presented, ostensibly, with a sample of UK incomes. Potentially, participants were not 
sufficiently invested in the task insofar as they are not subject to the distribution 
presented, or the information provided was too ambiguous to directly affect the 
attitudinal measures. For example, US participants may have difficulty in relating 
values of UK incomes to absolute standards of living, in which case efficiency is 
arguably an irrelevant criterion upon which to base fairness judgements (this issue is 
discussed more fully in the General Discussion section). We sought to investigate this 
possibility in Study 3b by instead presenting US participants with an ostensible sample 
of US incomes.    




US participants were recruited online (N = 178, 51% male; Mage = 34.97 years; SDage = 
12.92) via $PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUN%XKUmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) 
IRUDVXUYH\HQWLWOHG³(VWLPDWLQJ6RFLDO'LVWULEXWLRQV3.2.7Similarly to Studies 1a, 1b and 
3a, and previous investigations of the representativeness of MTurk samples, (Paolacci et 
al., 2010), the incomes of the present sample were lower, but similarly distributed, to 
the US population as a whole (based on estimates from the US Census Bureau, 2013).  
Thus, 5.65% of the sample reported household incomes placing them in the wealthiest 
20% of the US population, and 9.04%, 22.03%, 26.55% and 36.72% reported household 
incomes in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th wealthiest quintiles respectively.  
Materials and Procedure 
Study 3b was a full replication of Study 3a, and the design, materials (incomes samples 
and measures) and procedure were identical, with one minor exception ± whereas in 
Study 3a participants were informed that the income series shown were probabilistically 
sampled from the true UK household income distribution, in Study 2b, participants were 
informed that incomes were sampled from the true US household income distribution. 
All instructions and measures were adapted appropriately, (e.g., $ signs replaced £ 
signs).   
 
 
                                                          
Footnote 3.2 
Although 200 participants were requested, due to a technical error, payment for 22 HITs was claimed 




3.6. Study 3b Results 
Weighted-mean incomes and Gini indices of estimated income distributions were 
calculated using the same procedure used in Studies 1a and 3a. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations appear in the lower panel of Table 3.1, and Figure 3.3 graphs mean 
estimated distributions for both the low and high sample wealth conditions against the 
values actually presented in either condition. Similarly to Study 3a, independent t-tests 
were conducted to examine the effect of sample wealth level on the key dependent 
measures. As can be seen in the lower panel of Table 3.1, the manipulation was again 
successful; derived and directly estimated means were significantly higher in the high 
sample wealth condition. In a departure from the Study 3a results, Gini indices did not 
differ between conditions. Consistent with the Study 3a findings, and contrary to 
expectations, however, perceived fairness and support for redistribution were not 
significantly different across the high and low sample wealth conditions. 
The same bootstrapped mediation analyses employed in Study 3a were then 
repeated for the Study 3b data (10,000 resamples). Specifically, these analyses 
examined whether sample wealth level exerted an indirect effect on redistributive 
preferences sequentially via derived/estimated population mean incomes 
*LQL¶VHVWLPDWHGLQHTXDOLW\DQGVXEVHTXHQWO\IDLUQHVV3ROLWLFDOSUHIHUHQFHDQG
perceived self-interest in redistribution were included as covariates. As previously, all 
data were standardised prior to analysis. 
Study 3b Mediation Analyses 
In a departure from the Study 3a findings, and as predicted, sample wealth level was 
found to exert an indirect effect on redistributive preferences via derived mean income 
and fairness, both with the relevant covariates (political attitudes, self-interest in  
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Figure 3.3. Study 3b mean estimated population-level distributions in the low (left) and high (right) mean 
conditions against low and high mean distributions actually presented. 
 
 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQLQFOXGHGLQWKHPRGHO%&D&,¶VRI-.18 and -.01, indirect effect = -.08), 
DQGZLWKRXWFRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.23 and -.003, indirect effect = -.10). As shown in 
Figure 3.4 participants in the high sample wealth condition estimated wealthier 
population income distributions, perceived the distribution to be fairer, and were 
consequently less supportive of redistributive efforts. No other indirect effects attained 
significance. Contrary to Study 3a, sample wealth level was not found to exert an 
indirect effect on redistributive preferences via Gini indices and fairness, either with the 
relevant covariates (political attitudes and self-interest in redistribution) included in the 
PRGHO%&D&,¶VRI-DQGLQGLUHFWHIIHFW RUZLWKRXWFRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶V
of -.01 and .04, indirect effect = .002).  
The above analyses were then repeated for direct mean income and inequality 
estimates. Sample wealth level was not found to exert any indirect effect on 
redistributive preferences via directly estimated mean income and fairness, either with 
WKHUHOHYDQWFRYDULDWHVLQFOXGHG%&D&,¶VRI-.09 and .05, indirect effect = -.02), or 
without coYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.13 and .05, indirect effect = -.04). No other indirect 
effects attained significance. Furthermore, sample wealth level was not found to exert  
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Figure 3.4. Study 3a indirect effect of distribution manipulation on support for redistribution via derived 
mean-popualtion income and fairness. The total effect is given in parentheses. 
 
 
any indirect effect on redistributive preferences sequentially via directly estimated 
inequality and fairness, both with the relevant covariates (i.e., political attitudes and 
self-LQWHUHVWLQUHGLVWULEXWLRQLQFOXGHGLQWKHPRGHO%&D&,¶VRI-.10 and .02, indirect 
effect = -RUZLWKRXWFRYDULDWHV%&D&,¶VRI-.16 and .03, indirect effect = -.06). No 
other indirect effects attained significance.  
3.7. Study 3b Discussion 
As was observed in Study 3a, mean estimated income distributions closely approximate 
the underlying shape of the income samples with which participants were presented 
prior to the estimation task (see Figure 3.3). Similarly to Study 3a, and in line with 
predictions, participants population estimates reflected the experimentally presented 
samples; as can be seen in the lower panel of Table 3.1, participants in the high sample 
wealth condition estimated significantly more efficient distributions and gave higher 
point-estimates of mean income. In a departure from the Study 3a findings, participants 
(quite correctly) both estimated and perceived similar levels of inequality in either 
condition; neither Gini indices nor directly measured perceptions of inequality were 
found to differ between sample wealth conditions. As in Study 3a, and contrary to our 
hypotheses, the manipulation was observed to have no direct effect upon the attitudinal 
measures; both fairness and support for redistribution were the same across the low and 
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high sample wealth conditions. Hence, the manipulation potentially did not fail to 
impact directly upon the attitudinal measures in Study 3a due to the dissociation 
between our US MTurk sample and the stimuli, ostensibly a sample of UK incomes.  
 Although the sample wealth manipulation did not translate directly into 
between-condition differences in either fairness or redistributive preferences, the 
mediation analyses indicate that the manipulation did exert an indirect effect on 
redistributive concerns via derived mean incomes and fairness. Echoing the 
correlational findings of Studies 1a and 1b, participants in the high sample wealth 
condition estimated wealthier population income distributions, perceived the 
distribution to be fairer and were consequently less supportive of redistributive efforts. 
In a departure from the Study 3a findings, the redistributive concerns of participants in 
Study 3b were not sensitive to levels of inequality in estimated distributions, but were 
sensitive, indirectly, to efficiency.   
3.8. General Discussion 
Contrary to expectations, manipulating efficiency via the presentation of low versus 
high wealth income samples did not impact directly upon the perceived fairness of the 
distribution, or support for redistribution. Although, in both Studies 3a and 3b, the 
sample wealth manipulation was clearly successful (participants in the high mean 
condition estimated higher mean income distributions and provided higher point-
estimates of mean income), this did not translate into between-condition differences in 
either fairness or support for redistribution. Both Studies 3a and 3b, however, provide 
clear support for the proposal that people inductively extrapolate from small samples in 




The correlational results from Studies 1a and 1b support the notion that fairness 
and redistributive concerns are sensitive to efficiency, such that higher perceived 
efficiency leads to greater perceptions of fairness and reduced support for redistributive 
measures. Studies 3a and 3b provide some support for this finding. Although 
manipulating efficiency did not directly affect fairness or support for redistribution in 
Studies 3a or 3b, in Study 3b, the efficiency manipulation did indirectly influence 
support for redistribution in a manner consonant with the models reported in Chapter 2. 
In Study 3b, the high wealth sample was associated, sequentially, with more efficient 
population estimates, greater perceived fairness and reduced support for redistribution, 
thus partially replicating the Study 1a and 1b models.  
It is important to consider certain qualitative differences between social samples 
and the experimentally presented samples used in the present studies. These differences 
potentially render the experimental stimuli relatively less relevant to judgments of 
fairness and redistribution than social samples, and perhaps explain why stronger effects 
of the sample wealth manipulation on economic attitudes were not observed. For 
example, basic differences presumably exist between the memory structures utilised in 
the encoding and recall of information regarding social contacts compared to the 
experimental stimuli. A fuller discussion of memorial processes is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, however, the distinction between episodic and semantic memory is of basic 
relevance here (Tulving, 1972). Whereas the experimental stimuli likely depend 
exclusively upon episodic memory (i.e., explicit memory for specific, experienced 
events), memory for social contacts presumably involves semantic memorial processes 
also (i.e., knowledge of facts, meaning, concepts and associations). To elucidate this 
point, consider the difference between knowledge RIWKHIRUP³person X earns income 
<´an episodic memory) versus knowledge RIWKHIRUP³social contact X is poor and 
earns income Y´ (episodic and semantic). Income values in and of themselves are 
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single, episodic items of knowledge, whereas poverty or wealth are semantically rich 
and socially significant concepts.  
Measured social circle income distributions presumably capture not only 
episodic knowledge of how incomes values themselves are distributed in the social 
environment, but also chronic, meaningful experience of how others life circumstances 
and material living standards are related to incomes.  Experimentally presented income 
samples, on the other hand, are presumably not semantically integrated in this manner, 
and may consequently fail to provoke a similar reaction. Relatedly, research shows that 
aggregate representations of groups evoke less emotionally charged responses than 
individual cases, a phenomenon termed the identifiable victim effect (Jenni & 
Lowenstein, 1997; Small & Lowenstein, 2003).  
It seems unlikely that people are aware of the true values of the incomes of all 
but a few of their closest social contacts, insofar as such information is generally 
confidential and conversational norms proscribe discussing salaries (Edwards, 2005; 
/LWWPDQ,QGHHGPDQ\86FRPSDQLHVPDNHXVHRI³QR-GLVFORVXUH´FRQWUDFWV
which expressly forbid employees from discussing salaries with their co-workers. 
Accordingly, values of incomes per se are unlikely to be sampled directly, but may 
instead be inferred post-hoc during estimation on the basis of known, salient cues to 
VRFLDOVWDWXVVXFKDVDSHUVRQ¶VMREWKHQHLJKERXUKRRGWKH\OLYHLQWKHFORWKHVWKH\
wear and various other indicators of material wealth and consumption (Belk, 1981). 
7KLVHFKRHV%UXQVZLN¶VOHQVPRGHORISHUFHSWLRQLQZKLFKLQGLUHFWO\
H[SHULHQFHGGLVWDOSURSHUWLHVHJDJLYHQSHUVRQV¶LQFRPHDUHLQIHUUHGRQWKHEDVLVRI
salient proximal cues (e.g., consumption behaviour or other cues to social status) to 




also how different cues are related to different levels of income.  
Research suggests that people are attuned to social status (e.g., Dalmaso, Pavan, 
Castelli & Galfano, 2011; Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich & Kingstone, 2010) and 
that wealth is an important dimension upon which people engage in social comparisons 
(Clarke & Oswald, 1996; Clarke & Senik, 2010; Hagerty, 2000). Furthermore, people 
can provide relatively accurate descriptions of social distributions that are of personal or 
social significance to the self, for example because they reflect important dimensions 
for social comparison or help guide behaviour in unfamiliar situations (Galesic et al., 
2012; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). It seems likely that people possess relatively accurate 
knowledge regarding the distribution of status-related cues in their day-to-day 
environment, even if incomes themselves are not directly known. Hence, although 
individuals may not directly know the distribution of incomes across their social 
contacts, they may possess fairly accurate knowledge of the relevant proximal cues 
HJVRFLDOFRQWDFWV¶MREDSSearance, possessions, lifestyle, neighborhood of residence, 
preferences) from which the income distribution may subsequently be inferred.  
In order to arrive at an estimate of the income distribution across their social 
contacts, participants must necessarily consider the distribution of these overt cues, 
which in turn carry information about others material living standards and wellbeing. 
These cues in and of themselves could potentially be more relevant to considerations of 
fairness than the income values derived from them. Arguably, money in and of itself has 
no intrinsic value - rather, it is the satisfaction of needs and wants for which money 
DOORZVRUFRQYHUVHO\IRUZKLFKODFNRIPRQH\SUHYHQWVRU³XWLOLW\´LQHFRQRPLF
phraseology, that is of value. As such, it may not be the perceived distribution of 
income values per se that influences judgements of fairness and the proclivity to 
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redistribute income, but the rather more semantically rich, vivid and emotionally 
arousing content that underpins perceptions of the distribution ± SHRSOHV¶HYHU\GD\
experience of the affordances or constraints upon others living standards and wellbeing 
facilitated by different levels of income. Requiring participants to estimate an 
experimentally presented distribution of income values, however, does not necessitate 
any consideration of cues pertaining to standards of living that different levels of 
income allow for ± income values can instead be drawn directly from memory.  
A similar explanation may also underlie the divergence between the Study 3a 
and Study 3b findings in terms of the effects of equality (Gini) and efficiency (mean 
LQFRPHVLQ6WXG\DSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHGLVWULEXWLYHSUHIHUHQFHVVKRZHGLQGLUHFWO\VRPH
sensitivity to levels of inequality in estimated distributions, but were not sensitive to 
efficiency, and vice-versa in Study 3b. Consider that, in Study 3a, US participants 
ostensibly made judgements about the UK household income distribution, whereas in 
Study 3b, US participants made judgements about the US household income 
distribution (the absolute £ and $ values presented were the same). Presumably, the 
majority of our US Study 3a participants possess limited experience with British 
currency and the cost of goods and services in the UK. Hence they are likely unable to 
associate different absolute living standards with different levels of income, or 
experience difficulty in doing so, insofar as they have no experience upon which to base 
WKHLULQIHUHQFHV:KDWFRQVWLWXWHVD³ORZ´RU³KLJK´LQFRPHLQDVSHFific time and place 
is not determined by the absolute value of income itself, but by what income affords in a 
given geographical and temporal context. Where the relationship between monetary 
values and absolute living standards is ambiguous, efficiency might be considered 
irrelevant to judgements of fairness, and consequently redistributive concerns, because 
it carries no information about living standards across society. Inequality, on the other 
hand, is both a relative and normative construct, and monetary values need bear no 
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obvious relation to material living standards in order for inequality to be employed in 
judgements of distributive justice. Large inequalities may potentially be perceived as 
unfair irrespective of the relation between incomes and absolute living standards. 
Indeed, where the relation between living standards and incomes is ambiguous, 
inequality in incomes provides the only criterion available upon which to base fairness 
judgements.  
In some regards, the judgements RISDUWLFLSDQWVLQ6WXG\DSHUKDSVHFKR¶V
5DZOV¶VXJJHVWLRQWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVEHKLQGD³YHLORILJQRUDQFH´LHD
K\SRWKHWLFDOVLWXDWLRQSULRUWRUDQGRPDVVLJQPHQWRIRQH¶VRZQVRFLDOVWDWXV would 
employ a maximin principle, meaning they would seek to maximise the incomes of the 
poorest in society. These participants are in a similar situation insofar as they are a 
disinterested party (i.e., they are not subject to the distribution they are judging), and are 
perhaps uncertain as to the relation between incomes and absolute living standards in 
the sample presented. Irrespective of the relation between absolute living standards and 
income values, increments in equality entail perceived improvements in the fortunes of 
the least well-RIIDNLQWR5DZO¶VPD[LPLQSULQFLSOH,QFUHPHQWVLQHTXDOLW\WKXV
potentially hedge fairness concerns against the mere possibility that low incomes are 
associated with low absolute living standards. 
Recall that the instructions provided to participants in both Studies 3a and 3b 
framed the task in terms of accuracy. Specifically, participants were informed that the 
aim of the study was to assess the accuracy of estimates relative to the true population-
level distribution. Prior research on accuracy goals suggests ways in which this framing 
PD\KDYHLQIOXHQFHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJPHQWV (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla & Chen, 1996; 
Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989; Chen, Schechter & Chaiken, 1996). It has been 
argued that accuracy-motivated judgment is characterised by impartiality and a 
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preference for objective, unambiguous information (Chaiken, 1980; Chen et al., 1996; 
Festinger, 1954), and promotes effortful, systematic (versus, effortless, heuristic) 
processing of stimuli (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Chaken et al., 1996). Indeed, accuracy 
motivation has been shown to reduce primacy, salience and priming effects in 
impression formation (Borgida & Howard-Pitney, 1983; Tetlock, 1983; Martin, Seta & 
Crelia, 1990). Hence, if it is assumed that the task framing motivated participants to 
prioritise accuracy (i.e., relative to the population distribution), it may have encouraged 
more effortful processing of, and greater reliance upon, the experimentally presented 
samples insofar as these were construed as providing a faithful and unbiased estimate of 
the population.  
It cannot, however, be ascertained from the present data whether the framing of 
the task did effectively promote an accuracy goal, or to the extent that it did so, whether 
this goal in turn facilitated more effortful processing of the stimuli. As noted by 
Neuberg (1989, p.384-³DFFXUDF\JRDOVPD\EHOHVVHIIHFWLYHZKHQFRPSHWLQJZLWK
RWKHUJRDOVDQGWDVNVIRUOLPLWHGFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDOUHVRXUFHV´ Where cognitive 
capacity is constrained, for example due to time pressure, high task demands or 
competing priorities, or where motivation is low, accuracy-motivated individuals may 
fall back upon less cognitively demanding strategies that are deemed suitable for the 
task at hand (Chen et al., 1996). Social sampling perhaps represents a likely fall-back 
strategy in the present context given that it relies on well-reinforced and elaborated 
knowledge, perhaps requires little effort and processing capacity, and potentially 
represents the default strategy by which inferences about populations are drawn. Indeed, 
the requirement to monitor no less than one-hundred discrete items (individual 





estimates in the intended manner, there is reason to suspect that population estimates 
remain contaminated to some degree by social sampling, even if participants are 
assumed to have prioritised accuracy.  
 
In sum, the results of Studies 3a and 3b provide somewhat ambivalent support 
for the notion that manipulating perceptions of efficiency by presenting new 
information can meaningfully impact upon economic attitudes. As expected, providing 
novel samples was indeed sufficient to influence perceptions of the population-level 
income distribution, in line with the samples presented; participants in the high mean 
condition estimated more efficient population distributions in both Studies 3a and 3b. 
This did not, however, translate directly into between-condition differences in fairness 
or support for redistribution, in either Study 3a or 3b. On the other hand, the indirect 
effect of the sample wealth manipulation observed in Study 3b shows that the 
manipulation did exert some effect upon redistributive preferences in the direction 
predicted. Insofar as experimentally presented incomes are, unlike social samples, 
detached from real-world experience and content, potentially they are not sufficiently 
evocative to exert strong effects on economic attitudes. Similarly, if exposure to 
samples encountered in day-to-day life shapes economic attitudes in an ongoing and 
implicit manner, these attitudes potentially become fixed and rigid over time, and hence 







The initial findings described in Chapter 2 provide reasonable evidence that social 
sampling processes influence important economic attitudes via selective exposure to 
systematically biased income samples. Studies 1a ± 2 show that wealthier, relative to 
poorer individuals, are exposed to wealthier social samples of incomes in their day-to-
day lives, and consequently perceive that the population as a whole is relatively more 
affluent. In turn, this leads wealthier individuals to perceive the distribution as relatively 
more fair and in turn reduces support for redistributive measures.  
Chapter 3 provides some experimental support for the notion that sampling plays 
a causal role in determining economic attitudes in accord with the theoretical model 
described in Chapter 2. In Studies 3a and 3b, experimentally presenting participants 
with novel income samples clearly influenced estimates of the population level income 
distribution in line with the samples provided. Across both studies, participants 
presented with a high (vs. low) wealth sample estimated higher mean distributions, and 
provided higher point-estimates of mean income. Although the sample wealth 
manipulation did not directly impact upon economic attitudes in either Study 3a or 3b, it 
did so indirectly via population estimates (via Gini indices in Study 3a and derived 
means in Study 3b), conceptually replicating the models described in Chapter 2.  
Cumulatively, Studies 1a ± 3b clearly show that people draw upon readily 
available samples in estimating unknown population distributions, and hence the 
parameters of population estimates depend upon the parameters of the samples relied 
upon. The social sampling model described by Galesic et al. (2012) argues that, by 
default, people rely upon their immediate social circles in such estimation tasks in an 
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automatic, heuristic fashion. The studies reported in Chapter 3, however, suggest an 
important caveat regarding the automaticity of social sampling: when an ostensibly 
reliable alternative to social samples is available, people may instead base their 
estimates upon this novel information. Social sampling, then, may not be inevitable or 
immutable, insofar as people are perhaps able to forgo social sampling where alternative 
information is available. However, it cannot be ascertained with certainty from Studies 
3a and 3b whether, or to what extent, participants rejected social samples and relied 
upon the experimentally presented samples, because social sampling was not measured 
in these studies.   
In the present chapter, the focus of attention is shifted away from the effect of 
sampling processes upon economic attitudes toward considerations surrounding the 
mutability of social sampling. Specifically, the present chapter seeks to examine 
whether people are able to exert deliberate control over sampling processes such that 
population estimates no longer depend upon social samples. To this end, Chapter 4 
presents two further studies that seek to ascertain whether providing an alternative 
sample, explicitly instructing participants to avoid social sampling or both interventions 
in combination, can serve to reduce or eliminate social sampling effects.  
Prior research paints a somewhat pessimistic picture UHJDUGLQJKXPDQ¶VDELOLW\
to monitor and exert control over cognitive processes, a capacity termed metacognition. 
Research shows, for example, that experts are only marginally less prone to failures in 
statistical reasoning than lay persons, and that awareness of prominent judgement biases 
does little to prevent people falling foul of them (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1982; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Repeated information can influence preferences even 
when people are fully aware of the repetition, and hence redundancy, of diagnostic 
information (Unkelbach et al., 2007). Attempts at suppressing stereotypic judgments 
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often rebound such that subsequent judgments are more stereotypic than in the absence 
of attempts at suppression (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994). Relatedly, 
research shows that people are naïve in respect to the external constraints imposed on 
information by the environment, and also in respect to the sophisticated properties of 
samples such as sample size, variance and conditionality (Fiedler, 2012; Fiedler & 
Juslin, 2006; Juslin, Winman & Hansson, 2007).  
Correspondingly, previous research in the domain of judgement and decision 
PDNLQJSUHVHQWVDVRPHZKDWPL[HGSLFWXUHLQUHJDUGVWRSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRRYHUFRPH
prevalent biases in judgement. Further, different paradigms in the literature imply 
different strategies for improving judgment processes and outcomes. Much literature 
within the ³heuristics and biases´ paradigm, associated strongly with the work of Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, employs a dual process model to parsimoniously 
account for both biased and normatively sound judgment. Under this view, the 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIIDVWHIIRUWOHVVDQGLQWXLWLYH³6\VWHP´SURFHVVHVLHKHXULVWLFVLV
assumed to underlie systematic biases in judgement (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). Errors are shown to be both pervasive and difficult to overcome, 
even amongst trained experts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the view of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), judgement biases are lLNHYLVXDOLOOXVLRQV³[...] both types of errors 
UHPDLQFRPSHOOLQJO\DWWUDFWLYHHYHQZKHQWKHSHUVRQLVIXOO\DZDUHRIWKHLUQDWXUH´S
1). Overcoming such myopia in judgement thus requires the conscious suppression of 
intuitive processes in favour of slRZHIIRUWIXODQGDQDO\WLFDO³6\VWHP´SURFHVVHVIRU
example via eliciting a metacognitive experience of difficulty or disfluency (Kahneman, 
2011; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Oppenheimer, Epley & Eyre, 2007).  
7KH³IDVWDQGIUXJDOKHXULVWLFV´Saradigm, as its name implies, also invokes 
heuristics as the primary mechanism of human judgement and decision making 
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(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1995). As discussed in the 
introduction, from this perspective, heuristics are not considered a normatively sub-
optimal means of judgement, but are instead ecologically rational, evolved adaptations 
to the natural environment. From this perspective, the relative accuracy of judgement is 
to be understood as a function of the relationship between heuristics and task demands. 
Poor fit between the evolutionary design and purpose of a heuristic and the structure of 
a task or environment leads to biased judgement. Theorising in this perspective is 
perhaps more optimistic about the possibility of correcting biases in judgement than the 
heuristics and biases literature. Adapting the representational properties of judgement 
tasks (e.g., presenting problems in frequencies rather than probabilities; Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995) or training people to select the most reliable and informative cues from 
the environment (e.g., via decision trees; Martignon, Vitouch, Takezawa & Forster, 
2003) can increase accuracy without placing strong demands on cognitive capacity.   
The sampling approach (e.g., Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006), 
contrastingly, places the explanatory burden not on cognitive processes per se in 
attempting to explain judgement biases, but upon the information input recruited by 
cognitive processes. Whereas the heuristics and biases and fast and frugal paradigms 
tacitly assume that input information provides an objective representation of the world, 
the sampling approach emphasises that constraints upon samples, be they drawn 
externally (from the environment) or internally (from memory), are sufficient to explain 
many apparent biases in judgement. Constraints are potentially imposed upon samples 
not only by the environment itself, but also by cognitive limitations upon MXGJH¶V 
attention, capacity or processing goals. As such, sampling biases and resultant errors in 
judgement reflect processes of cognitive-ecological interaction (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler 
& Wänke, 2009); the interaction of human minds with environmental structures.  
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The information samples to which people are exposed in their day-to-day lives, 
for example, are often not random but conditional upon another variable, often the 
criterion variable (i.e., the variable under prediction) itself. Samples are often not 
random, but quota samples because their composition is a function of another variable. 
The findings of Galesic et al. (2012) demonstrate how, due to the tendency toward 
homophily in social networks, this is the case for various social attributes (e.g., income, 
work stress, number of friends, health problems, education). In the case of income, the 
social samples people encounter are conditional upon the criterion of income itself; 
wealthier and poorer individuals are disproportionately exposed, respectively, to other 
wealthier and poorer individuals. In this manner, the information people receive about 
the distribution of various attributes, such as income, is related to SHRSOH¶VRZQVWDQGLQJ
on the attribute concerned.  
The metaphor of humans as a naïve intuitive statisticians entails that people are 
naïve to constraints upon samples such as conditionality and as such do not correct for 
WKHPWKH\VXIIHUIURP³PHWD-FRJQLWLYHP\RSLD´)LHGOHU). In sum, under 
the sampling approach, biases in judgement emerge due to a) biases inherent in samples 
and sampling processes that serve to bias samples, and b) the absence of appropriate 
metacognitive correction for such biases. Correspondingly, the sampling approach 
implies two possible routes to reducing bias in judgement; reducing bias in samples 
themselves, or enhancing metacognitive control over sampling processes.  
Research on the base-rate neglect phenomenon - the tendency to overlook 
population base-rates in judging the conditional probability of rare events - provides a 
neat illustration of how sampling processes can serve to bias judgement. In Kahneman 
and 7YHUVN\¶Vclassic demonstration of the base rate fallacy, for example, 
participants were more likely to judge a person to be an engineer rather than a lawyer 
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when the target person ostensibly spent their free time on mathematical puzzles, despite 
being told that the base-rate of engineers in the population was considerably lower 
(30%) than lawyers (70%). The authors attribute this finding to reliance upon a 
³UHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVV´KHXULVWLFHJDQDVVXPSWLRQWKDWEHKDYLRXUx is more typical of 
person y) in judgements of conditional probability, at the expense of neglecting 
population base rates.  
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) presented participants with an analogous task in 
ZKLFKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶JRDOZDVWRMXGJHWKHFRQGLWLRQDOSUREDELOLW\(i.e., P(A|B)) that a 
woman has breast cancer given a positive mammogram. Participants were told that the 
hit rate (i.e., probability of cancer given a positive test) was 80%, the false-alarm rate 
(probability of no cancer given a positive test) was 9.6% and the base-rate of cancer in 
WKHJLYHQSRSXODWLRQZDV$SSO\LQJ%D\HV¶WKHRUHPWKHDFWXDOSRVWHULRUSUREDELOLW\
of cancer given a positive mammogram is no greater than 7.8%, although participants 
typically report inflated estimates of P(A|B) in this and other analogous tasks. People are 
apparently misled by high hit rates and consequently overlook low base rates. The 
research further revealed that adapting the representational properties of the task, by 
substituting probabilities for frequencies, lead to a substantial increase in accuracy. The 
authors construe this finding in terms of the evolutionary adaptation of judgment 
mechanisms to ecological conditions. It is suggested that humans are attuned to natural 
frequencies, and judgment mechanisms have evolved to utilise frequencies specifically 
since information is typically encountered in this form. Probability, on the other hand, is 
a relatively modern invention and does not preserve information in the form upon which 
KXPDQ¶V mental calculus has evolved to function. In contrast to Kahneman and 
7YHUVN\¶V (1972) interpretation, then, inaccuracies in judgments of conditional 
probability do not result from the use of intuitive, suboptimal judgment mechanisms 
(such as a representativeness heuristic). Rather, they occur due to a poor fit between 
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judgment mechanisms and the representational format of information (i.e., probabilities) 
typically used in problems of this kind.   
Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch andWilde (2000) examined the same and other 
analogous judgement probOHPVDOWKRXJKWKHDXWKRUV¶primary concern was with the 
active processes involved in acquiring information, that is, the sampling procedures 
people utilise. Some participants were presented with index cards organised by 
predictor category (e.g., positive vs. negative mammogram), which allowed participants 
to learn whether cancer was or was not present. Other participants received index cards 
organised by the criterion category (e.g., women with vs. without breast cancer), which 
informed participants whether a mammogram was positive or negative. The base rate of 
cancer and proportions of hits and false positives were preserved across conditions and 
could be learned by scanning through the files. Participants¶ task in both conditions was 
to estimate P(A|B) on the basis of samples drawn freely from the box of index cards, 
such that participants could select any number of cards from either category (i.e., 
cancer/no cancer or positive/negative mammogram).  
The authors found that judgements closely followed the proportions in the 
samples drawn. As such, the accuracy of participants in judging P(A|B) depended upon 
how accuracy was normatively defined ± either in relation to the sample of cards drawn 
by the participant, or in relation to the entire population of cards. Across both 
conditions, participants were remarkably accurate when accuracy was defined in 
relation to the sample drawn (i.e., P(A|B) calculated for the cards actually sampled). 
Predictor sampling, however, produced considerably more accurate judgements in 
relation to the total population of index cards. The authors attributed this finding to a 
pervasive tendency of participants in the criterion (i.e., cancer/no cancer) sampling 
condition to oversample the infrequent (i.e., cancer present) category, thus vastly 
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inflating the base-rate in the sample, and consequently P(A|B). To illustrate, consider a 
situation in which a participant draws equal observations of cancer and no cancer cases. 
The inflation in the base rate of cancer raises P(A|B) to 89% in the sample, multiplying 
the conditional probability of cancer given a positive test by more than a factor of ten 
relative to the entire population of cards.  
Fiedler (2000) suggests that, given the information actually sampled is judged 
accurately, base-UDWHQHJOHFWLVVRPHWKLQJRIDPLVQRPHU³6HULRXVELDVHVPLJKWRFFXU
despite, or exactly because, judges are quite sensitive to the (inflated) base-rate in the 
VDPSOH´S. People are sensitive to base rates, but are seemingly unaware of the 
constraints imposed by oversampling the infrequent event. In sum, these findings 
suggest that a crucial factor in determining the accuracy of judgments of this kind is the 
extent to which the sampling process preserves the correct proportions via judges own 
selection strategies. Biased judgement appears to result from naïve assumptions in 
generating the sample and a consequent metacognitive failure to account for the effects 
of selection strategy on the information acquired. 
Although estimating the population distribution of incomes does not entail a 
judgement of conditional probability, accurate judgement does require similar 
metacognitive abilities and understanding of sampling constraints. As emphasised 
SUHYLRXVO\LQGLYLGXDOV¶LQFRPHVDPSOHVLHVRFLDOFLUFOHLQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQVDUH
related to their own income; they are conditional upon judge¶s own standing on this 
very attribute (i.e., people are overexposed to incomes relatively closer to their own 
income). Accurate generalisation from social samples to the population hence requires, 
first and foremost, an appreciation that the available sample is biased in this specific 
manner, and secondly, a process to correct population estimates for biases in samples 
resulting from this conditionality.  
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Under these ideal conditions, participants might be expected to engage in a type 
of theory-based correction (Wegner & Petty, 1997; Wegner, Silva, Petty & Garcia-
Marques, 2012). That is, people acknowledge and make attempts to adjust for biases in 
accordance with their understanding of the nature of the bias. Research does suggest 
that people can exert at least some degree of control over various automatic processes 
(Fiedler, 2012; Fiedler, Bluemke & Unkelbach, 2011). For example, providing 
deliberate instructions can serve to eliminate priming effects (Degner, 2009) and 
selective attention strategies can be employed to avoid unwanted thoughts (Wenzlaff & 
Bates, 2000) or to devalue unattended stimuli (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). Research 
also shows that individuals can strategically disregard sampled information in the 
service of motivational goals (Doosje, Spears & Koomen, 1995).  
Indeed, correction processes may not be entirely absent in social sampling. 
Galesic et al. VXJJHVWWKDW³VPRRWKLQJ´HYLGHQWLQHVWLPDWHGSRSXODWLRQ
distributions might reflect adjustment to account for the biasing effect of homophily 
upon social samples. To the extent that such correction efforts are employed, however, 
they are clearly insufficient or misguided given that estimated populations still depend 
strongly upon social samples. Nevertheless, people do seemingly possess some tools 
they are able to recruit in order to exert control over unwanted, biasing stimulus 
influences under certain circumstances, and it remains an open question as to whether 
such control can be successfully applied over social sampling. As was highlighted 
previously in relation to naiveties in sampling processes, people may possess the 
requisite tools, but fail to recognise the circumstances under which such tools need be 
employed, or they apply them inappropriately. This is strikingly apparent from research 
demonstrating WKDWH[SHUWVDUHRIWHQHTXDOO\SURQHWRVXFK³PHWDFRJQLWLYHP\RSLD´
(Fiedler, 2012) as lay persons, in spite of considerable statistical training and expertise 
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(Fiedler, Brinkmann et al., 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1982; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973).  
An alternative means of reducing bias in population estimates, of course, is to 
draw a new and truly random sample of observations upon which to base estimates. 
Realistically, however, this may be largely impossible in the case of social attributes, 
samples of which are presumably constructed sequentially and updated over time 
through ongoing experience and interaction with the social environment. In many 
judgement situations, it will be impossible to draw a new sample directly because the 
relevant information is simply not available for immediate inspection in the given 
context (e.g., when estimating distributions in a psychology study). Because human 
EHLQJVGRQRWSRVVHVVWKHLQILQLWHNQRZOHGJHDQGSHUFHSWXDOSRZHUVRI/DSODFH¶V
demon, the entire universe of information is never available for full inspection.  
 On the other hand, although generating a new sample on-line may not be 
possible, a person might have access to formal summary statistics (e.g., census data on 
household incomes) or an alternative sample of observations (e.g., an experimentally 
presented sample of incomes) which accurately represents the population. Where people 
are aware of, and motivated to avoid bias, they might discount biased information and 
rely instead upon such an alternative source of information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
As opposed to simply adjusting responses to account for perceived bias in social circles, 
people may instead engage in a process of recomputation (Strack & Mussweiler, 2001), 
setting aside biased information (e.g., social samples) and basing judgements instead on 
remaining alternative information.  
To summarise thus far, in estimating the population distribution of incomes (or 
other attributes), people may have little choice but to draw upon social samples insofar 
as they are potentially the only source of relevant information available, at least in the 
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absence of secondary knowledge such as official statistics. Conceivably, however, 
warning participants against social sampling may prompt theory-based correction of 
population estimates, or motivate a search for alternative information upon which 
estimates might reliably be based (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Strack & Mussweiler, 
2001). Introducing awareness of the specific nature of the bias in social samples (i.e., 
incomes relatively closer WRRQH¶VRZQDUHRYHUUHSUHVHQWHG) may facilitate correction 
efforts by providing some basis for determining the necessary direction and magnitude 
of correction processes. This is in line with research and theory suggesting that people 
rely on their lay beliefs regarding the specific nature of biasing influences in correction 
attempts (Brekke & Wilson, 1994; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Strack, 1992). To 
effectively correct for biasing stimulus influences on judgment, people require accurate 
knowledge of the direction and magnitude of bias concerned (Petty & Wegener, 1993; 
Wegner & Petty, 1997; Wegner, Silva, Petty & Garcia-Marques, 2012). 
As discussed, however, simply raising awareness of the biased nature of social 
samples may have a limited impact if practical constraints force reliance upon social 
sampling. This is perhaps hinted at by the observation of Galesic et al. (2012) that the 
smoothing of population estimates may reflect correction attempts aimed at reducing the 
bias in population estimates resulting from homophily in social circles. If smoothing 
does indeed reflect deliberate correction, it is clearly either insufficient in magnitude, or 
otherwise misguided, insofar as population estimates remain strongly related to social 
samples. In short, to the extent that such theory based correction already occurs in social 
sampling, but is apparently of limited effectiveness, explicitly prompting similar theory-
based correction may do little to reduce the dependency of population estimates upon 
social circles. As such, prompting avoidance of social sampling and additionally 
providing alternative information upon which to base estimates may provide the most 
effective means of reducing social sampling. Under these conditions, participants may 
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be expected to engage in attempts at recomputation, basing population estimates on the 
novel, ostensibly reliable information (Strack & Mussweiler, 2001).  
Accordingly, Studies 4a and 4b sought to ascertain whether providing an 
alternative sample of incomes, warning against social sampling or both interventions in 
combination, can serve to reduce or ameliorate the relationship between own income 
and estimated population distributions via social circle distributions. This approach 
rested on two key assumptions. Firstly, it was assumed that although individuals might 
produce relatively accurate descriptions of their social samples, they are naïve to 
constraints upon these samples that impoverish their generality to the wider population 
(Fiedler, 2012, 2000). Raising awareness of the biased nature of social samples may 
provoke attempts to correct population-level inferences accordingly (Wegner & Petty, 
1997; Wegner, Silva, Petty & Garcia-Marques, 2012), or motivate a search for 
alternative, unbiased information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). To investigate this 
possibility, half of all participants in Studies 4a and 4b were presented with a textual 
prompt that warned participants about the homophilous nature of social samples and 
instructed participants to avoid social sampling.  
Secondly, it was assumed that in many judgement situations, people may have 
no choice but to draw upon social samples insofar as they are the only information 
available upon which inferences of the population-level distribution can be based. 
Hence, in isolation, warning against social sampling might exert a limited impact 
because practical constraints force reliance upon social sampling. Thus it was predicted 
that providing both a prompt and an alternative sample should provide the most 
effective means of reducing social sampling effects, by promoting attempts at 
recomputation of the population distribution on the basis of novel, ostensibly reliable 
information (Strack & Mussweiler, 2001). To investigate this possibility, half of all 
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participants in participants in Study 4a, and all participants in Study 4b, were presented 
with an alternative sample of incomes from which estimates of the population 
distribution could be derived.  
4.2. Study 4a Method 
Participants 
US participants were recruited online (N = 403, 41.7% male; Mage = 38.07 years; 
SDage  YLD$PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7XUN07XUN%XKUPHVWHU.ZDQJ	
*RVOLQJIRUDVXUYH\HQWLWOHG³(VWLPDWLQJ6RFLDO'LVWULEXWLRQV´ Consistent with 
our prior data, the incomes of the present sample tended to be somewhat lower, but 
similarly distributed, to the US population as a whole (based on estimates from the US 
Census Bureau, 2013).  Thus, 8.2% of the sample reported household incomes placing 
them in the wealthiest 20% of the US population, and 22.8%, 20.6%, 25.8% and 22.6% 
reported household incomes in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th wealthiest quintiles 
respectively. Sample size was determined a priori based on budgetary considerations. 
For both studies reported herein, ethical approval was obtained from the institutional 
Ethics Committee, and the research was conducted in full accordance with British 
Psychological Society (BPS) ethical guidelines. 
Design & Materials 
Approximately a quarter of participants (N = 97) were presented with a low-mean 
sample of incomes (M = $41,000), a further quarter (N = 101) were presented with a 
high-mean sample of incomes (M = $72,000), and all remaining participants (N = 205) 
were assigned to a control condition in which they completed a filler task involving 
simple arithmetic problems. Participants were randomly assigned to these conditions. 
The presented income samples were the same as used in Studies 2a and 2b. Within each 
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alternative sample condition and the control condition, half of all participants received a 
passage of text describing the phenomenon of homophily and emphasising the 
unrepresentative nature of social. The text also explicitly instructed participants not to 
base their estimates upon their social circles. The remaining half of participants received 
no additional information. Although the study employed a 3 (high-mean sample, low-
mean sample, no alternative sample) x 2 (homophily information vs. no additional 
information) conditions, it is treated in key analyses as a nested 2 (alternative low or 
high-mean sample vs. no sample) x 2 (homophily information vs. no homophily 
information) fully between-subjects design. A nested design was adopted in order to 
facilitate a check as to whether participants were sensitive to the (low or high wealth) 
samples presented, and whether such sensitivity is itself a function of the homophily 
instruction. The crucial theoretical issue, however, was whether, and to what extent, 
participants based their population estimates upon social circles, versus an alternative 
sample of any character where one was available. The mean level of the alternative 
samples was not important given the central hypothesis under examination, and hence a 
nested design was both sufficient for the purposes of the study and economical in terms 
of the number of participants required.          
Measures    
Similarly to prior studies, participants estimated the complete distribution of annual 
household income across both their social contacts and the US population by indicating 
the percentage earning incomes within each of nine $20,000 intervals ($0 ± $20,000; 
$20,000 - «XVLQJDFOLFN-bar histogram.  The final interval was 
open-ended (all incomes of $160,000 upward). Participants were also asked to directly 
estimate the mean household income for both their social contacts and the US 
population (using a single click-bar ranging from $100 - $150,000). For both social 
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circles and the US population, two items assessing perceived inequality were included, 
VSHFLILFDOO\³7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHKRXVHKROGLQFRPHVHTXDOO\± unequally distributed 
across your social contacts (the US population)´ Very Equally; 6 = Very 
UnequallyDQG³7RZKDWH[WHQWLVLQFRPHLQHTXDOLW\DFURVVyour social contacts (the 
US population) low-KLJK´ Very Low; 6 = Very High). The correlations between 
these two items (r = .31 and r = .42 for items pertaining to social circles and the US 
population, respectively) was too low to warrant combining them into single measures, 
so they were examined separately in reported analyses. Participants also completed a 
five-item scale designed to measure the perceived representativeness (i.e., of incomes in 
the wider US population) of participant¶VRZQVRFLDOFLUFOHVIRUH[DPSOH³0\VRFLDO
contacts' household incomes are representative of household incomes in the US as a 
ZKROH´DQG³:LWKUHJDUGWRKRXVHKROGLQFRPHVP\VRFLDOFRQWDFWV are like a 
PLFURFRVPRIWKH86DVDZKROH´ Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree). The full 
five items did not form a reliable scale and as such only items 1-3 were averaged to 
IRUPDFRPSRVLWHPHDVXUHRISHUFHLYHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVVĮ A complete list of 
new items (those not appearing in prior studies) appears in Appendix IV. 
Procedure 
As in Studies 3a and 3ESDUWLFLSDQWVUHFHLYHGWKHFRYHUVWRU\WKDW³we are interested in 
people¶s accuracy in estimating how various attributes are distributed across a wider 
population on the basis of a representative VXEVDPSOHRIWKHGLVWULEXWLRQ´In an opening 
section, participants provided basic demographic information, including their household 
income, and indicated whether or not they were born in the US, and if not, how long 
they had been resident in the country. Participants then estimated their social circle 
income distribution and completed the other measures pertaining to their social circles 
as described above (e.g., direct estimate of mean social circle income). Participants were 
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then assigned to the low mean distribution, high mean distribution or arithmetic filler 
task. In both the low and high sample wealth conditions, participants were provided a 
definition of household income and were informed that they would view a series of 
household incomes that were probabilistically sampled (a simple definition was 
provided) from US census data, as per the procedure in Studies 3a and 3b. Participants 
were further instructed that they were not expected to memorise individual incomes but 
WR³WU\WRJHWDVHQVHRIKRZWKH\DUHGLVWULEXWHG´3DUWLFLSDQWVWKHQYLHZHGDVOLGHVKRZ
presenting each of the 100 incomes, one income per page, each displayed for 2 seconds. 
Both high and low mean income series were presented in a fixed-random order, such 
that incomes within each consecutive quartile (i.e., each consecutive 25 incomes) were 
fully-randomised across participants, but all participants viewed quartiles in increasing 
order (i.e., lowest through highest income quartile). Participants assigned to the control 
condition worked on a series of addition, subtraction and multiplication problems for a 
period of 220 seconds (equivalent to the total length of the sample slide shows). Half of 
all participants in each condition then received a brief description of the biased nature of 
social circles and were prompted not to base their estimates of the wider income 
distribution on their own social circles (see Appendix IV for full text). Participants were 
LQIRUPHGWKDW³A large body of research has shown that social networks are 
homophilous. Simply put, people move in social circles of people who are similar to 
each other [...] If you are relatively well-off, your social contacts are probably wealthier 
than most Americans, on average; if you are relatively less well-off, your social contacts 
probably tend to be poorer than most Americans.´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHLQIRUPHGWKDW³>@
levels of wealth among the people you know are probably not representative of those in 
America.  As a result, you should try not to base your estimates on the people you 
know.´ All participants then estimated the US population-level income distribution and 
completed other measures pertaining to the population (e.g., direct estimate of US 
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population mean income), and then completed the five-item perceived 
representativeness scale.  
4.3. Study 4a Results & Discussion 
As in previous studies, all variables were standardised prior to analysis for ease of 
interpretation, and weighted means and Gini indices for estimated distributions were 
derived using the same procedures used in prior studies. Descriptive statistics across 
each of the 2x3 conditions are provided in Table 4.1, and intercorrelations for the key 
variables are displayed in Table 4.2. For consistency with Studies 1a and 1b, 1 
participant reporting a household income +4 SD above the sample mean was excluded 
from these analyses. 
Firstly, a t-test was conducted to check whether perceived representativeness of 
social samples was successfully influenced by the homophily prompt manipulation. 
Social samples were perceived as marginally less representative in the prompt (M = 
3.29, SD = 1.05) compared to the no-prompt condition (M = 3.47, SD = 1.04); t (399) = 
1.68, p =.09. Hence the homophily prompt manipulation exerted only a minor and 
marginal effect on overt perceptions of the representativeness of social circles. 
Analyses then sought to examine whether, in absolute terms, population 
estimates were influenced by either the low or high wealth samples presented, the 
homophily prompt, or both manipulations in combination. To this end, a 2 (homophily 
prompt; provided vs. not provided) x 3 (sample condition; low-wealth, high-wealth, no-
sample control) fully-between subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine the absolute 
effect of the manipulations on derived population means. There was an unexpected 
main effect of homphily prompt, F (1, 396) = 3.98, p = .04, Ș2 = .01, in which 
participants estimated wealthier population distributions when a prompt was provided  
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Tables 4.1 (top) and 4.2 (bottom). Study 4a descriptive statistics (4.1) and intercorrelations (4.2). 
 
 
Measures Control/No Homophily Control/Homophily Low/No Homophily Low/Homophily High/No Homophily High/Homophily
SC mean income (derived) $54,577 (23,513) $57,843 ($25,399) $53,679 ($25,500) $51,950 ($20,242) $55,214 ($27,217) $55,591 ($24,600)
SC mean income (estimated) $56,275 (27,740) $57,684 ($25,633) $54,960 ($27,176) $54,472 ($25,713) $52,628 ($28,578) $55,245 ($28,083)
Population mean income (derived) $63,366 (20,943) $64,848 ($17,320) $57,773 ($14,870) $63,659 ($21,464) $64,220 ($13,220) $69,348 ($28,083)
Population mean income (estimated) $50,784 (18,028) $54,069 ($20,487) $47,324 ($17,230) $50,031 ($21,238) $51,750 ($15,964) $52,708 ($15,560)
SC Gini index 28.83 (8.43) 26.57 (8.63) 26.53 (8.75) 28.24 (6.29) 25.97 (6.29) 26.89 (7.20)
Population Gini index 35.37 (7.56) 36.11 (6.53) 35.91 (5.87) 35.13 (5.16) 34.66 (5.54) 33.83 (6.81)
SC perceived representativeness 3.52 (1.04) 3.30 (0.99) 3.33 (1.10) 3.29 (1.19) 3.52 (0.98) 3.29 (1.05)
Household income




Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. SC mean income (derived) -
2. SC mean income (estimated) .58*** -
3. Population mean income (derived) .30*** .16** -
4. Population mean income (estimated) .18*** .31*** .28*** -
5. SC Gini index -.5 -.23*** -.03 -.01 -
6. Population Gini index -.14** -.11* -.21*** -.35*** .21*** -
7. SC perceived representativeness -.09 -.09 -.05 .01 .09 -.10* -
8. Household income .48*** .48*** .12* .14** -.25*** -.06 -.06
*p < .05, **p  < .01, ***p < .001
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(vs. not) 4.1.8The main effect of sample wealth was marginally significant, F (2, 396) = 
2.34, p = .09, Ș2 = .01. Three planned comparisons were conducted comparing both the 
low and high sample wealth conditions vs. the control, and the low vs. high sample 
wealth conditions. The planned comparisons revealed no significant differences in 
derived population means between either the low (M = $60,746, SD = $18,638) or high 
sample wealth (M = $66,759, SD = $21,919) conditions compared to the no alternative 
sample control condition (M = $64,107, SD = $19,132), t(299) = 1.44, p =.15 and t(300) 
= 1.08, p =.28, respectively. Derived mean incomes were significantly higher in the 
high compared to low sample wealth condition, however; t(196) = 2.1, p =.04. Hence 
participants in the high, relative to low, sample wealth condition estimated wealthier 
population distributions, although estimates in neither the high or low condition differed 
significantly from those in the control condition. The interaction between homophily 
prompt and sample wealth was not significant; F (2, 396) = 0.53, p = .59, Ș2 = .003. 
Effects of Alternative Sample and Homophily Prompt on Social Sampling 
Subsequent analyses sought to examine whether, in line with the hypotheses, presenting 
alternative (high or low mean) samples or providing information about the biased nature 
of social circles moderated the relationship between own income and estimated 
                                                          
Footnote 4.1 
Additional analyses sought to examine whether the unexpected main-effect of the homophily prompt 
manipulation on derived population means was due to higher or lower income individuals responding 
differently (i.e., estimating more or less efficient distributions) to the prompt. To this end, three simple 
moderation models were generated (one within each distribution condition (PROCESS model 1, 10,000 
resamples) testing the conditional effect of the prompt manipulation on derived population means as a 
function of income. The interaction terms were non-significant in all three models (all P¶V!.05), 




population means via social circle means, either independently or in concert. To this 
end, bootstrapped moderated mediation analyses were conducted (10,000 resamples) 
using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 18; see Hayes, 2012, 2013). This model 
examines the conditional indirect effect of household income on derived population 
means via social circle means as a function of sample condition, prompt condition, and 
the three-way interaction between sample condition, prompt condition and social circle 
means on the b path. The theoretical model tested is shown in Figure 4.1. Note that this 
analysis treats high and low wealth sample participants as nested within a single 
alternative sample category (i.e., compares control participants with high and low-
wealth sample participants simultaneously).  
This analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction between derived social 
circle means, sample wealth (no alternative sample control vs. high and low wealth 
sample) and homophily prompt (provided vs. not) on derived population means; b = .49, 
SE = .19, p = .01. No other interactions attained significance (all S¶s > .05). For control 
(no alternative sample) participants, the conditional indirect relationship between 
income and derived population means via social circle means was similar across the 
SURPSW%&D&,¶VRIDQGLQGLUHFWHIIHFW DQGQRSURPSWFRQGLWLRQV%&D
&,¶VRIDQGLQGLUHFWHIIHFW $PRQJVWDOWHUQDWLYHVDPSOHSDUWLFLSDQWV
however, the conditional indirect relationship between income and population means 
YLDVRFLDOFLUFOHPHDQVZDVQRWVLJQLILFDQWLQWKHQRSURPSWFRQGLWLRQ%&D&,¶VRI-.01 
DQGLQGLUHFWHIIHFW EXWZDVVLJQLILFDQWLQWKHSURPSWFRQGLWLRQ%&D&,¶VRI
.12 and .43, indirect effect = .25). To summarise, when not provided with an alternative 
sample, mean estimated SRSXODWLRQLQFRPHVZHUHUHODWHGWRSDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQLQFRPH
irrespective of whether or not participants were warned against social sampling. In other 
words, participants in the control condition appeared to social sample regardless of 
whether they were made aware of bias in social samples and explicitly prompted to  
125 
 
Figure 4.1.  
Theoretical model of Study 4a conditional indirect effect of income on population means via social circle 
means. The indirect effect is moderated by sample condition (alternative vs. no alternative control), 
homophily prompt (provided vs. not) and the three-way interaction between sample condition, homophily 
prompt and social circle mean.   
 
 
avoid social sampling. In contrast, when provided with an alternative sample, 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶HVWLPDWHVRImean population incomes were unrelated to their income in 
the absence of a warning against social sampling, but were related when the warning 
was provided in addition. Hence although providing an alternative (high or low wealth) 
sample appeared to reduce social sampling (population estimates were indirectly related 
to own income amongst all no-sample control participants, but not amongst alternative 
sample/no homophily prompt participants) providing both an alternative sample and 
warning against social sampling lead to an apparent increase in social sampling relative 
to the no-sample control4.2.9  
                                                          
Footnote 4.2 
An alternative model including self-reported judgments of the representativeness of social circles as a 











The Study 4a findings, then, were somewhat mixed. On the one hand, providing 
an alternative sample of incomes was sufficient to ameliorate the indirect link between 
own income and derived population means via social circle means.  This was evident in 
the conditions in which no homophily prompt was provided. Here, the social sampling 
effect was not significant when an alternative sample of incomes was provided to 
participants, but was significant in the absence of an alternative sample. Simply 
providing information about the biased nature of social samples, however, did not serve 
to reduce social sampling; amongst control (no alternative sampleSDUWLFLSDQWV¶WKH
indirect relationship between own income and derived population means via social 
circles was the same irrespective of whether participants were warned against social 
sampling or not. Further, although it was expected that providing an alternative sample 
in addition to highlighting social sample bias would be the most successful means of 
reducing social sampling, the opposite tendency was in fact observed. Social sampling 
was strongest under these circumstances.  
One possible explanation for this unexpected and rather striking finding is that 
the manipulation of awareness of homophily was not fully successful. Social circles 
were perceived as only marginally less representative in the prompt versus no-prompt 
condition. Hence participants may have simply disregarded the textual prompt 
highlighting the biased nature of social samples. Although the prompt manipulation did 
not effectively undermine explicit judgments of the representativeness of social circles, 
KRZHYHULWFOHDUO\GLGH[HUWDQLPSDFWXSRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJHPHQWSURFHVVHV- when 
an alternative distribution was provided in addition to this information, social sampling 
apparently increased. Study 4b sought to examine whether these unexpected results 




4.4. Study 4b Method 
Participants 
US participants were recruited online (N = 410, 42.4% male; Mage = 38.3 years; 
SDage = 12.0) via MTurk for a VXUYH\HQWLWOHG³(VWLPDWLQJ6RFLDO'LVWULEXWLRQV´  
Similarly to Studies 1a through 4a, the incomes of the present sample were lower, but 
similarly distributed, to the US population as a whole (based on estimates from the US 
Census Bureau, 2013).  Thus, 7.7% of the sample reported household incomes placing 
them in the wealthiest 20% of the US population, and 21.5%, 28.4%, 25.4% and 17% 
reported household incomes in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th wealthiest quintiles 
respectively.  
Materials and Procedure 
Experiment 4b sought to partially replicate the alternative sample manipulation used in 
Experiment 4a. Sample condition was not manipulated as a factor in the design, 
although all participants were presented with the high wealth sample previously used in 
Study 4a. As in Study 4a, the precise character of the alternative sample (i.e., relatively 
low or high wealth) was immaterial to the aims of the study, and hence the high-wealth 
sample was selected at random via a coin toss. As previously, half of all participants 
received a brief description of the homophilous nature of social circles and were 
prompted not to base their estimates of the wider income distribution on their own 
social circles. The materials and procedure were identical to the high mean condition in 
Study 4a. Specifically, participants provided demographic information (e.g., household 
income), completed items pertaining to their social circles (e.g., estimated the income 
distribution), viewed the incomes slide show, received a description of homophily or 
received no additional information, completed measures pertaining to the population 
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(e.g., estimated the population-level income distribution) and then completed the 
perceived representativeness of social circles items (as in Study 4a, the full five items 
did not form a reliable scale and as such only items 1-ZHUHLQFOXGHGLQWKHVFDOHĮ 
.85). Participants also responded to three additional items (Į ; Appendix IV) which 
were designed to measure the perceived credibility and representativeness of the 
DOWHUQDWLYHLQFRPHVVDPSOHHJ³7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXIHHOWKDWWKHVDPSOHRI
incomes you saw accurately reflects the actual distribution of household incomes in the 
86´ Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree).  
4.5. Study 4b Results & Discussion 
All variables were standardised prior to analysis for ease of interpretation, and weighted 
means and Gini indices for estimated distributions were derived using the same 
procedures used in prior studies. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are 
displayed in Table 4.3. For consistency with Studies 1a, 1b and 4a, 4 participants 
reporting a household income +4 SD above the sample mean were excluded from these 
analyses. A further participant failed to report their household income and is hence also 
missing from the following analyses. 
Analyses first sought to examine the absolute effects of the homophily prompt 
manipulation on population estimates, and upon judgments of the representativeness of 
social circles and of the alternative sample. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the prompt 
manipulation had no effect on estimated population distributions as derived population 
means and Gini indices were the same in both conditions; t (403) = 1.62, p =.11 and t 
(403) = 0.34, p =.91, for derived population means and Gini indices respectively. Self-
reported judgements of the representativeness of social circles (hereafter referred to as 
SC representativeness) were not observed to differ across prompt conditions, t (400) = 
1.48, p = .14. Nor did the prompt manipulation affect the perceived representativeness  
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Table 4.3. Study 4b descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. 
Measures No prompt Prompt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   1. Derived SC mean income £55,995 (25,623) £55,305 (24,619) -
   2. Derived SC Gini index 26.50 (8.13) 26.93 (7.65) .07 -
   3. Derived Pop. mean income £62,618 (17,377) £60,052 (14,311) .24*** -.01 -
   4. Derived Pop. Gini index 36.06 (6.05) 35.86 (5.70) -.11* .15** -.17** -
   5. SC representativeness 3.61 (0.98) 3.46 (0.95) -.20*** .06 -.04 -.05 -
   6. Alt. sample representativeness 4.09 (0.98) 4.15 (0.88) -.02 -.08 -.01 .01 .19*** -
   7. Household income .55*** -.15** .12* -.12* -.15** .06 -
*p  < .05, **p < .01, ***p  < .001







of the alternative sample (hereafter referred to as alternative sample representativeness), 
t (400) = 0.58, p = .56.  
Effects of Homophily Prompt on Social Sampling 
Subsequent analyses sought to examine whether providing a prompt about the biased 
nature of social samples influenced the indirect relationship between own income and 
derived population means via social circle means (i.e., moderated mediation). To this 
end, bootstrapped moderated mediation analyses were conducted (10,000 resamples) 
using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 14; see Hayes, 2012, 2013). This analysis 
examines the conditional indirect relationship of own income to derived population 
means via social circle means as a function of prompt condition (no prompt vs. prompt). 
The theoretical model tested is shown in Figure 4.2.  
This analysis revealed a significant interaction between social circle means and 
homophily prompt on derived population means; b = .35, SE = .10, p < .001. 
Specifically, the indirect relationship between own income and population means via 
VRFLDOFLUFOHPHDQVZDVVLJQLILFDQWZKHQSDUWLFLSDQWVUHFHLYHGDSURPSW%&D&,¶VRI
.16 and .34 , indirect effect = .24) and non-significant when they did not (B&D&,¶VRI-
.05 and .14, indirect effect = .05). Similarly to Study 4a, derived population means were 
positively and indirectly related to own income via social circles only when a prompt 
highlighting the biased nature of social circles was given (vs. not).  
Additional analyses sought to examine whether the effect of the prompt 
manipulation on explicit judgments of social circle representativeness depended upon 
judgments of alternative sample representativeness. Across conditions, mean ratings of 
alternative sample representativeness (M = 4.12, SD = 0.93) were above the scale mid-
point of 3.5; t (401) = 13.35, p < .001. Hence in absolute terms, on average, participants  
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Figure 4.2.   
Theoretical model of Study 4b conditional indirect effect of income on population means via social circle 
means. The indirect effect is moderated by homophily prompt (provided vs. not) and the two-way 
interaction between homophily prompt and social circle mean.   
 
 
tended not to doubt the authenticity or representativeness of the alternative sample. 
Alternative sample representativeness was found to moderate the effect of the prompt 
manipulation on judgments of SC representativeness, b = -.24, SE = .10, p =  .02. 
Whereas the prompt manipulation had no effect upon SC representativeness when 
alternative sample representativeness was perceived to be low (-1 SD%&D&,¶VRI-.19 
and .33, indirect effect = .07), the homophily prompt manipulation was negatively 
related to SC representativeness when alternative sample representativeness was high 
(+1 SD%&D&,¶VRI-.63 and -.11, indirect effect = -.37). Hence the prompt 
manipulation was only successful in shifting explicit perceptions of the 
representativeness of social samples when the alternative sample provided was itself 
perceived to be a reliable alternative.  
This SDWWHUQRIUHVXOWVDPRQJVWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SOLFLWMXGJPHQWVof social circle 
and alternative sample representativeness perhaps suggests that raising awareness of 









to the extent that alternative information is both available and perceived to be reliable. 
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SOLFLWMXGJPHQWVRI their social circles shifted in line with the 
manipulation only to the extent that the alternative sample was judged to be reliable. 
Nevertheless, explicit judgments of either social circle or the alternative sample 
representativeness apparently had no bearing on the extent to which participants 
actually engaged in social sampling. Including either or both variables as covariates or 
additional moderators in the key moderated-mediation analysis (i.e., of income on 
population means via social circle means, moderated by prompt condition) had no 
substantive influence on the outcome of the model. Hence, irrespective of its effect 
upon the perceived efficacy of either social samples or the alternative sample as an 
estimator of the population, explicitly warning participants about bias in social samples 
served to increase social sampling. 
In combination with the findings from Study 4a, the results from Study 4b imply 
that the ironic rebound in social sampling observed in the presence of both a prompt not 
to rely on social sampling and an alternative sample is not a fluke, but a genuine effect 
of the combination of these conditions. In both studies, providing a prompt did not 
straightforwardly undermine the perceived representatives of social circles, but it did 
impact upon sampling processes - in the opposite direction than expected. Further, only 
when participants perceived the alternative sample to be a highly reliable estimator of 
the population was the manipulation successful in undermining explicit judgments of 
the representativeness of social circles. This change in self-reported representativeness 
of social circles, however, did not translate into a reduction in social sampling. 
Irrespective of the perceived representativeness of either social samples or the 
alternative sample, explicitly warning participants against social sampling only served 
to increase reliance upon this very strategy. 
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4.6. General Discussion 
Studies 4a and 4b sought to examine whether social sampling effects might be reduced 
or eliminated by either explicitly highlighting the systematic bias in social samples via a 
textual prompt, providing participants with an alternative sample, or both interventions 
in combination. It was suggested that warning against social sampling may provoke 
attempts to correct population estimates accordingly, or motivate a search for 
alternative, unbiased information upon which to base population estimates. It was 
further suggested that warning against social sampling in isolation might exert only a 
limited impact because practical constraints force reliance upon social samples. Thus it 
was predicted that providing both a prompt and an alternative sample should provide 
the most effective means of reducing social sampling effects.  
 The results were, however, somewhat mixed. In Study 4a, in line with 
expectations, providing participants with a textual prompt highlighting the biased nature 
of social samples alone was not sufficient to undermine social sampling. In the absence 
of an alternative sample, pDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQLQFRPHZDVLQGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWRSRSXODWLRQ
estimates to a similar extent irrespective of whether or not participants were informed of 
the pitfalls of social sampling and instructed to avoid doing so. Apparently, participants 
in this condition continued to social sample, or reduced their reliance on social samples 
to only a minimal extent, such that population estimates remained contingent, via social 
samples, upon their own income. Several explanations for this apparent failure to 
respond in line with the homophily prompt are possible. Firstly, it may simply be the 
case that the manipulation was not sufficient to undermine the perceived reliability of 
social samples as an estimator of the population; self-reported perceptions of the 
representativeness of social circles differed only marginally between the prompt and no 
prompt conditions in Study 4a, and did not differ in Study 4b. Hence participants may 
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have explicitly rejected the prompt and continued to place faith in their social circles as 
an unbiased estimator of the population.  
Recall that in Study 4b, however, judgements of the representativeness of the 
alternative sample moderated the effect of the same prompt manipulation on the 
perceived representativeness of social samples; when the representativeness of the 
alternative sample was judged to be high, the prompt (relative to no prompt) did cause 
participants to deemphasise the representativeness of their social circles, although this 
did not translate into a reduction in social sampling. This observation does imply, 
however, that it is not inevitable that people will reject information that casts doubt 
upon the representativeness of their social circles. Where an alternative sample is both 
available and is perceived to be credible and representative, faith in the apparent 
representativeness of social circles does indeed diminish in line with a warning about 
their biased nature. A seemingly more probable alternative, then, is that participants 
were unable to avoid drawing on social samples in spite of the prompt, either because 
alternative information was absent (i.e., in the Study 4a no-sample control conditions), 
or because overt attempts to exert control over sampling failed. Even to the extent the 
prompt was successful in alerting participants to the pitfalls of social sampling and 
motivating them to avoid doing so, the direction and magnitude of bias in social 
samples may not have been apparent, and consequently, participants may not have 
known how to appropriately alter their responses (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).  
An alternative possibility is that the prompt did indeed provoke attempts at 
correction, but that the direction and magnitude of this correction process is itself 
determined systematically by social samples, such that the indirect link between 
population estimates and SDUWLFLSDQWV¶own income via social samples remained intact. 
That is, participants may have tried to correct their inferences, but correction processes 
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relied upon pre-experimental knowledge of the income distribution stemming from 
social samples. It is noteworthy that, in Study 4a, although derived  population means 
were indirectly related to income irrespective of whether or not a prompt was provided 
(i.e., social sampling influenced population-level estimates), a main-effect of prompt 
condition was observed such that estimated population means were higher in the prompt 
(vs. no prompt) condition. This potentially suggests that, although the prompt did not 
break the contingency of population estimates on own income, participants did attempt 
to engage in some form of correction in response to the prompt. 
The information participants in the homophily prompt-only condition were 
exposed to entails that population estimates should be corrected for bias in social 
samples, but did not provide any tools or additional information (e.g., an algorithm, 
rule-of-thumb, population parameters or an alternative sample) from which the 
necessary direction and relative magnitude of correction might be reliably 
DSSUR[LPDWHG3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHVLPSO\LQIRUPHGWKDW³If you are relatively well-off, 
your social contacts are probably wealthier than most Americans, on average; if you 
are relatively less well-off, your social contacts probably tend to be poorer than most 
Americans´3DUWLFLSDQWVWKHQZHUHDWWKHYHU\OHDVt aware that to determine the 
approximate magnitude of correction across levels of income, they must consider their 
own position in the distribution (i.e., whether they are wealthy or poor relative to the 
average American).  
The social sampling model data supplied by Galesic et al. (2012) imply that this 
YHU\MXGJHPHQWDVWRRQH¶VUDQNLQWKHSRSXODWLRQLVLWVHOIGHWHUPLQHGE\VRFLDO
sampling processes. Specifically, due to homophily in social samples, when the 
underlying population distribution of a given characteristic is positively skewed (as in 
the case of income), better-off people will underestimate the frequency of worse-off 
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relative to better-off people in the population, making their own position appear 
relatively lower. Research shows that this can result in depreciation in subjective 
income rank such that wealthier individuals feel relatively poorer than they really are 
(Cruces et al., 2011). In turn, such depreciation in perceived rank might serve to 
systematically bias the correction process insofar as the direction and magnitude of any 
FRUUHFWLRQPXVWDFFRXQWIRURQH¶VSHUFHLYHGSRVLWLRQLQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQDQGWKHPDQQHU
in which social samples are consequently biased. It follows that relatively wealthier 
individuals might under-correct their social samples at the bottom and over-correct them 
at the top end of the distribution, insofar as it is implied in the prompt that a lower rank 
entails over-sampling of low, and under-sampling of high, incomes. This process could 
lead to relatively more efficient estimated population distributions than when social 
samples remain uncorrected, consistent with the main-effect of prompt condition on 
population means observed in Study 4a. Research on the flexible correction model 
(FCM; Wegner & Petty, 1997, 1995; Petty & Wegner, 1993) does indeed suggest that 
people correct judgements in different directions when they hold opposing naive 
theories as to the direction of a bias (Wegner, Petty & Dunn, 1998; Wegner & Petty, 
1995). In short, then, attempts to correct for perceived bias in estimating population-
level distributions from social samples may be subject to a kind of feedback loop; 
ironically, the self-same bias that is targeted by correction processes might conceivably 
in turn produce systematic biases in the correction process itself. 
It was, however, observed in Study 4a that providing an alternative sample of 
incomes alone was in fact sufficient to ameliorate the indirect link between participants 
own income and their derived population means via social circle means. In both Studies 
4a and 4b, in the absence of a prompt to do so, participants automatically disregarded 
their social samples in estimating the population distribution and presumably relied 
instead upon the alternative sample shown to them prior to the population distribution 
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estimation task. Recall that the experimental samples were ostensibly drawn from US 
Census Bureau data and participants were explicitly told that they were representative of 
the population income distribution. When participants were provided with novel, 
ostensibly reliable information, they automatically opted to base their judgements upon 
this new information as opposed to social samples. Interestingly, though, the perceived 
reliability of either social samples (Studies 4a and 4b) or alternative samples (Study 4b) 
had no impact upon the tendency to rely on social samples. Including either or both 
measures as covariates (or as an additional moderator in Study 4b) in the moderated-
mediation analyses made no substantive difference to the outcome of the models tested 
in either study. To the extent that participants relied on social sampling, they did so 
irrespective of the perceived efficacy of either social samples or an alternative sample as 
an estimator of the population distribution. Evidently, then, participants found it 
difficult to overcome the tendency to draw on social samples even when they were 
ostensibly aware of the pitfalls of doing so.  
Most strikingly, although it was predicted that the combination of both a prompt 
and an alternative sample would provide the most effective means of reducing social 
sampling, the data from both Studies 4a and 4b in fact suggest the opposite.  Population 
means were most strongly related to own income via social sample means in the 
presence of both a prompt and an alternative sample. It was assumed that alerting 
participants to bias in social samples would serve to motivate attempts at bias 
correction. Providing an ostensibly reliable alternative sample would provide a means 
by which the (ostensibly) necessary direction and magnitude of correction could be 
learned by participants. This should reduce or eliminate the contingency of population 
estimates on own income via social circles because participants may engage in 
recomputation of the population distribution on the basis of the new sample. Ironically, 
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however, social sampling effects were in fact strongest under these conditions, in both 
Studies 4a and 4b.  
This finding is reminiscent of ironic rebound effects of effortful control in other 
domains such as stereotyping (Ko, Muller, Judd & Stapel, 2008; McCrae, Bodenhausen, 
Milne & Jetten, 1994), self-regulation (Vohs, Baumeister & Ciarocco, 2005; 
Baumeister, Muraven & Tice, 2000) and thought suppression (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000; Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). For example, research demonstrates 
that overt attempts to suppress stereotypes often rebound such that perceivers 
subsequently make more stereotypical judgements (McCrae et al., 1994), and similarly, 
attempts to exert self-control (e.g., resisting temptation, regulating emotional responses) 
can lead to diminishing performance over time (e.g., Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 
1998) or self-control failure in a subsequent task (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven & Tice, 1998). Such rebound effects have been explained by some researchers 
in terms of the depletion of mental resources (e.g., Govorun & Payne, 2006; 
Baumeister, 2002). It is assumed that suppressing unwanted thoughts or behaviours 
depletes limited resources available for self-regulation, and that successful suppression 
is dependent upon the availability of such resources (e.g., Baumeister, 2002).  
Under many circumstances, social samples may provide the only information 
upon which inferences about a population can be drawn, and as such it might be 
expected that social sampling, like stereotyping, is a default strategy upon which people 
automatically rely in certain judgement situations. Suppressing a default tendency to 
draw on social samples may thus place a strain upon limited mental resources, in turn 
leading to an ironic rebound in this very tendency; attempting to supress biased 
judgement may actually lead to greater bias due to depletion of mental resources. Given 
the procedure employed in the present studies, however, this explanation is somewhat 
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doubtful. There is little reason to assume that participants in Studies 3a and 3b were 
mentally depleted when estimating the population-level distribution, insofar as the 
prompt manipulation was delivered immediately prior to the population estimation task. 
Although avoiding bias in estimation, and of course the task itself, may place demands 
upon limited resources, such potentially depleting control efforts were not called upon 
until participants commenced the task in which biased judgement was observed. 
Rebound phenomena in stereotyping (e.g., McCrae et al., 1994) or behavioural 
tendencies (e.g., Denzler, Förster, Liberman & Rozenman, 2010) is typically post-
suppressional, that is, it occurs in a new context after depleting control efforts are 
relaxed. The rebound effect observed in the present studies, however, occurred in the 
very same task in which participants were required to exert control, rather than 
subsequent to presumably depleting control efforts.  
A more viable explanation for the observed rebound in social sampling may 
reside in the literature on thought suppression (for a review see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
:HJQHU¶VWKHRU\RILURQLFSURFHVVHVLQPHQWDOFRQWUROVWDWHVWKDW
thought suppression involves two mechanisms: an intentional process that searches 
memory or the environment for distracting (i.e., from the suppressed thought) 
information and an automatic monitoring process that checks for failures in suppression. 
The monitoring process is required to keep the suppressed thought at some level of 
activation in memory, although below the level of consciousness, in order to keep track 
of it. This ironically renders the thought hyperaccessible (Wegner & Erber, 1992), 
leading to its resurgence when control is relaxed, or when cognitive resources are 
limited. In contrast with ego-depletion explanations of rebound phenomena, this 
account allows for enhanced accessibility during as well as after control attempts. 
Attempts at thought suppression actually increase the accessibility of the target 
(Higgins, 1989), producing an increase in targeted thoughts during suppression 
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attempts. Indeed, a few studies have found evidence of enhanced accessibility during 
suppression in the absence of additional cognitive demands (Salkovskis & Campbell, 
1994; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990, 1994), and imposing additional cognitive demands 
increases the frequency with which such enhancement is found (Wenzlaff & Bates, 
1999, 1998; Wegner & Erber, 1992).  
A similar ironic process may conceivably underlie the apparent rebound in 
social sampling observed in the present studies. Where participants seek to avoid bias 
by re-computing the distribution on the basis of the novel sample, the estimation task 
requires an intentional search in memory for incomes included in the alternative sample 
at each given level of the distribution. Supressing a default tendency to draw upon 
social samples instead might require a simultaneous, automatic monitoring process to 
check for intrusions of socially sampled incomes, or to monitor the source (i.e., social 
vs. alternative sample) of data used in judgement. This monitoring process may 
ironically result in the intrusion of social sample data into the judgement process, due to 
KHLJKWHQHGDFFHVVLELOLW\DVLPSOLHGE\:HJQHU¶VLURQLFSURFHVVHVDFFRXQW 
Furthermore, the estimation task under these conditions required participants not 
only to suppress social sampling, but also to intentionally search memory for alternative 
sample data and to compute the relevant proportions at each income interval. In short, 
KLJKGHPDQGVZHUHSUHVXPDEO\SODFHGXSRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRJQLWLYHFDSDFLW\Xnder these 
conditions. Insofar as suppression is an effortful process (Muraven et al., 1998; Wegner, 
1992), it seems reasonable to assume that failures of suppression, and consequently 
rebound, are especially likely under these circumstances, as has been observed in prior 
research employing cognitive load manipulations (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1999, 1998; 
Wegner & Erber, 1992).  
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To summarise, the persistence of social sampling in the presence of a prompt 
and in the absence of an alternative sample, as observed in Study 4a, might suggest that 
participants either disregarded the prompt or were unable to avoid social sampling in the 
absence of alternative information upon which to base their judgements. Alternatively, 
LWLVFRQFHLYDEOHWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLGLQIDFWattempt to engage in a theory-based 
correction (Wegner, Silva, Petty & Garcia-Marques, 2012; Wegner & Petty, 1997) of 
population estimates in response to the prompt. Participants were made aware of the 
source of bias in population estimates (i.e., conditionality of social samples upon own 
income) and, given the absence of relevant, alternative information, may have attempted 
to correct their inferences accordingly. However, if the nature of the correction process 
itself is systematically determined by social sampling processes, as the research of 
Galesic et al. (2012) could suggest, the contingency of population estimates on own 
income via social circles may remain intact, as was indeed observed in Study 4a. 
Furthermore, recall that in Study 4a, a main-effect of prompt condition on derived 
population means emerged, such that mean income was relatively higher in the prompt 
condition. This perhaps suggests that participants did attempt some degree of correction 
in response to the prompt, even though the indirect relationship between own income 
and population estimates remained intact.  
In both  Studies 4a and 4b, social sampling did not occur in the presence of an 
alternative sample only. Presumably, participants under these circumstances attempted 
to recompute the population distribution on the basis of the novel sample, and were 
relatively successful in disregarding their social samples. Only under these conditions 
was a relative reduction in social sampling observed. In the presence of both a prompt 
and an alternative sample, however, a relative increase in social sampling was evident. 
Potentially, attempts to actively supress social sampling in favour of relying on the 
alternative sample lead to heightened accessibility of social samples, in turn producing 
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an ironic rebound in social sampling. This implies that, on the one hand, providing 
ostensibly reliable, novel information about the population alone can serve to reduce 
social sampling. Apparently, people will automatically employ this new information in 
their judgements in the absence of any explicit instruction to do so. On the other hand, 
when such a recomputation strategy is accompanied by active, controlled attempts at 
supressing the tendency to social sample, an ironic rebound in social sampling occurs ± 
the very act of suppressing the tendency to draw on social samples results in an increase 
in the influence of social samples on population estimates. 
In conclusion, the present results suggest that social sampling is difficult to 
avoid, and that deliberate attempts at avoiding social sampling are potentially prone to 
backfire. It seems reasonable to assume that participants were not motivated to defy the 
instruction to avoid social sampling. For example, judgments of the representativeness 
and authenticity of the alternative sample had no bearing on the extent to which 
participants engaged in social sampling. Failure to follow the instruction seemingly 
suggests that participants were not unwilling to forgo social sampling, but that they 
were unable to do so. As such, social sampling does not seem to be amenable to 
volitional control.  On the other hand, simply providing alternative samples may be 
sufficient to reduce or even eliminate social sampling. Hence altering the information 
people have at their disposal, and not their motivation, apparently represents the most 









This final chapter comprises a general discussion of the present findings and their wider 
theoretical implications, and highlights unresolved issues and potential avenues of 
future research. The next section provides a review and recap of Chapters 1 ± 4. 
Following sections discuss the broader implications of social sampling phenomena for 
attitudes toward inequality and redistributive preferences, and political polarisation. The 
potential effects of sampling processes on subjective judgments of socioeconomic 
status, and implications for redistributive attitudes, are also explored. Further discussion 
of an important issue touched upon in Chapter 3 ± the content of social samples and the 
role of alternative sources of knowledge (e.g., the media) about the wealth distribution ± 
LVSURYLGHGXQGHU³7KH&RQWHQWRI6RFLDO6DPSOHV´)ROORZLQJWKLV³3UHYHQWLQJRU
QRW6RFLDO6DPSOLQJ´DGGUHVVHVWKHPXWDELOLW\RIVRFLDOVDPSOLQJLQOLJKWRIWKH
findings described in Chapter 4. The penultimate section discusses the present findings 
in the broader context of cognitive-ecological models of judgement. The final section 
highlights limitations of the present research and unresolved questions, and suggests 
important directions for future research.   
5.2. Summary of Chapters 1-4 
Chapter 1 outlined how much current theory in political psychology emphasises the top-
down, intra-psychic underpinnings of attitudes toward inequality, and political beliefs 
more generally. Such accounts broadly argue that political beliefs reflect opaque 
existential, epistemic and group-based motivations, and are adopted in order to satisfy 
these needs and motives. In this view, anti-egalitarian political attitudes reflect 
motivated attempts to manage uncertainty or fear in the face of threat (Jost et al., 2003), 
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rationalise current social arrangements (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 2003), or 
legitimise the hegemony of specific groups over others (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
Importantly, the locus of these tendencies is inside the mind ± political attitudes are 
assumed to stem from the top-down operation of psychological processes, such that 
political beliefs reflect reasoning in service of reaching a desired, goal-driven 
conclusion.  
These accounts do, of course, acknowledge that normative and ideological social 
LQIOXHQFHVVKDSHLQGLYLGXDOV¶goals and motivations, which in turn leads to biased 
processing of information. The present account differs, however, in terms of how it 
models the interaction between social and psychological processes in determining 
political beliefs and attitudes. The social sampling phenomena investigated presently 
demonstrate how features of social structure, such as homophily, serve to organise 
information in a selective, non-random and systematic fashion (Fiedler, 2000; Simon, 
1982). As a result, biased judgment can emerge even amongst ³XQELDVHGPLQGV´
(Galesic et al., 2012, p. 7), with no other motivation than to reach accurate conclusions 
about the social and political world.  
Drawing upon research emphasising the role of social sampling in shaping 
knowledge of social distributions (Galesic et al., 2012), it was argued that sampling 
processes may play an important role in determining perceptions of how wealth is 
distributed across society, and consequently, attitudes toward the distribution. 
Specifically, because wealthier, relative to poorer people, are overexposed via sampling 
to similarly wealthy others in their day-to-day lives, they will tend to perceive higher 
aggregate levels of wealth across society as a whole. This has implications for attitudes 
toward inequality, because higher perceived efficiency may undermine support for 
measures aimed at reducing inequality (Deutsch, 1972; Okun, 1975; Rawls, 1971). 
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Further, such sampling processes may contribute toward divergence in the economic 
attitudes of wealthy and poor via divergence in perceptions of prevailing economic 
circumstances across society.  
Chapter 2 reports 3 studies supporting the contention that the distribution of 
incomes in LQGLYLGXDOV¶LPPHGLDWHVRFLDOFLUFOHVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\LQIOXHQFHVSHUFHSWLRQV
of the income distribution across wider society via social sampling (Galesic et al., 
2012). The results of Studies 1a and 1b suggest that sampling processes partly explain 
the divergent economic attitudes of relatively wealthier and poorer individuals.  Since 
wealthier individuals move in wealthier social circles, they are prone to estimate that the 
distribution of incomes across society as a whole is more efficient (i.e., the distribution 
has a higher mean income), and consequently, fairer. This, in turn, was associated with 
greater opposition to redistributive measures amongst wealthier people. Importantly, 
this finding held whilst accounting for ideology (Studies 1a and 1b) and perceived self-
interest in redistributive measures (Study 1b). These results support the contention that 
divergence in the economic preferences of wealthier and poorer individuals cannot be 
explained entirely by differences in the political preferences and material interests of 
wealthier and poorer people.  Rather, consideration of how the informational structure 
of immediate social environments moulds perception of the income distribution via 
sampling processes is also necessary (e.g., Cruces et al., 2013).  
Additional support for our theoretical model was obtained in Study 2, which 
conceptually replicated the initial findings using data drawn from a large scale, 
nationally representative survey conducted in New Zealand. Specifically, the 
relationship between household income and attitudes toward the economic status quo in 
New Zealand was mediated via neighbourhood-level deprivation (a proxy for social 
circle wealth) whilst controlling for political ideology and other relevant control 
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variables. Wealthier, relative to poorer people, resided in wealthier neighbourhoods 
(presumably exposing them to wealthier social samples) and in turn rated New Zealand 
society as more fair. Importantly, these results conceptually replicate the findings of 
Studies 1a and 1b using an objective indicator of social circle wealth, as opposed to 
subjective, self-reported estimates. This strengthens confidence in the proposal that 
objective ecological conditions serve to influence political and economic attitudes by 
directly assessing the role of these conditions, as opposed to relying on potentially 
biased or inaccurate estimates of social circle incomes.  
Nevertheless, given the correlational nature of Studies 1a through 2 it is not 
certain that sampling processes play a causal role in determining such attitudes. As 
GLVFXVVHGLQ&KDSWHUPRWLYDWLRQDOSURFHVVHVRURWKHU³WRS-GRZQ´LQIOXHQFHVRQ
judgement might conceivably account for the relationships observed between 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶RZQZHDOWKHVWLPDWHGGLVWULEXWLRQVDQGHFRQRPLFDWWLWXdes, for example by 
biasing social circle and population estimates in line with political preferences. Study 2 
goes some way toward assuaging this concern by utilising an objective proxy for social 
circle wealth.  Nonetheless, reverse causality (i.e., economic and political attitudes 
determine wealth, which in turn determines the neighbourhood in which individuals 
live) or spurious correlation due to unaccounted for, confounding variables cannot be 
entirely ruled out.  
Chapter 3 sought to address these concerns by employing experimental designs. 
Studies 3a and 3b attempted to directly manipulate perceptions of the income 
distribution via experimentally presented (low or high mean) income samples. Since 
more efficient distributions are perceived as more fair (Scott et al., 2001; Mitchell et al., 
2003), it was expected that participants presented with a high, compared to a low mean 
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distribution, would rate the distribution as more fair and show less support for 
redistribution. 
The results of Studies 3a and 3b, however, were somewhat equivocal. It is clear 
that participants made use of the novel samples provided, because estimates of the 
population-level income distribution differed in line with the (low vs. high wealth) 
samples presented. That is, in both Studies 3a and 3b, participants in the high-mean 
distribution condition estimated higher mean income distributions than those in the low-
mean condition, and provided higher point-estimates of mean income. Furthermore, 
mean-estimated distributions across participants, although imperfect, qualitatively 
resembled the high or low mean distributions with which participants were presented in 
the learning phase of the experiments. Providing participants with novel, experimentally 
induced samples was indeed sufficient to influence perceptions of the population-level 
income distribution. In agreement with research emphasising the accuracy of frequency 
learning and accurate assessment of samples (e.g., Zacks & Hasher, 2002; Fiedler, 
2000), participants evidently learned and recalled the incomes presented with a relative 
degree of accuracy, and subsequently used the novel sample information to inform their 
population-level estimates.  
This effect upon estimated population distributions did not translate directly into 
between-condition differences in fairness or support for redistribution, in either Study 
3a or 3b. It cannot be ascertained from the present data why stronger effects of the 
manipulation were not observed, but several possibilities were speculatively considered 
in Chapter 2. For example, insofar as experimentally presented incomes are, unlike 
social samples, detached from real-world experience and content, it is possible they are 
not sufficiently evocative to exert strong effects upon economic attitudes. Similarly, if 
exposure to income samples encountered in everyday life shapes economic attitudes in a 
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chronic and ubiquitous manner, such attitudes potentially become fixed and rigid over 
time, and hence impervious to a single, one-off exposure to new information.  
Nevertheless, indirect effects of the distribution manipulation did emerge, via 
inequality (i.e., Gini indices of estimated population distributions) in Study 3a and via 
efficiency (i.e., mean income of estimated population distributions) in Study 3b. In 
Study 3a, participants in the high, relative to low mean condition, estimated less 
unequal population distributions, perceived the distribution as more fair, and were in 
turn less supportive of redistributive efforts.  In Study 3b, participants in the high, 
relative to low mean condition, estimated more efficient population distributions, 
perceived the distribution as more fair, and were in turn less supportive of redistributive 
efforts. Study 3b thus conceptually replicated the Study 1a and 1b models using an 
experimental manipulation of available samples, as opposed to measured social circle 
distributions. 
In Chapter 4, Studies 4a and 4b sought to examine whether social sampling 
could be reduced or attenuated by promoting awareness of systematic bias in social 
samples, providing an alternative sample, or both interventions in combination. It was 
assumed that, although individuals may be able to produce relatively accurate 
descriptions of their social samples, they are naïve to the systematic bias that renders 
social samples unrepresentative of the wider population (Fiedler, 2000, 2012; Fiedler & 
Juslin, 2006). Further, it was assumed that in many judgement situations, people may 
have no choice but to draw upon social samples insofar as no alternative information is 
available upon which inferences of population-level distributions can be based. Warning 
against social sampling may thus exert little or no impact on social sampling when the 
absence of alternative information necessitates drawing upon social samples. Hence it 
was assumed that highlighting bias in social samples in addition to providing an 
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alternative sample upon which to base judgement would provide the most effective 
means of reducing social sampling. In Study 3a, it was anticipated that the indirect 
relation between own income and estimated population distributions via social samples 
would be weakest or non-significant when participants were made aware of constraints 
on social samples, and were additionally provided with an alternative (low or high 
mean) sample of incomes. 
Contrary to expectations, the indirect relationship between own income and 
estimated population distributions via mean social circle income was strongest when 
participants were both made aware of social circle bias and provided with an alternative 
sample. For participants who were not presented with an alternative distribution of 
incomes, social sampling effects occurred and were similar irrespective of whether 
participants were warned against social sampling or not (i.e., the indirect relationship 
between own income and estimated population mean income via mean social circle 
income was significant and of similar size for prompt and no-prompt groups). Providing 
an alternative sample of incomes in isolation, however, was indeed sufficient to 
eliminate social sampling (the indirect relationship between own income and estimated 
population mean income via social circle mean income was not significant). Study 4b, a 
partial replication of Study 4a, replicated the key findings. Providing an alternative 
sample alone was sufficient to eliminate the indirect relationship between own income 
and estimated population mean income via social circles. However, this relationship, 
indicative of social sampling, was significant when participants were additionally 
warned against social sampling.  
The cause of the unexpected and ironic increase in social sampling observed 
when bias was made salient in the presence of a reliable alternative sample cannot be 
reliably ascertained from the present studies, although several possibilities were 
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considered in Chapter 4. One possibility is that the direction of the correction process 
itself is systematically determined by social sampling processes, as the research of 
Galesic et al. (2012) could suggest, thus preserving the relation of population estimates 
to own income via social circles. An alternative explanation may reside in the literature 
on thought suppression (e.g., Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Overt attempts to supress 
social sampling might ironically increase the accessibility of social samples, producing 
an increase in socially sampled incomes as a result of suppression attempts (e.g., 
Higgins, 1989). Regardless of the underlying mechanism, the results of Studies 4a and 
4b imply that social sampling is difficult to avoid, and that explicit attempts to avoid 
social sampling are likely to fail. Consequently, providing alternative information alone 
appears to be the most effective means of reducing social sampling   
5.3. Implications of Social Sampling for Attitudes toward Inequality 
Studies 1a-2, 4a and 4b, then, provide support for the notion that people do indeed 
sample from their social circles in order to estimate the population-level income 
distribution. The homophilous nature of social circles means that people are 
disproportionately exposed to others of similar incomes, relative to the population level 
income distribution, leading to systematic differences in the perceptions of poorer and 
wealthier individuals. Wealthier, relative to poorer people, perceive generally higher 
levels of affluence across society as a whole, estimating a more efficient (i.e., higher 
mean income) distribution across the population. Studies 1a-2 further demonstrated that 
the systematic influence of social sampling on perceptions of efficiency has an effect 
upon economic attitudes, partly explaining the divergence in judgements of fairness 
(Studies 1-2) between wealthier and poorer individuals, and in turn, attitudes toward 
redistributive measures (Studies 1a and 1b). Differences in political ideology and self-
interest explain, directly, a larger amount of variation in such attitudes, but relatively 
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mundane and innocent sampling processes clearly also play an important role in that 
they account for the relation between wealth and economic attitudes.  
TKHVHHIIHFWVRIVRFLDOVDPSOLQJDUJXDEO\UHIOHFWWKH³RSHUDWLRQVRIDQXQELDVHG
PLQGDFWLQJLQDSDUWLFXODUVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH´*DOHVLFHWDO2, p. 7), that is, they do 
not result from differences in self-interest, ideology or other motivational forces but 
from differences in environment. Nonetheless, social sampling does work in tandem 
with these top-down processes. For example, in Studies 1a and 1b, the effect of own 
income on attitudes toward redistribution was also mediated via political attitudes 
(Studies 1a and 1b) and perceived self-interest in redistributive measures (Study 1b). 
7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶RZQZHDOWKVHUYHVWRVKDSHHFRQRPLFDWWLWXGHVYLD
distinct, but parallel and complementary, ecological and attitudinal processes. Income 
systematically structures information about distributive outcomes via social samples, 
producing divergence in the perceptions (e.g., of the distribution of wealth across 
society) of wealthier and poorer people. In parallel, income also produces divergence in 
attitudes and motivations - wealthier people report more conservative political attitudes 
and less self-interest in redistributive measures. These differing processes work in the 
same direction, reducing support for redistributive measures as wealth increases.  
Further, it seems likely that political attitudes and perceptions of self-interest 
also share some degree of interdependence with sampling processes. Sampling 
processes presumably serve to undergird or indirectly legitimise political attitudes by 
shaping perceptions in a manner that accords with and supports such attitudes. Insofar 
as sampling processes lead wealthier (and hence more conservative) individuals to 
perceive that the income distribution is relatively more efficient, the opposition to 
egalitarianism that is an inherent feature of political conservatism is perhaps more easily 
justified by wealthier individuals. Efficiency is often considered to justify inequalities 
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(Hayek, 1976; Okun, 1975), and as the present and past research demonstrates, is 
employed as a normative principle by lay persons in judging the fairness of distributive 
outcomes (Mitchell et al., 1993; Scott et al., 2001). Both equality and efficiency are 
WUHDWHGDV³QRUPDOJRRGV´LQMXGJLQJGLstributive outcomes (i.e., more of either is 
preferred to less), and individuals make trade-offs between these properties; people 
tolerate greater inequality as efficiency increases (Mitchell et al., 1993; Rawls, 1971; 
Scott et al., 2001). As such, the relatively greater efficiency perceived by wealthier 
individuals due to social sampling presumably serves to legitimise anti-egalitarian 
attitudes which are associated with conservatism.  
Although the present research only specifically examined the effect of efficiency 
perceptions on attitudes toward redistribution, it seems probable that the same processes 
also affect other facets of economic attitudes. For example, greater perceptions of 
HIILFLHQF\PLJKWDOVREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHQGRUVHPHQWRI³WULFNOHGRZQ´economics ± the 
notion that reducing the tax burden of businesses and the wealthy indirectly benefits 
society as a whole by stimulating production ± and may militate against any proposed 
reforms to the economic status quo which entail perceived costs to efficiency, such as 
progressive taxation and increased social spending. More generally, because efficiency 
LVWUHDWHGDVDQRUPDOJRRGZHDOWKLHULQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUFHSWLRQVDUHPRUHFORVHO\DOLJQHG
with abstract, normative ideals of distributive justice. Hence the wealthier subjectively 
live in a relatively fairer society, irrespective of their self-interest or political ideology.  
The present research focused exclusively on the social sampling of incomes and 
the role own income plays in systematically structuring social samples of income 
specifically. A vast amount of other information, however, can also be sampled via the 
same process (i.e., from social contacts) and is subject to the constraints of homophily 
in social networks ±people are relatively similar to their social contacts across a range of 
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attributes (Galesic et al., 2012; McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). In addition to 
sociodemographic attributes, theory and research also suggests that homophily may 
extend to psychological attributes, such as beliefs, attitudes and preferences, either 
because like-minded individuals selectively associate with each other (Festinger, 1957) 
or due to conformity bred via social influence (Asch, 1954; Cialdini & Goldstiein, 
2004).   
Researchers have indeed asserted that the self-selection of individuals into 
DWWLWXGLQDOO\KRPRSKLORXVVRFLDOQHWZRUNVFUHDWHV³HFKRFKDPEHUV´ZKLFKFRQWULEXWHWR
polarisation in political attitudes (Bishop, 2009; Sunstein, 2009), and evidence also 
VXJJHVWVWKDW³SHRSOHZKRWDONWRJHWKHUYRWHWRJHWKHU´3DWWLH	-RKQVWRQ
Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, individuals choose to live in communities in 
which their political ideology is widely shared, and members of local political 
minorities are more inclined to migrate compared to members of local political 
majorities (Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter & Nosek, 2014). It is well established that 
social networks are an important source of social and political information and serve to 
influence political attitudes and behaviour (Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg, 2013; Mutz, 
2002; Newman, 2013). Presumably, social sampling processes serve to reinforce 
polarisation in political attitudes and behaviour insofar as demographic homophily in 
social groups may also lead members to share similar perceptions of prevailing social, 
economic and political circumstances. Such shared perceptions might serve to reinforce 
political attitudes because interaction with similar social group members presumably 
provides validation for these perceptions. Further, both attitudinal and demographic 
homophily may also breed false consensus. Irrespective of any motivation to do so, 
people may come to overestimate the extent to which their own political perceptions 
and attitudes are shared by others in society because similar perceptions and attitudes 
are relatively overrepresented in their social networks, and hence in their social samples.   
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Research has uncovered large asymmetries in the social mobility of wealthy and 
poor individuals; the children of poor parents are disproportionately likely to remain 
poor in adult life, whereas the children of wealthy parents are disproportionately likely 
to remain wealthy (Pew Charitable Trust, 2012). In a pure meritocracy where there is 
substantial equality of opportunity across social groups, there should be little or no 
correlation between the socioeconomic status of parents and children, at least if it is 
assumed that innate ability and effort are also equally distributed across groups. Indeed, 
research demonstrates that, at the earliest stages of life, socioeconomic status is 
unrelated to cognitive ability (Fryer & Levitt, 2013). Differences in ability between 
children in low and high status families instead emerge in early childhood, increasing 
over time, and are related to levels of material and social investment of parents (Duncan 
& Murnane, 2011; Guryan, Hurst & Kearney, 2011).  
These findings imply that the wealthy are afforded greater opportunity to 
preserve, than the poor are to improve, their social status. Inequalities, for example in 
education, healthcare and job opportunities between wealthier and poorer individuals, 
also serve to diminish social mobility and entrench wealth and income inequality (Breen 
& Jonsson, 2005; Corak, 2013; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2011). This is an important 
observation from the perspective of social sampling insofar as it suggests that, not only 
do wealthy and poor differ in terms of their perceptions of distributive outcomes such as 
efficiency, but perhaps also in their perceptions of the distribution of opportunities 
which allow people to maintain or improve their social status. Insofar as wealthy 
individuals and their social contacts are afforded greater opportunities, and their 
endeavours are more often met with success, they may perceive that prevailing social 
and economic conditions offer relatively more opportunity for self-improvement given 
investment and effort. In short, social sampling processes might lead wealthier people to 
perceive that society is relatively more meritocratic than poorer people, and as such, 
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they may be more likely to attribute low social status to individual failures (e.g., lack of 
effort) as opposed to external and uncontrollable social constraints. 
Research on distributive justice also demonstrates that meritocracy serves to 
justify inequality (McCoy & Major, 2007), and that people prioritise efficiency over 
equality to a greater degree at higher levels of meritocracy (Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman 
& Lerner, 2003; Mitchell et al., 1993).  Greater perceptions of meritocracy may thus be 
DQDGGLWLRQDOIDFWRULQGHWHUPLQLQJZHDOWKLHULQGLYLGXDOV¶UHODtively higher opposition to 
redistribution, and might also lead wealthier individuals to prioritise the maximisation 
of net wealth and economic growth (i.e., efficiency) over reducing inequality to a 
relatively greater extent.  
5.4. Social Sampling and Political Polarisation 
The present findings build on previous research suggesting that wealth inequality is of a 
potentially self-reinforcing nature (Kelly & Enns, 2010; Volscho & Kelley, 2012). 
Insofar as rising inequality serves to increase social distance between wealthy and poor 
individuals, social sampling processes will produce greater divergence in perceptions of 
prevailing social and economic circumstances, which may in turn manifest in 
increasingly polarised political attitudes between wealthy and poor. Indeed, research has 
documented an association between rising inequality and increased polarisation 
amongst party policy positions, and greater stratification of partisanship by income 
levels over time in the US (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, 2003, 2006), as well as greater 
polarisation amongst the electorate in US states with higher income inequality (Garand, 
2010). The present findings suggest that social sampling processes may partly explain 
the apparent relationship between inequality and political polarisation.  
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Inequality also serves to increase physical distance, because rising 
inequality is associated with increased spatial segregation of wealthy and poor, 
resulting in reduced interaction between people of differing socioeconomic status 
(Massey & Fischer, 2003). Rising spatial segregation, then, presumably serves to 
exacerbate demographic homophily within social networks, insofar as wealthy 
individuals live in communities disproportionately populated by other similarly 
wealthy individuals, and vice versa for poor individuals. Study 2 suggests that 
such segregation, in turn, influences political attitudes; wealthy, relative to 
poorer respondents, reported living in more affluent neighbourhoods and 
consequently judged society to be fairer. This finding parallels prior research 
demonstrating that wealthier individuals develop greater support for leftist 
parties when they live in neighbourhoods with a relatively higher proportion of 
low-income individuals (Huckfeldt, 1983).  
Ironically, however, policies that are ostensibly designed to promote mixing 
across different social groups may inadvertently breed greater segregation. Research 
FRQVLVWHQWO\UHYHDOVIRUH[DPSOHWKDWJHQWULI\LQJ³XUEDQUHQHZDO´SURMHFWVUHVXOWLQWKH
displacement of low-income families from inner-city areas due to inflation in property 
values and rents, thus increasing spatial segregation between socioeconomic groups 
(Davidson & Lees, 2005; Slater, 2004; Walks & Maaranen, 2008). Such perverse 
effects of gentrification may also serve to breed hostility and conflict between poorer 
and wealthier individuals, as exemSOLILHGE\WKHUHFHQW³5HFODLP%UL[WRQ´SURWHVW
against gentrification in south London (McKie, 2015). Presumably, intergroup conflict 
of this kind serves to further discourage mixing across socioeconomic groups.  
Insofar as rising inequality is associated with increased polarisation in the 
political attitudes of wealthy and poor voters (Garand, 2010; McCarty, Poole & 
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Rosenthal, 2003, 2006), an outstanding question remains as to why such polarisation 
has not in turn resulted in redistributive measures that serve to limit or reduce 
inequality. Models in political economy have suggested that the democratic process 
should serve to limit inequality, because an increasing proportion of the electorate will 
vote for parties proposing redistributive measures as inequality increases (Meltzer & 
Richard, 1981). Inequality in OECD countries, however, has risen steadily since the 
1980s and stands at its highest level in 30 years (Cingano, 2014). Bonica, McCarty, 
Poole and Rosenthal (2013) point to the role of politics and public policy in 
perpetuating inequality. Polarisation leads to gridlock in political legislatures that 
immobilises reform efforts. Further, relatively lower electoral participation amongst 
lower income groups, combined with large political donations and lobbying efforts by 
wealthy individuals and business interests, ensure that wealthier people exert a 
disproportionate influence over public policy (Bonica, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, 
2013; Volscho & Kelley, 2012).   
5.5. Social Sampling and Bias in Subjective Rank  
 Political factors notwithstanding, and echoing the present findings, research implies 
that biased perceptions of the wealth distribution also play a direct role in maintaining 
inequality by militating against redistributive efforts. Across demographic and political 
groups, people are prone to underestimate the extent of wealth inequality, and estimate 
idealised distributions that are significantly more equitable than the status quo (Norton 
& Ariely, 2011). To the extent that inequality is widely underestimated, baseline 
demand for redistributive efforts is potentially lower than it would be given accurate 
perception of the distribution. Further, biased perceptions of the distribution in turn 
result in biases in perceived rank, and consequently, materially irrational redistributive 
preferences (Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz, 2011).  
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Paralleling the social sampling model, Cruces et al. (2011) suggest that 
individuals estimate the population-level income distribution by drawing on immediate 
reference groups. Estimates of rank hence reflect position within (socioeconomically 
homophilous) reference groups and are therefore biased relative to objective rank (i.e., 
in the true population). The authors found that, whilst poor people often overestimated 
their income rank, wealthy people often underestimated it, and bias in estimated rank 
was related to relative rank within reference groups; poorer people overestimated their 
rank, and to a greater extent, as position within the reference group increased (and vice-
versa for wealthy people). Notably, individuals with more heterogeneous social contacts 
were less prone to bias.  
Importantly, bias in perceived rank apparently exerted a causal effect on 
redistributive attitudes amongst poorer individuals; correcting for upward biases by 
providing information on the true distribution increased support for redistribution 
amongst poorer individuals, although the converse effect did not occur for wealthier 
individuals. These findings suggest that social sampling processes may exert an 
asymmetrical effect on the redistributive preferences of wealthy and poor via judgments 
of rank. Specifically, upward bias in perceived rank serves to reduce demand for 
redistribution amongst poorer individuals, but downward bias in perceived rank does 
not increase such demand amongst the wealthy. Paradoxically, then, although social 
sampling processes apparently lead to relatively greater demand for redistribution 
amongst the poor, the same processes might simultaneously serve to dampen aggregate 
demand by simultaneously distorting perceptions of self-interest in redistribution 
downward amongst some poor individuals.   
5.6. The Content of Social Samples 
159 
 
Social sampling is not the only channel by which people, wealthy and poor, can learn 
about levels of inequality, affluence and poverty across society. People are indirectly 
exposed to information concerning the distribution of wealth through various media, 
such as TV and print news, political messages and campaigns, as well as via interaction 
with other people. Undoubtedly, wealthy individuals are aware of the existence of poor 
individuals, and vice versa, irrespective of homophily in incomes within social 
networks, and each group have some awareness of the lifestyles and living 
circumstances of the other. Such indirect exposure might be assumed to engender some 
degree of convergence in perceptions, and perhaps decrease judgements of fairness, and 
increase support for redistributive measures, amongst the wealthy. The present research 
demonstrates that social sampling effects nevertheless account for differences in 
perceptions and preferences, and hence are detectable in spite of any potential 
convergence that might be produced through vicarious exposure (e.g., via the media) to 
information on distributive outcomes.  
Arguably, important qualitative differences exist between social samples of 
income and similar information learned indirectly, for example via the media. 
Information about social contacts is learned in a chronic and unintentional manner, 
absorbed, updated and integrated over time during every day social encounters (Galesic 
et al., 2012; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). Repeated exposure, as well as semantic richness 
and deeper integration presumably convey memorial advantages of social samples over 
information about others outcomes learned indirectly, for example via the media.  
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 3, it seems probable that the majority of 
social contacts¶incomes are not known directly, but are inferred during estimation on 
the basis of relevant, proximal cues to socioeconomic status such as employment, 
lifestyle and material possessions (Belk, 1981). For this reason, estimated social circle 
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distributions potentially capture not only abstract perceptions of the distribution of 
income per se, but concrete experience of the distribution of living standards, and the 
constraints and affordances upon living standards associated with different levels of 
income. This richer knowledge and experience is perhaps what actually informs 
judgments of fairness via social sampling, rather than the abstracted income values 
attached to social contacts. Estimated social circle income distributions might serve as a 
proxy for more vivid, arousing and concrete knowledge gleaned via direct contact and 
interaction with social contacts. Indirect exposure to abstract information about 
distributive outcomes (e.g., statistics on the distribution or verbal messages about the 
extent of inequality and poverty in the media) may therefore exert a relatively less 
powerful impact on attitudes because such information is not associated with 
meaningful experience of those outcomes, and is not subject to ongoing repetition and 
elaboration.  
This may partly explain why, in Studies 3a and 3b, although presenting 
participants with (ostensibly real) novel, low or high efficiency income samples was 
sufficient to influence perceptions of the income distribution accordingly, no direct 
effects of the manipulation were observed upon judgments of fairness and support for 
redistribution. Potentially, insofar as income values can be drawn directly from memory 
in this context, rather than inferred on the basis of social contacts attributes, they entail 
little or no consideration of the more vivid and arousing information that perhaps 
underlies the relationship between social circle income distributions and economic 
attitudes. Further, ecologically situated sampling processes presumably contribute to the 
formation of political attitudes continuously over time, and attitudes may become 
relatively rigid and impervious to a one-off exposure to new information.      
5.7. Preventing (or not) Social Sampling 
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Generally, the present findings are somewhat ambivalent as to whether presenting novel 
information can serve to reduce social sampling, correct perceptions and in turn produce 
change in political attitudes. As mentioned, in Studies 3a and 3b, although participants 
presented with a more (vs. less) efficient sample of incomes subsequently estimated 
more efficient population distributions, the manipulation had no direct effect upon 
either fairness or support for redistribution. An indirect effect of the manipulation on 
redistributive attitudes sequentially via estimated population mean income and fairness 
was, however, observed in Study 3b. This shows that the manipulation did exert an 
influence on redistributive attitudes by changing perceptions of efficiency, but that 
redistributive attitudes were only affected to the extent that the manipulation 
successfully produced changes in perceptions of the distribution. The indirect path from 
the distribution manipulation to redistributive attitudes via fairness only was not 
significant ± the manipulation had no effect when resulting variance in estimated 
population means was unaccounted for in the model. As such, providing novel 
information on the distribution can apparently produce some minor change in attitudes 
to the extent that perceptions of the distribution, notably levels of efficiency, are 
successfully modified by the new information.  
Further, in Studies 4a and 4b, providing an alternative sample of incomes was 
sufficient to eliminate social sampling insofar as, under these conditions, estimates of 
the distribution no longer depended, indirectly, upon own income as a result of 
differences in levels of social circle income. Studies 4a and 4b suggest that, where a 
new, ostensibly reliable sample is available, people will automatically disregard social 
samples and base population estimates upon new information, although Studies 3a and 
3b perhaps suggest that such novel information exerts only a small effect on attitudes. 
Further, social sampling processes will presumably inhibit ongoing change in both 
perceptions and attitudes in response to novel information. The ongoing embeddedness 
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of people within their social circles potentially renders both perceptions of the 
distribution and attitudes rigid over time; changes in response to new information on the 
distribution may therefore be both small and temporary.  
Studies 4a and 4b also revealed that making bias in social samples salient is 
ineffective in reducing social sampling. This is perhaps unsurprising given that, lacking 
any alternative information upon which to base population estimates, participants were 
forced to rely upon social samples irrespective of awareness of the potential for bias in 
resulting population estimates. In both Studies 4a and 4b, however, inducing awareness 
of social sample bias, in addition to providing an alternative sample, actually lead to a 
relative increase in social sampling. As such, the conditions under which participants 
were expected to be motivated to avoid social sampling (when the biasing effect of 
social sampling was salient) and also most able to avoid doing so (where alternative 
information was available upon which to base population estimates) ironically produced 
the highest levels of social sampling. To the extent that participants did attempt to 
engage in deliberate correction of their population estimates in response to perceived 
bias in social samples, then, such attempts clearly backfired. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
this finding parallels rebound phenomena observed in other domains such as thought 
suppression (Higgins, 1989; Wegener, 1992, 1994), and potentially involves a similar 
mechanism. Suppressing a default tendency to draw upon social samples may require a 
simultaneous, automatic monitoring process to check for intrusions of social sample 
data upon the judgement process, or to monitor the source (i.e., social sample vs. 
alternative sample) of data sampled. Such a monitoring process may ironically result in 
the intrusion of social sample data into judgement due to heightened accessibility of 
VRFLDOVDPSOHGDWDDVLPSOLHGE\:HJQHU¶VLURQLFSURFHVVHVDFFRXQW,W
cannot be ascertained from the present studies precisely why rebound effects occurred 
in Studies 4a and 4b, and an interpretation in terms of ironic processes is hence purely 
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speculative. Nevertheless, Studies 4a and 4b clearly imply that attempts to reduce social 
sampling by raising awareness of bias in social samples are likely to be ineffective, and 
that deliberate attempts at suppressing a default tendency to social sample may 
ironically increase social sampling.       
5.8. The Role of Cognitive-Ecological Processes in Political Cognition 
The present results underscore the importance of ecological processes for understanding 
political DWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRXUJHQHUDOO\LQDGGLWLRQWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶LGHRORJLHV
interests and motivations. Theory and research emphasising the role of sampling 
processes shows that biased judgment can emerge in the absence of motivational biases 
or cognitive shortcomings insofar the environment determines what information is 
available for inclusion in the judgement process (Fiedler, 2000). Space, time, density of 
information, social distance and cultural and economic restrictions serve to shape and 
limit the information samples to which people are exposed. As such, the information 
people can potentially acquire about important social and political circumstances and 
outcomes via sampling, such as the distribution of wealth across society, is constrained 
by the envLURQPHQWDQGDSHUVRQ¶VORFDWLRQZLWKLQLW 
Prior research implies that people can provide normatively accurate descriptions 
of samples encountered (Fielder, 2000; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Peterson & Beach, 
1967; Zacks & Hasher, 2002), but as a consequence, pre-existing biases in samples will 
carry over into judgements of populations (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch & 
Wilde, 2000; Juslin, Winman & Hanson, 2007). Although there is no means of 
DVVHVVLQJWKHDFFXUDF\RISDUWLFLSDQWV¶GHVFULSWLRQVRf their social samples in the present 
studies, this prior research suggests that they are likely to be reasonably accurate. Social 
sampling, in tandem with the homophilous nature of social networks, ensures that 
samples of income to which people are exposed are non-random because they are 
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conditioned upon people¶s own standing on this very attribute. This ensures that 
systematic biases will exist in perceptions of the population-level income distribution 
irrespective of ideological or self-serving biases in judgement, even when, and perhaps 
because, social samples are processed accurately and without bias (Fiedler, 2000; 
Galesic et al., 2012).   
The present findings resonate with prior research and theory suggesting that 
people are naïve to the constraints of samples and sampling processes, and consequently 
fail to account for these constraints in judgment (Fiedler, 2012; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; 
Juslin, Winman & Hansson, 2007). This work suggests that people assume that samples 
are representative of relevant populations, failing to account for selectivity imposed by 
either the environment itself or by the sampling processes employed to extract 
information from it. Social sampling encapsulates precisely this tendency; people 
assume that their social circles are representative of the wider population, failing to 
account for the conditionality of social samples upon their own ranking on the attribute 
under judgement. In both Studies 4a and 4b, participants tended to believe that incomes 
across their social circles were representative of incomes in the wider population 
(average judgements were at the scale midpoint in all conditions), and providing explicit 
information to the contrary had no effect on judgements of social circle 
representativeness. Further, raising awareness of bias in social samples did not reduce, 
and under certain conditions ironically increased, social sampling in Studies 4a and 4b.  
Hence people are apparently unable or reluctant to correct for biases in social 
sampling even to the extent that they are made aware of them. Previous research has 
construed similar effects, for example the ability to discount redundant information or 
account for the sample size effects, in terms of metacognitive shortcomings (Fiedler, 
2000; Fiedler, 2012; Unkelback et al., 2007). Sampled information is processed 
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accurately but uncritically, and people lack the necessary metacognitive facilities to 
account for properties of samples and sampling strategies, and apply appropriate 
correction to judgements where necessary. As such, and in agreement with the present 
findings, it may be necessary to change samples themselves in order to prevent biases 
manifesting in judgment.     
The present findings, and prior research and theorising on sampling processes 
more generally, is also informative for the socioecological model (e.g., Oishi, 2014). As 
described in Chapter 1, the socioecological approach emphasises the role played by 
objective features of the environment in shaping cognition, emotion and behaviour, and 
vice-versa. The present findings are one example of such interactivity between persons 
and environments, linking LQGLYLGXDOV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQFRPHWRWKH immediate social 
environment to which they are exposed (their social circles), and in turn to political 
attitudes. Furthermore, the role of sampling processes in mediating between the macro-
HQYLURQPHQWDQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶SV\FKRORJLFDOUHVSRQVHVWRZDUGLWSRWHQWLDOO\VXJJHVWDQ
important nuance to the socioecological model. Specifically, the present findings 
highlight that the way in which individuals experience and respond to objective 
properties of macro-environments (e.g., national levels of wealth)  is partly determined, 
and constrained by, the informational structure of micro-environments (e.g., social 
circle wealth) via which the wider world is experienced. As such, apparent effects of 
macro-level environmental variables (e.g., GDP, inequality, demographics, institutions) 
on individual-level psychological outcomes (e.g., political attitudes, voting preferences, 
happiness, ) may not always result, straightforwardly and strictly from, objective 
variation  in environmental structures per se, but from variation in how those properties 
are experienced and perceived across different people. Where inferences about macro-
level properties (e.g., wealth, inequality, demographics) are drawn on the basis of small, 
immediate and systematically determined samples, individual-level perception need not 
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coincide with macro-level reality, even in the absence of motivational, ideological or 
cognitive biases. 
Such insights from the sampling approach may be fruitfully incorporated into the 
socioecological model. For example, sampling processes may help explain paradoxical 
findings in which correlations between the same variables occur only at the macro (e.g., 
between-country) or individual level of analysis, or take different signs at either level. 
Gelman et al. (2009), for example, show that although individual-level wealth in the US 
is positively correlated with a tendency to vote Republican, wealthier states tend to vote 
for the Democrats. This paradox is potentially explained by LQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUFHSWLRQ of 
their own wealth relative to others in their immediate reference group. Irrespective of 
absolute wealth, people living in wealthier states may perceive themselves as relatively 
less well-off (because there are proportionally more high-earners in wealthy states) and 
are perhaps more likely to vote for the Democrats as a result (and vice-versa for 
Republican voters). 
An alternative explanation is also possible, however, because higher (lower) 
mean wealth at the state-level need not result from higher (lower) proportions of 
wealthy individuals residing in particular states. Instead, higher state-level wealth might 
reflect heavy skewing of the wealth distribution ± some states may be wealthier because 
they contain a small number of extremely wealthy individuals. This underscores an 
important caveat that must be borne in mind when individual-level outcomes (e.g., 
voting tendencies) are explained in terms of ecological differences (e.g., differing 
proportions of wealthy individuals across states). Because differences between 
environments do not always translate straightforwardly to differences between 
individuals within those environments, correlations between ecological and individual-
level variables are potentially spurious. If wealthier states are wealthier simply due to 
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skewing of the distribution by a few very rich residents, then there is no paradox 
between the (apparently) contradictory relations of state-level and individual-level 
wealth to voting tendencies ± income alone can explain voting tendencies, and the 
relationship of state-level wealth to voting tendencies is in fact misleading. This would 
render the relativity explanation an example of the ecological fallacy, in which 
erroneous inferences about individual-level outcomes are drawn on the basis of 
observed differences at the aggregate (i.e., ecological) level.   
A related issue, of direct relevance to the present findings, concerns the direction 
of causality in interactions between persons and the environment ± the extent to which 
variation in individual-level cognition, attitudes and behaviour result from differences in 
environment, versus the extent to which variations in environment result from 
differences in cognition, attitudes and behaviour. As discussed elsewhere, the 
environments to which people are exposed are not entirely static or arbitrary, but are 
SDUWLDOO\VKDSHGE\LQGLYLGXDOV¶RZQEHKDYLRXU, for example via processes of self-
selection (Winkel, Saegert & Evans, 2009). The research by Motyl et al. (2014) 
showing that individuals choose to live in communities where their political attitudes 
are widely shared is a good example of how iQGLYLGXDOV¶attitudes and behaviour play a 
role in determining the day-to-day political ecology to which they are exposed.  
Recall that the social sampling model proposed and tested in Chapter 1 assumes 
WKDWDSHUVRQ¶VLQFRPHGHWHUPLQHVWKHZHDOWKRIWKHLUVRFLDOFRQWDFWVVXFKWKDWZHDOWKLHU
people are exposed to wealthier social contacts because they are wealthier. Although 
this is conceptually similar to self-selection (it involves properties of persons 
determining their environment), it is also importantly different. Namely, the social 
sampling account neither assumes nor rejects any motivation on the behalf of 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ to associate with others who are similarly wealthy to themselves. The 
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relation between individual and social circle wealth might reflect either an active 
process in which people choose to associate with similarly wealthy others (i.e., self-
selection), a passive process in which social structure ensures relative overexposure to 
similarly wealthy others, or some combination of both. Similarly, although the present 
model assumes that income influences political attitudes via social sampling processes, 
the findings of Motyl et al. (2014) suggest a potential reversal of the proposed causal 
chain. Specifically, if it assumed that a) individuals self-select into communities where 
their political attitudes are widely shared and b) poorer (wealthier) communities provide 
poorer (better) earning opportunities for individuals belonging to them, then it is 
possible that political attitudes causally affect indiviGXDOV¶ income. In short, pro-
redistributionist individuals may choose to live in areas where such attitudes are 
common, and because these areas tend to provide low paying jobs, they and their social 
contacts are relatively less well off (and vice-versa).  
5.9. Limitations and Future Directions 
The present research represents an important first step in investigating the role that 
VRFLDOVDPSOLQJSOD\VLQVKDSLQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHVRFLDOZRUOGDURXQG
them, and how these perceptions in turn serve to shape political attitudes. Nevertheless, 
many important questions remain unaddressed. This final section will briefly highlight 
outstanding questions regarding social sampling phenomena, suggest potential avenues 
of future research, and discuss limitations of the present studies. The following 
discussion is not exhaustive, but aims to focus upon the key questions and issues raised 
by the present research. 
 One important question unaddressed by the present studies concerns whether, 
and to what extent, people are aware of social sampling. It remains an open question as 
to whether social sampling represents a deliberate strategy upon which people rely in 
169 
 
estimating populations, or whether, as suggested by Galesic et al. (2012), it is an 
implicit and automatic tendency, akin to a heuristic. Although Studies 4a and 4b 
demonstrate that it is difficult for people to avoid social sampling, these studies provide 
QRLQVLJKWLQWRSHRSOH¶Vpre-existing awareness of the means by which they make 
population estimates. Future research should seek to address this issue, perhaps by 
openly questioning people about the strategies they use in making inferences about 
populations.  
Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent people are aware of the tendency 
toward homophily in social circles and, correspondingly, that they are hence a biased 
estimator of the population. Prior research and theory would suggest that this is not 
likely the case ± DVGLVFXVVHGSHRSOHDUH³PHWDFRJQLWLYHO\P\RSLF´GHPRQVWUDWLQJSRRU
understanding of the properties of samples and employing them in an uncritical fashion 
in judging populations (Fiedler, 2012, 2000; Fiedler, Brinkmann et al., 2000;  Fiedler & 
Juslin, 2006). Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine circumstances in which it is 
difficult for people to avoid acknowledging the unrepresentative nature of their social 
circles. For example, people who are at the extremes of the socioeconomic spectrum 
(i.e., very wealthy or very poor) conceivably possess some explicit understanding that 
their social circles are not representative.  
This raises the question of whether such individuals rely on social sampling in 
spite of understanding that their social circles are unrepresentative. Future research 
might seek to address this issue by investigating social sampling amongst such 
individuals, such as the very wealthy. Evidence, for example, that very wealthy people 
are prone to social sampling, in spite of acknowledging the unrepresentative nature of 
their social circles, would support the contention that social sampling is an automatic 
and unavoidable tendency. 
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Further questions arise as to the kind of information that is contained in social 
samples. Although the present studies investigated social sampling via estimates of 
income distributions, as suggested earlier, it is perhaps not the distribution of income 
values per se that matters for judgments of fairness and redistribution. Estimated social 
circle income distributions potentially also capture concrete experience of others living 
standards, and the constraints and affordances associated with different levels of 
income. Potentially, it is this richer knowledge and experience that informs judgments 
of fairness and preferences for redistribution. Estimated social circle distributions might 
serve simply as a proxy for more vivid, arousing and concrete knowledge about others 
wellbeing which is more relevant to such judgments.  
Future research should seek to examine this issue directly, perhaps by 
simultaneously manipulating both sample wealth levels and the qualitative properties of 
the information provided. For example, participants could be presented with a low 
versus high wealth sample, where wealth levels are conveyed by either numerical 
income values, qualitative information (e.g., via text vignettes) pertaining to wellbeing, 
lifestyle and consumption, or both kinds of information in combination.    
Relatedly, it is likely the case that it is not only information pertaining to 
SHRSOHV¶ZHDOWKWKDWLVOHDUQHGYLDVRFLDOVDPSOLQJDQGHPSOR\HGLQMXGJPHQWVRI
fairness and redistributive preferences. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, inequalities 
exist not only in distributive outcomes such as wealth, but also in opportunities, and 
hence social mobility (Corak, 2013; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2011; Breen & Jonsson, 
2005). The social sampling model implies that such inequality in opportunity will 
EHFRPHPDQLIHVWLQSHRSOHV¶SHUFHSWLRQV$VDUHVXOWZHDOWKLHUSHRSOHSHUKDSVSHUFHLYH
that society provides greater opportunity for improving ones social position, and is more 
meritocratic, than do poorer people.  
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This has several important implications. Firstly, to the extent that wealthier 
people perceive higher levels of meritocracy, they are potentially more likely to 
attribute poverty to personal failings as opposed to inequitable social arrangements 
(McCoy & Major, 2007; Mitchell et al., 1993). As such, higher perceptions of 
meritocracy may be an additional factor leading to lower support for redistribution 
amongst wealthier, relative to poorer individuals.  
Secondly, to the extent that poorer (relative to wealthier) people perceive that 
VRFLDOFRQWDFWV¶DWWHPSWVDWLPSURYHPHQWHJYLDHGXFDWLRQVHHNLQJEHWWHUSDLG
employment) often go unrewarded, and that society is relatively less meritocratic, they 
are perhaps discouraged from engaging in similar attempts at improving their own 
circumstances. In this manner, inequalities in social mobility, and consequently in 
perceptions of opportunity and success, might act as a vicarious driver of learned 
helplessness amongst poorer individuals (Brown & Inouye, 1978; DeVellis, DeVellis & 
McCauley, 1978).  
Future research might seek to address these important questions by examining 
whether perceptions of social mobility or success amongst social contacts are related to 
DSHUVRQ¶VLQFRPHDQGLQWXUQKRZVXFKSHUFHSWLRQVLQIOXHQFHEHOLHILQPHULtocracy, 
sense of control over life circumstances and personal efficacy.  
The present research emphasised the role of social sampling specifically, 
LQYROYLQJLQIRUPDWLRQVDPSOHVGUDZQIURPLQGLYLGXDOV¶VRFLDOQHWZRUNVLQGHWHUPLQLQJ
judgments of the population income distribution. Of course, social contacts are not the 
sole source of information of relevance to such judgments. People are also exposed to 
information about levels of inequality, and extremes of poverty and affluence, through 
other sources such as TV and print media. It is not clear from the present research what 
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role such vicarious sources of information play in judging population distributions, and 
whether such forms of information have any bearing on social sampling processes.  
Future research should seek to clarify the role of such vicarious information, for 
example by presenting participants with news articles addressing poverty or inequality, 
in addition to measuring social circle and population distributions. Such information 
may undermine social sampling, as perhaps suggested by the findings of Studies 4a and 
4b where participants automatically relied on an alternative sample where available. 
Alternatively, such information is perhaps combined with social sampling, such that 
population estimates are adjusted accordingly but continue to be largely based upon 
social samples. 
 Although the present research shows that social sampling leads wealthier people 
to be relatively more opposed to redistribution, and vice versa, it is not 
straightforwardly the case that wealthy people adopt conservative, and poorer people 
liberal, ideological positions (e.g., Jost et al., 2004). Poor people often adopt 
conservative, anti-egalitarian political ideologies, and wealthy people often adopt liberal 
ideologies. Social sampling implies a dissonance between the ideological preferences 
and perceptions of such poor conservatives and wealthy liberals. Why, for example, 
would poor individuals adopt anti-egalitarian political ideologies, despite the fact that 
their social samples expose them to the damaging consequences of poverty and 
inequality? It is important for future research to establish how people resolve tensions 
between ideological motivations, on the one hand, and their perceptions of prevailing 
economic circumstances, on the other. A clear shortcoming of the present theoretical 
PRGHOLVWKDWLWVWUXJJOHVWRDFFRXQWIRUWKRVHFDVHVLQZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOV¶SROLWLFDO
beliefs run counter to their personal and group interests.  
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A related issue concerns the relative influence of ecological versus ideological 
processes in determining economic attitudes. As discussed in Chapter 2, although 
sampling processes appear equally important as political attitudes in explaining (by 
mediating) the negative relation between income and support for redistribution, political 
attitudes (and self-interest) bear a stronger direct relationship to such attitudes than do 
social samples. Furthermore, the results from Study 1b suggest that self-interest, but not 
either social samples or political ideology, account for the relation between income and 
attitudes toward redistribution. As such, ecological processes alone cannot fully explain 
attitudes to redistribution. Ideological processes, and self-interest, potentially play a 
more important role in shaping such attitudes than do social sampling processes. On the 
other hand, as noted in Chapter 2, it should also be borne in mind that, insofar as 
attitudes to inequality and redistribution are in and of themselves components of 
political ideology, (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), there is potentially some degree of 
redundancy between these variables, and similarly so for self-interest in, and support 
for, redistribution. Future research should seek to more fairly and directly examine the 
relative contributions of sampling versus ideological processes or self-interest, perhaps 
by examining dependent variables that are less proximal to ideology, or operationalising 
variables in such a way that is less likely to elicit ideological thinking . For example, 
rather than directly measuring attitudes to redistribution, which is transparently 
politically loaded, future research might assess preferences for inequality using 
hypothetical salary alllocations (e.g., Jasso, 1983).    
An additional shortcoming of the present research is its strict reliance on MTurk 
samples. Research has criticised over-reliance on crowd-sourced samples, and it has 
been shown for example that MTurk workers are not fully representative of the wider 
population. MTurk workers are on average younger, better educated, underemployed 
and more liberal compared to the general population (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; 
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Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010). Nevertheless, MTurk 
samples are more representative than traditional student samples, and were more 
suitable for the present research given that it was necessary to recruit members of 
earning households across a range of incomes.  
Research further suggests that MTurkers, although highly motivated, are keen to 
please requesters and are potentially more prone to demand effects. MTurkers score 
higher on measures of social desirability (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011), 
and may use the Internet to find answers to factual questions (Goodman, Cryder & 
Cheema, 2013). This represents a potential problem for the present studies ± 
conceivably, participants may have searched the Internet for information on the income 
distribution rather than basing estimates solely on pre-existing knowledge. 
The importance of sampling phenomena in political cognition is underscored by 
recent experimental research showing that search engine rankings can exert powerful 
effects on the preferences of undecided voters (Epstein & Robertson, 2015). These data 
VXJJHVWWKDWZKHUHHOHFWLRQVDUHZRQE\VPDOOPDUJLQVVXFK³VHDUFKHQJLQH
PDQLSXODWLRQ´LVSRWHQWLDOO\VXIILFLHQWWRGHWHUPLQHHOHFWRUDORXWFRPHVAlongside the 
present findings, this research highlights how even seemingly trivial sampling processes 
can have important consequences for political attitudes and behaviour, and hence 
political outcomes, in the real world.  
Correspondingly, future research should examine the broader role that sampling 
processes play in political cognition and attitudes, other than in perceptions of the 
income distribution and redistributive preferences. It was suggested in Chapter 1, for 
example, that sampling processes may contribute to widespread biases in factual 
political knowledge (e.g., concerning the division of government spending, levels of 
immigration, the prevalence of benefit fraud). What role might structural (i.e., 
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environmental) availability biases play in the genesis of common misperceptions 
surrounding social, political and economic realities? HRZPLJKWSHRSOHV¶VHDUFK
strategies vis-a-vis the environment contribute to biases in political knowledge, even in 
the absence of biased processing in the mind?  
Questions of this kind require examination of how environmental structures 
interact with the sampling processes by which people acquire information from the 
external world. To paraphrase Simon (1990, p.7), the present research underscores the 
importance of considering how both ³scissor blades´, the environmental and the 
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APPENDIX I: STUDY 1A MEASURES 
The following are examples of the Study 1a social circle (a) and population distribution 
(b) estimation tasks. The social circle task example demonstrates a hypothetical 
response (in the surveys, distributions were always presented with 0% allocated 
initially). Studies 3a-4b used the same procedure, although income intervals varied as 














Perceived fairness of the income distribution was measured using the following two 
items (identical items were used in Studies 1b, 3a and 3b, although scaling varied as 
indicated in the relevant method sections): 
1. To what extent do you feel that household incomes are fairly-unfairly distributed 
across the US population (R)? 
2. How satisfied-dissatisfied are you with the way in which household incomes are 
distributed across the US population (R)? 




SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION 
Preferences for redistribution were measured using the following four items taken from 
the 1998 Gallup Poll Social Audit Survey (identical items were used in Studies 1b, 3a 
and 3b): 
1. The government should redistribute wealth through heavy taxes on the rich. 
2. The government should not make any special effort to help the poor, because 
they should help themselves (R). 
3. Money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed among a 
larger percentage of people. 
4. The fact that some people in the US are rich and others are poor is an acceptable 
part of our economic system (R). 
1 = Strongly disagree; 6 = Strongly agree 
 
POLITICAL ORIENTATION 
1. How would you describe your political attitudes? 








APPENDIX II: STUDY 1B MEASURES 






DIRECT MEAN INCOME ESTIMATES 
In Study 1b, direct estimates of mean social circle (top) and US population (bottom) 
income were measured using the following scales. Studies 3a ± 4b used the same 
procedure, although the maximum value was increased to $150,000 as indicated in the 




PERCEIVED INEQUALITY MEASURE 
Direct perceptions of social circle and population inequality were measured using the 
following two items (the same items were also used in Studies 3a ± 4b).  
1. To what extent are household incomes equally - unequally distributed across 
your social contacts (the US population)? 
2. To what extent is the difference in income between your poorest and wealthiest 
social contacts (the US population) small - large? 
1 = Very equally/small; 6 = Very unequally/large 
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SELF INTEREST IN REDISTRIBUTION 
In Study 1b, perceived self-interest in redistribution was measured using the following 
three items (the same scale was also used in studies 3a and 3b). 
1. To what extent do you personally gain or lose financially from government tax 
and welfare policies aimed at redistributing wealth from richer to poorer 
citizens? (R)  
1 = Gain strongly; 6 = Lose strongly 
2. To what extent do you feel that redistribution of wealth through tax and welfare 
is in agreement with your own financial interests? 
3. To what extent do you feel that redistribution of wealth through tax and welfare 
is financially beneficial to you personally? 
1 = Strongly disagree; 6 = Strongly agree 
 
3-ITEM POLITICAL ORIENTATION SCALE 
In Study 1b, political attitudes were assessed using the following 3-item scale. 
³How would you describe your political attitudes?´ 
1. 1 = Very liberal; 9 = Very conservative 
2. 1 = Very left-wing; 9 = Very right-wing 





APPENDIX III: STUDY 2 SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES 
Supplementary Table S1.Additional mediation analyses of the effect of income on 
alternative political attitudes via varying proxies for neighbourhood wealth levels. 
Unless specified otherwise, the analyses reported below are based on Census Area Units 
&$8¶VUDWKHUWKDQPHVKEORFNXQLWV0%8¶VDVWKHPHGLDWRUVH[DPLQHGDUHQRW
available at the finer-grained meshblock level in the NZAVS data (with the exception of 
the NZdep2006; MBU deprivation). The sample contDLQHGXQLTXH&$8¶VZLWK
3.38 participants per unit (SD = 2.35, range 1-16). The geographic size of &$8¶VGLIIHUV
depending on population density, but each unit tends to cover a region containing a 
median of roughly 1977 residents (M = 2210, SD = 1673). 
 
Mediator b SE LLCI ULCI
CAU Deprivation .009 .003 .004 .014
CAU Median Income .007 .003 .002 .013
CAU Proportion of poor relative to wealthy residents .007 .003 .002 .013
CAU Proportion of residents in reciept of state benefits .01 .003 .005 .016
MBU Deprivation
CAU Deprivation .011 .004 .004 .018
CAU Median Income .011 .004 .004 .019
CAU Proportion of poor relative to wealthy residents .009 .004 .002 .018
CAU Proportion of residents in reciept of state benefits .013 .004 .007 .022
MBU Deprivation
CAU Deprivation .01 .004 .003 .017
CAU Median Income .006 .004 -.002 .014
CAU Proportion of poor relative to wealthy residents .008 .004 .001 .016
CAU Proportion of residents in reciept of state benefits .011 .004 .005 .019
MBU Deprivation .087 .013 .064 .115
CAU Deprivation .085 .013 .062 .112
CAU Median Income .039 .011 .02 .062
CAU Proportion of poor relative to wealthy residents .048 .011 .029 .071
CAU Proportion of residents in reciept of state benefits .079 .013 .055 .107
          Outcome Variable: Vote for National Party (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
Note. All scale variables were standardised prior to analysis. Political ideology, age, gender, whether 
the respondent was born in New Zealand vs. not and whether the respondent was in paid 
employment vs. not, were included as covariates in all reported analyses.
Table S1 Study 2 indirect effects of household income 
          Outcome Variable: General System Justification
          Outcome Variable: Fairness 
          Outcome Variable: National Wellbeing Index
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APPENDIX IV: STUDY 4A AND 4B MATERIALS 
HOMOPHILY PROMPT: 
Half of all participants in Studies 4a and 4b received the following instruction. 
 ?dŚĂŶŬƐĨŽƌǇŽƵƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? Before moving on to the final phase of this 
study, please read and consider the information on this page carefully.   
A large body of research has shown that social networks are 
homophilous.  Simply put, people move in social circles of people who 
are similar to each other.  These social circles are like "bubbles" in which 
"birds of a feather flock together". 
So, for example, wealthier individuals tend to live near, and associate 
with, wealthier people. The converse is true of poorer people, who tend 
to have more contact with other relatively poor people.  
Thus, a person's social contacts are generally not representative of the 
wider society in which they live.  When you think about the people you 
know, there's a good chance that they don't represent the extremes of 
rich and poor that exist in America.  If you are relatively well-off, your 
social contacts are probably wealthier than most Americans, on 
average; if you are relatively less well-off, your social contacts probably 
tend to be poorer than most Americans.    
In the next task you will be asked to estimate how household incomes 
are distributed across America.  As you work on this task, please keep in 
mind that since "birds of a feather flock together", levels of wealth 
among the people you know are probably not representative of those 
in America.  As a result, you should try not to base your estimates on 
the people you know. ?  
 
SOCIAL CIRCLE REPRESENTATIVENESS 
In Studies 4a and 4b, perceived representativeness of social circles was 
measured using the following 5 items (items 4 and 5 were not included in the 
final scale).  
1. My social contacts' household incomes are representative of household incomes 
in the US as a whole. 
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2. My social contacts' household incomes are typical of household incomes in the 
US as a whole. 
3. With regard to household incomes, my social contacts are like a microcosm of 
the US as a whole. 
4. My social contacts tend to have incomes rather like mine, which do not reflect 
the extremes of wealth and poverty in the US. (R) 
5. In general, people tend to mix in social circles of people whose incomes are like 
theirs, rather than a representative sample of incomes across the country (R) 
1 = Strongly disagree; 6 = Strongly agree 
 
ALTERNATIVE SAMPLE RELIABILITY 
In Study 4b, perceived reliability of the alternative sample was measured 
using the following 3 items. 
1. To what extent do you feel that the sample of incomes you saw accurately 
reflects the actual distribution of household income in the US?  
2. To what extent do you feel that the sample of incomes you saw provides a 
believable representation of the actual distribution of household income in the 
US? 
3. To what extent do you feel that the sample of incomes you saw provides a 
plausible representation of the actual distribution of household income in the 
US? 
 
1 = Strongly disagree; 6 = Strongly agree 
 
